Rethinking Reliance on Eyewitness Confidence

Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 2006

Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology (Northwestern University School of Law), 1986

One of the most significant issues currently confronting the criminal justice system is the development of effective safeguards against unreliable eyewitness identification. In response to this problem, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in United States v. TelfaireI proposed a set of model instructions which trial judges may employ in focusing juror attention on the issues surrounding eyewitness testimony. Although these instructions do not describe recent psychological research that documents the numerous factors which limit the accuracy of eyewitnesses, nevertheless they highlight the reasons a juror should evaluate such testimony carefully. Judicial commentary, along with expert witness testimony and defense counsel's cross-examination, represents a potentially important safeguard against false eyewitness testimony. Since the Telfaire decision, several other courts have adopted model instructions for cases involving eyewitness testimony. Unfortunately there is no research investigating the impact of judicial cautionary instructions about eyewitness testimony. Accordingly, this Article begins to clarify the relationship between this form of judicial commentary and the process of jury decision making.

Journal of Applied Psychology, 1979

Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2010

We surveyed 164 members of the juror pool of the Court of Appeal and a representative sample of 1000 adult Norwegians without juror experience, about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of Norwegian judges. Although the judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than jurors and the general public, all groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Juror experience, in terms of number of times serving as juror, did not correlate with eyewitness knowledge. Consistent with this finding, the knowledge scores of the jurors were similar to the scores of the general public, tested with an abridged seven-item version of the questionnaire. Comparisons with the results of surveys conducted in the US, indicate similar levels of knowledge among law professionals and jurors in the two countries. Increasing the knowledge of eyewitness testimony among the principal participants in the judiciary system may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error.

This study investigated whether people's "common knowledge" is sufficient to enable them to accurately assess the validity of evidence based upon an eyewitness report. Prospective jurors were provided with descriptions of actual research studies on eyewitness identification and asked to predict the research results. A sample of registered voters, selected to represent the court's lists of prospective jury members, was presented with scenarios derived from the method sections of previously conducted empirical studies of eyewitness identification involving target-present lineups. Respondents' estimates of the hit rates in the three target-present situations were significantly greater than the actual hit rates in each of the three cases. The mean percentage of respondents who overestimated the hit rates, averaged across the three cases, was 83.7%. The results indicate that awareness of the unreliability of eyewitness evidence does not appear to be part of the "common knowledge" of prospective jury members. These data can be seen as refuting the claim made by some courts that expert testimony about eyewitness evidence would not tell the jury members anything they did not already know.

Journal of Applied Psychology, 1980

The purpose of the present research was to study the influence on jurors of expert testimony about eyewitness identification. In Experiment 1 240 students (all registered voters) acted as jurors and received evidence against a defendant in a violent or a nonviolent case. The major piece of prosecution evidence was the testimony of the eyewitness. Half of the jurors read about the testimony of a defense expert on the reliability of eyewitness identification, whereas half did not. Individual verdicts were reached. The results indicated that there were fewer convictions when expert testimony was permitted. In Experiment 2 120 students received evidence in a hypothetical violent crime and then deliberated injuries of 6 to reach a verdict for or against the defendant. Jurors who had read about the expert testimony spent much more time discussing the eyewitness account than did jurors who had not been presented with expert testimony. The results indicate that one consequence of presenting psychological expert testimony is an increase in the amount of attention that jurors give to eyewitness accounts, perhaps enhancing their scrutinization. Some pros and cons of the psychological expert testimony are discussed.

ABSTRACT: Over the past thirty years, researchers have made substantial strides in understanding the workings and limitations of human memory. However, the application of these scientific advances to eyewitness identifications in the criminal justice system, though increasing, has been limited. Trial judges in most jurisdictions exercise their discretionary powers to exclude expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identifications.

Along with anthropometry and the introduction of photographs of suspects they could catalog criminal records. I believe the ability to identify a suspect correctly with more research in an ever-evolving society is necessary as the doubt of the eye-witness’s true credibility is in question. This analysis is to determine the validity of eyewitness testimony under current practices.

Encyclopedia of Psychology and Law

Conn. L. Rev., 2009

CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW tall. Finally, he spoke. "I'm not mad at you," he said softly. "I've never been mad at you. I just want you to have a good life." Tears falling, Thompson looked into his eyes and knew she would never see him in her nightmares again. 9 This case produced several tragedies. Jennifer endured the terrible ordeal of the rape; she is still afraid sometimes, especially at night when she is alone, and she had to deal with the guilt of convicting the wrong man. Ronald Cotton was imprisoned for eleven agonizing years for crimes he did not commit. Additional crimes could have been prevented if Bobby Poole had been arrested earlier. The prosecutor, police, defense attorneys, jurors, and judges have to live with the knowledge that they are responsible for sending an innocent man to prison for eleven years. This case illustrates both the power and the danger of erroneous eyewitness testimony. 10 Each year, thousands of men and women in the United States are wrongfully convicted of felonies that they did not commit." t Experts estimate that eyewitness error plays a role in half or more of all wrongful felony convictions. 1 2 A study published in 2006 showed that eyewitness 9 O'Neill, supra note 1. Jennifer Thompson and Ronald Cotton became good friends. She said of Ronald Cotton, "He is an amazing human being. He has been a real good teacher for me." Id Jennifer Thompson has become a strong opponent of the death penalty and frequently speaks about the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. Id.

Psychonomic bulletin & review, 2009

It is well known that the frailties of human memory and vulnerability to suggestion lead to eyewitness identification errors. However, variations in different aspects of the eyewitnessing conditions produce different kinds of errors that are related to wrongful convictions in very different ways. We present a review of the eyewitness identification literature, organized around underlying cognitive mechanisms, memory, similarity, and decision processes, assessing the effects on both correct and mistaken identification. In addition, we calculate a conditional probability we call innocence risk, which is the probability that the suspect is innocent, given that the suspect was identified. Assessment of innocence risk is critical to the theoretical development of eyewitness identification research, as well as to legal decision making and policy evaluation. Our review shows a complex relationship between misidentification and innocence risk, sheds light on some areas of controversy, and s...

Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2016

A substantial corpus of social science research has revealed that the Manson v. Brathwaite, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision controlling the admission of eyewitness identification evidence, is seriously flawed. Yet courts have historically ignored this research. In recent years several courts' consideration of the research has led to a rejection of Manson. These decisions offer hope for scientifically-informed judicial decision making in the area of eyewitness identification.

Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 2012

To significantly reduce eyewitness error, law officers must do the following: (a) identify the relevant eyewitness factors at the crime scene and determine how they likely affected eyewitness accuracy; (b) apply scientific procedures to eyewitness interviews; and (c) use scientific procedures for identification procedures. Research shows, however, that most U.S. law officers have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors and fail to follow proper procedures for eyewitness interviews and identification procedures. By following the recommended procedures delineated in this article, law officers will be able to substantially reduce wrongful convictions from eyewitness error and significantly strengthen the state's evidence in criminal cases.

Understanding Criminal Investigation, 2010

Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2015

Mistaken identification testimony by highly confident eyewitnesses has been involved in approximately 72% of the cases in which innocent people have been convicted and later exonerated by DNA testing. Lab studies of eyewitness identification, however, show that mistaken eyewitnesses are usually not highly confident and that there is a useful confidence-accuracy relation that can help distinguish accurate from mistaken eyewitnesses. We describe research on important variables that can cause mistaken eyewitnesses to give inflated self-reports about their confidence and other testimony-relevant judgments. These testimony-bolstering variables tend to be controlled in pristine experiments, thereby permitting good confidence-accuracy relations. In the real world, however, methods of obtaining identifications and supporting testimony permit testimony-bolstering variables to contaminate witness self-reports in ways that make it difficult to distinguish between accurate and mistaken eyewitness identification testimony. We describe how the justice system can dramatically reduce the chances of such contamination.