Philosophy of Psychology

Social entities only exist in virtue of collective acceptance or recognition, or acknowledgement by two or more individuals in the context of joint activities. Joint activities are made possible by the coordination of plans for action, and the coordination of plans for action is made possible by the capacity for collective intentionality. This paper investigates how primitive is the capacity that nonhuman animals have to create social entities, by individuating how primitive is the capacity for collective intentionality. I present a novel argument for the evolutionary primitiveness of social entities, by showing that the collective intentions upon which these social entities are created and shared are metaphysically reducible to the relevant individual intentions.

Neither neuroscientist nor philosopher has adequately explained how the behavior of neurons can give rise to consciousnesss.. . The explanatory gap has never been bridged. And the inescapable reason is this: a neural state is not a mental state.

Recuperando el marco esbozado en un análisis anterior, el presente trabajo describe una propuesta de enseñanza de sistemas psicológicos a partir de parámetros de análisis meta-teórico y de modelos meta-científicos concretos, con el objeto de resituar los cursos de sistemas psicológicos en la sistematología como parte del subsistema de la epistemología de la psicología. Se describen tres cuestiones centrales para la sistematología en la formación de psicólogos: la importancia del trabajo sobre fuentes primarias a partir de recursos pedagógicos específicos para el desarrollo de competencias y actitudes científicas, la necesidad de disponer de uno (o varios) conjuntos de parámetros fijos para analizar comparativamente los sistemas teóricos, y los problemas, criterios y opciones al momento de contextualizar dicho análisis meta-teórico comparativo en modelos meta-científicos comprehensivos pertenecientes a la filosofía de la ciencia y de la psicología. Se concluye sobre la necesidad de t...

Im vorliegenden Band „Zur Zukunft der Bereichsethiken – Herausforderungen durch die Okonomisierung der Welt“ werden Ansatze und Beispiele behandelt, diese Herausforderungen anzugehen und damit auch einen Beitrag zur Zukunft der Bereichsethiken zu leisten. Themen sind u.a.: zur Zukunft der Technik-, Wirtschafts- und Wissenschaftsethik, die Okonomisierung der gesellschaftlichen und Sozialen Arbeit, der Medien, der personlichen Beziehungen, der Wasserversorgung, im Gesundheitswesen sowie im Sport.

Abstract
What is involved in understanding the concept of remembering? According to the Causal
Theory, the most popular analysis of remembering in philosophy, someone can be said to
remember if and only if (1) the remembered event occurred (Factivity), (2) one has had
personal experience of the event (Prior Experience), and (3) there exists an appropriate causal
connection between one’s current memory and one’s prior experience of the event
(Causality). We tested whether this way of understanding remembering is shared by native
English speakers more widely (Experiment 1) and by native speakers of nine other languages
around the world (Experiment 2). We asked participants to judge (a) what beliefs are entailed
by someone’s subjective judgment of remembering, and (b) what conditions have to hold for
someone to “actually” remember. Our results suggest that the folk concept of remembering
across our samples largely falls in line with the analysis provided by the Causal Theory,
while also showing significant cross-linguistic variation. These results have implications for
how we should think about the scientific and philosophical objects of memory research as
well as for the question of whether “remembering” and its translations express a culturally
universal concept.
Keywords: Remembering, Episodic Memory, Experimental Philosophy, Folk Concepts

In this paper, we present an experiment that shows conflicting findings from truth-value judgments and eye-tracking data for testing reference assignment of proper names. We argue that if eye-tracking is a more reliable method than truth-value judgment tasks, then our eye-tracking data provide stronger empirical support for Kripke’s causal-historical theory of reference for proper names. We also argue that eye-tracking and truth-value judgments cannot both be reliable techniques for resolving the debate. If they were, they should yield convergent results. Instead, we find that the truth-value judgment data align with the descriptivist prediction, while the eye-tracking results conform to the Kripkean pattern.

La tesis de la continuidad entre el romanticismo y el pensamiento posmoderno se ha transformado en un lugar común. Se fundamenta en que ambos tendrían el denominador común del irracionalismo, contrapuesto a la racionalidad propia de la Ilustración. El debate
acerca de la posmodernidad es, al mismo tiempo, una discusión acerca de la esencia de la Ilustración. Considerar, en este contexto, la cuestión filosófica del amor, y su relación con el concepto de persona, puede aportar datos importantes a este análisis. Se propone en estas
líneas que la dialéctica eros-ágape, presente de distinta forma tanto en el iluminismo como en el romanticismo, es notoria también en el pensamiento posmoderno. Esta dialéctica sería un aspecto particular de otra, más amplia, que explicaría la continuidad en la diferencia entre
la ilustración, el romanticismo y la posmodernidad. Por otro lado, se sostiene que esta mirada sobre la posmodernidad puede aportar una serie de claves para interpretar algunos fenómenos actuales.

This is my perception of the world as we know it today from the individual level to the world level. It is an opinionated piece though based on my classes that I've taken in my short time at college. Please engage with it, share and discuss it if you find it interesting.

Steve Stich used to be an eliminativist. As far as I can tell, he renounced eliminativism about the time that he moved from the west to the east pole.1 Stich was right to reject eliminativism, though I am not convinced that he rejected it for the right reasons. Stich 1983 contains a comprehensive attack on representational content, a central feature of both folk psychology and the Representational Theory of Mind, the leading philo-sophical construal of scientific psychology. Stich’s current position on the role of content in psychological explanation is not entirely clear. One of my aims in this chapter is simply to invite Stich to clarify his views on representational content; the question that forms the title of this chapter is therefore addressed directly to Stich. I begin by sketch-ing his original anti-content argument. I then trace some later developments in his thinking about content. I argue that content does play an important role in scientific psy-chology, for precisely th...

Locus of Control (LOC) refers to people's beliefs concerning personal control, which is viewed as a continuum ranging from internality to externality. Internal LOC consists in an internal attribution of control over life events whereas external LOC implicates relying on others or chance. Control beliefs are involved in setting expectancies toward outcomes in many contexts, including mental health. In this review, we explore the complex interplay between mental health disorders and LOC orientation. LOC orientation is crucial in the development and clinical course of anxiety, mood and psychotic disorders. Treatment seeking and adherence to therapies have been related to LOC orientation. Moreover, LOC has been implicated in shaping posttraumatic responses. Although evidence are still scarce, LOC seems to have a role in determining mental health of migrants and minorities.

Given the pervasive presence of stereotypes' negative effects, there is a widely shared view according to which almost all stereotypes are harmful. However, some scholars have claimed that we should distinguish between stereotypes: those with and those without statistical support. In her book, Katherine Puddifoot claims that the statistical criterion falls short of what we need to develop a full theory of the epistemology of stereotyping, so she advocates for a Multifactorial view. While I share Puddifoot's discomfort with the accuracy criterion, in these comments I will put forward some critical considerations. Firstly, I will introduce a methodological concern regarding the discussion about the normative versus nonnormative conception of stereotypes. Secondly, I will introduce some doubts about the extent to which the additional factors pointed out by Puddifoot's Multifactor view, are actually a challenge to the accuracy criterion. Thirdly, I will also critically comment on the argument that not having stereotypes or having egalitarian stereotypes that do not reflect some aspect of social reality improves our chances of attaining certain epistemic ends regarding the perceptions of individuals. Finally, I will briefly introduce a further factor of deception: the normativity of stereotypes, which is not considered within Puddifoot's proposal.

Cet article décrit ls recherches de Mach sur le sens du temps, le contexte dans lequel elles prennent place au début des années 1860, les discussions qui ont lieu sur les problèmes de la psychophysiologie, principalement autour de Fechner, ainsi que les prolongements philosophiques des recherches de Mach sur les relations entre temps physique et temps psychologique, aboutissant à des idées particulières sur la nature du temps. 1. « J'ai pris le problème de la perception comme étant psychologique, ai recherché les processus psychiques élémentaires en analysant les événements perceptifs dont ils sont issus, mais je ne les ai pas étudiés à l'aide de spéculations métaphysiques, mais avec la méthode expérimentale du physiologiste » [Wundt 1862, IV-V].

April is the cruelest month, breeding Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing Memory and desire, stirring Dull roots with spring rain. T.S. Eliot (1922), The Waste Land 1 Este libro se propone analizar de manera interdisciplinaria -aunque teniendo como hilo conductor a la argumentación filosófica-el autoconocimiento y la libertad, la manera como estos fenómenos se relacionan entre sí y los efectos que sus respectivas ampliaciones tienen en la vida humana. Se trata, pues, de una investigación que aborda temas centrales de la filosofía desde distintas perspectivas y tomando en consideración la evidencia empírica procedente de diversas disciplinas. Si la filosofía actual quiere decir algo relevante sobre la realidad y acerca de nuestro conocimiento de ella, es inevitable que tome en consideración las

É com grande satisfação que publicamos o presente número da Revista doispontos, "Hegel, Marx e a Contemporaneidade". Este número foi construído a partir do evento "I Colóquio Hegel, Marx e a Contemporaneidade", ocorrido entre os dias 26 e 28 de setembro de 2023 em Curitiba, em um trabalho colaborativo entre a Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) e a Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná (PUCPR). A comissão organizadora do evento, a mesma que organiza este número, foi composta Cassiana Lopes Stephan (UFPR), César Candiotto (PUCPR), Daniel Verginelli Galantin (PUCPR), Maria Cristina Longo (UFES) e Polyana Tidre (UFPR). Os objetivos desta publicação -os mesmos do evento -consistem na promoção de um intercâmbio científico-filosófico no âmbito das pesquisas sobre Hegel e hegelianismo(s), Marx e marxismo(s), e filosofias contemporâneas como a Teoria Crítica, Filosofias Pós-Estruturalistas e Filosofias da Diferença. Além de termos por fio condutor a questão acerca da proximidade e distância entre essas tradições, damos ênfase -nas tentativas de atualização, de reabilitação crítica, ou mesmo de subversão de Hegel e Marx -a categorias como "diferença", "alteridade" ou "negatividade". Através dessas categorias, filósofos/as como Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Axel Honneth, Frank Ruda, Susan Buck-Morss, Vladimir Safatle, para citar alguns, têm buscado atualizar o pensamento de Hegel sem, no entanto, deixar de apontar seus limites. Assim, interpretações contemporâneas da teoria hegeliana do reconhecimento e da relação dialética senhor-escravo, do diagnóstico de Hegel das contradições da sociedade civil-burguesa e da noção de populaça, ou, ainda, de noções como liberdade e trabalho são, ao mesmo tempo, acompanhadas de questões acerca de possíveis déficits dos ideais modernos defendidos pelo filósofo.

Attention makes things look brighter and more colorful. In light of these effects, representationalist philosophers propose that attentive experiences represent more determinate color properties than inattentive experiences. Although this claim is appealing, we argue that it does not hold for one of our best conceptualizations of content determinacy, according to which an experience has more determinate contents if it represents a narrower range of values within the relevant dimension. We argue that our current empirical evidence fails to show that attention has this kind of effect on color perception. We then offer an alternative, representationalist-friendly account of the attentional effects, as changes in vividness.

Bir çocuğun doğumu tüm aile sistemi içindeki bireyler için dönüm noktası olmakla birlikte ailelerin en temel beklentisi ise sağlıklı bir çocuğa sahip olmaktır. Derecesi ve tanısı ne olursa olsun çocuğun özel gereksinimli olduğunu öğrenmek, ailedeki tüm dinamikleri etkileyen travmatik bir süreç olarak kabul edilmektedir. Aile üyelerinin duyguları, düşünceleri, davranışları ve yaşam alanlarının tümü çocuğun tanı almasıyla olumsuz etkilenebilmektedir. Özel gereksinimli çocuğu olan ebeveynlerin psikolojik iyi oluşları ile bakım verme yükleri arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemek amacıyla gerçekleştiren bu araştırmada; iki ya da daha fazla değişken arasındaki ilişkiyi inceleyen, nicel araştırma türünde, tanımlayıcı ve kesitsel tarama modeli kullanılmıştır. Araştırma örneklemini özel gereksinimli çocuğu olan %15,6’sı (21) erkek ve %84,4’ü (114) kadın olan 135 ebeveyn oluşturmaktadır. Katılımcılara Bilgilendirilmiş Gönüllü Onam Formu, Sosyodemografik Bilgi Formu, Psikolojik iyi olma ölçekleri (Pİ...

The thinking and rethinking of the sciences, in terms of their fields, has generated different positions in the future. Levi-Strauss ventures into the 1960s on the position of the human sciences in scientific discourse in favor of their episteme. Two phases are considered in the present analysis, a formal one that seeks to show the structure of the text based on classical rhetoric and then, the understanding of the proposed postulates, where it is concluded that the author differentiates between the ends of the human and social sciences, and in turn between these and the exact and natural sciences, in addition to exposing how structuralism is an axis that allows consolidation by opposites, often leading to appear subdisciplines, which in the end will allow the assembly that will make them indissoluble and indistinguishable

CHAPTER FOUR Beyond the philosophy of the (unconscious) mind: the Freudian cornerstone as scientific theory, a cult, and a way of talking Vesa Talvitie CHAPTER FIVE Unconscious knowing: psychoanalytic evidence in support of a radical epistemic view Linda A. W. Brakel CHAPTER SIX In defence of unconscious mentality Simon Boag REFERENCES INDEX

In psychoanalysis, it is commonly thought that ideas (desires, fears, etc.) may be repressed, and that they can be made conscious. In this article, we shall apply cognitive viewpoints and assert that ideas do not exist in the unconscious as ‘ready made’, and thus repressed ideas cannot be ‘brought’ into consciousness. We suggest that the contents of consciousness are formed by processes on four levels: (1) unconscious brain processes, (2) the level of consciousness, (3) the level of self‐consciousness, and (4) the level of narrative self‐consciousness. From this point of view, the absence (or repression) of certain contents appears to be due to the missing of processes on Levels 1 – 4. Consequently, repressed contents appear in consciousness when appropriate processes take place. When studied in terms of our four‐level model, repression may be treated as part of the study of the self. By applying the viewpoint of the self to the phenomenon of repression, the danger of the homunculus...

In this paper, the author discusses the concept of »immediate experience« and its meaning for Adlerian Psychology. With reference to Daniel Stern's (2005) concept of »Now Moments« and Michel Henry's (1992) Phenomenology of Life«, the author suggests that Adler's »Social Interest« and his »Striving for Completion« can be understood as expressions of immediate experience. Furthermore, the authors touches on the question of what it really is that is mutative in therapeutic treatment.

Exploring the Masonic approach to consciousness reveals a sophisticated dual-processing framework that parallels contemporary cognitive theories (Kahneman, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). This paper examines how Masonic traditions integrated rational and intuitive modes of understanding, creating what could be termed an early model of parallel cognitive processing. Through analysing their methodologies and symbolic systems, we uncover insights relevant to contemporary discussions in consciousness studies (Dehaene, 2014), cognitive science, and human development. The analysis reveals striking parallels between Masonic practices and modern dual-process theories of reasoning and decisionmaking.

Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three times, 6–8 days apart. In addition to investigating the stability of our participants’ ratings over time, we also explored some potential explanations for instability. To end, we will discuss these and other potential psychological sources of moral stability (or instability) and highlight possible philosophical implications of our findings.

In this introduction we present the orthodox account of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), a number of worries for this account, and some potential responses open to its proponents. With some problems still remaining, we then introduce the problems presented by the phenomenon of thought insertion, in particular the question of how different it is supposed to be from AVHs. We then mention two ways in which theorists have adopted different approaches to voices and thoughts in psychosis, and then present the motivation and composition of this special issue.

I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox Bbottom-up^aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and potentially more plausible accounts of these three cases. I reflect on how this mental files approach can be viewed either as a supplement to the orthodox aetiology, or as suggesting an altogether different aetiology. I end by addressing a concern surrounding the explanatory power of mental files.

Marcus's view of belief is applied to the debate that centers on the question, "Are delusions beliefs?" Two consequences of this are that i) the question, "Are delusions beliefs?" needs rephrasing and ii) the answer is, "No, some delusional patients do not believe what they prima facie seem to believe".

Verbal hallucinations are often associated with pronounced feelings of anxiety, and it has also been suggested that anxiety somehow triggers them. In this paper, we offer a phenomenological or 'personal-level' account of how it does so. We show how anxious anticipation of one's own thought contents can generate an experience of their being 'alien'. It does so by making an experience of thinking more like one of perceiving, resulting in an unfamiliar kind of intentional state. This accounts for a substantial subset of verbal hallucinations, which are experienced as falling within one's psychological boundaries and lacking in auditory qualities.

In this introduction we present the orthodox account of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), a number of worries for this account, and some potential responses open to its proponents. With some problems still remaining, we then introduce the problems presented by the phenomenon of thought insertion, in particular the question of how different it is supposed to be from AVHs. We then mention two ways in which theorists have adopted different approaches to voices and thoughts in psychosis, and then present the motivation and composition of this special issue.

A recent debate in the literature on delusions centers on the question of whether delusions are beliefs or not. In this paper, an overlooked distinction between egocentric and encyclopedic doxastic states is introduced and brought to bear on this debate, in particular with regard to delusions of misidentification. The result is that a more accurate characterization of the delusional subject's doxastic point of view is made available. The patient has a genuine egocentric belief ("This man is not my father"), but fails to have the commonly attributed encyclopedic belief ("My father has been replaced by an impostor"). The Capgras delusion is often described as the delusion that "a loved one has been replaced by an impostor". 1 Along with a number of other delusions (e.g. the Frégoli delusion, mirrored selfmisidentification), it is classified as a delusion of misidentification, which is to say that the subject fails to correctly identify someone or something that one would expect them to correctly identify. In the case of the Capgras delusion, the subject's perceptual system seems to be working fine: she is not blind, or agnosic, and makes accurate judgments concerning what things and people look like. And yet, in the presence of, say, her father, the Capgras patient will say, "That man is not my father; he looks exactly like my father, but isn't him." Some theorists have claimed that delusions generally (Currie 2000), and the Capgras delusion in particular (Currie and Jureidini 2001), are not really beliefs. In this paper, I want to re-examine this claim in the light of a distinction between egocentric and encyclopedic doxastic states. Following Bayne and Pacherie (2005), let's call the view that delusions are beliefs, doxasticism, and the view that they are not beliefs, anti-doxasticism. My aim is not to conclusively criticize either view, but rather to introduce something that seems to have been overlooked in the debate, and which warrants consideration. In the light of this, one may argue that the Capgras patient believes the egocentric proposition, "This man is not my father", but fails to believe the encyclopedic proposition, which is commonly attributed to the Capgras patient, "A certain man, my father, has been replaced by an impostor". The anti-doxasticists are right that the belief commonly attributed to Capgras patients (e.g. 1 I use "often described" because we shall see that that ascription is not altogether optimal.

I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox Bbottom-up^aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and potentially more plausible accounts of these three cases. I reflect on how this mental files approach can be viewed either as a supplement to the orthodox aetiology, or as suggesting an altogether different aetiology. I end by addressing a concern surrounding the explanatory power of mental files.

Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to motor representations over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage to interface in producing action? The question has seemed puzzling, because each state is thought to be formatted differently: Intention has propositional format, whereas the format of motor representation is motoric. My primary goal here is to defend a novel and attractive (dis)solution to the interface problem. I do so by connecting it with a rather different discussion about the format of intention, instigated by a minority of philosophers who reject the idea that intention should be construed as a propositional attitude. As I explain, the most compelling reason to accept the heterodox non-propositional conception of intention actually holds the key also to explaining away the interface problem. In so doing, the heterodox conception itself gains further credibility.

Bu çalışmada üniversite gençliğinin din ve Tanrı’ya olan inanç ya da inançsızlığı, dindarlık
düzeyleri, yoğa, meditasyon, reiki gibi uygulamalara olan bakış açıları, spiritüel iyi oluş ve
hedonizm düzeyleri ve bu düzeylerin çeşitli sosyal değişkenlere göre farklılık gösterip
göstermediği ele alınmaktadır. Üniversite gençlerinde spiritüel inançlara olan eğilimin artış
gösterdiği, spiritüel iyi oluşun hedonizmi sınırlandırdığı ve ateizm ve deizm inancının
yükseliş gösterdiği bu çalışmanın temel iddialarıdır. Günümüz modern toplumlarda görülen
sekülerleşme, sübjektivizm, kayıtsızlık, aşınmışlık, bireycilik, hazcılık, küreselleşme,
çoğulculuk ve hızlı değişim üniversite gençlerini doğrudan etkilemektedir. Yeniçağda genç
birey iki uç noktada: anlam ve haz arasında kendisine yeni kimlikler ve inançlar bulmaya
çalışmaktadır. Genç birey tarafından modernliğin getirdiği bireysellik, hazcılık, mutluluk
gibi olgular ile dinden uzaklaşmanın yarattığı boşluk doldurulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Modern
toplumda genç birey hazları ile anlam arayışları arasındadır. Çalışma bu haz ve anlam
arayışı spiritüel iyi oluş hali ve hedonizm kavramları ile ele almaktadır. Literatürde, spiritüel
iyi olma hali ve hedonizm ilişkisini gençler üzerinden irdeleyen çalışmaların eksikliği göze
çarpmaktadır. Yapılan çalışmalar daha çok mutluluk ve spiritüel iyi oluş ilişkisini ele almakta
ve mutlu olmak amacıyla bireylerin spiritüel inançlara eğilim gösterdiğini iddia etmektedir.
Bu anlamda bu çalışma, günümüz haz ve hız gençliğinin, spiritiüel iyi oluşu ve hedonizmi
arasındaki ilişkiyi ele alma açısından literatürde var olan boşluğu doldurmayı hedeflemekte
ve anlam ve haz arasında gençlerin konumlandıkları noktayı keşfetmeyi amaçlamaktadır.
Spiritüellik, bireyin hayat yolunu ve amacını bulmasında etkili olan, bireyi doğa veya
Tanrıya, enerji gibi güçlere yaklaştıran, onu anomi ve belirsizlikten uzaklaştıran, psikolojik
anlamda duygusal, inançsal anlamda ahlaki iyi oluş halidir. Hedonizm ise bireyin yapacağı
seçimlerde kendisine en fazla haz veren olguyu seçmesi, bireyselliğin, mutluluğun,
maddiyatın ön planda toplumsal ve dinî olanın geri planda olduğu haldir. Çalışmada
spiritüel iyi oluş durumu Ekşi ve Kardaş tarafından geliştirilen Spiritüel İyi Oluş Ölçeği ile;
hedonizm düzeyi ise Şengül ve Aydınalp tarafından geliştirilen Hedonizm ölçeği ile
ölçülmüştür. Araştırma modeli dokümantasyon ve tarama olmak üzere iki farklı metotla
tasarlanmış ve nicel araştırma metoduna ait anket tekniğinden yararlanılmıştır. Araştırmaya
katılanların spiritüel iyi oluş düzeyleri ve hedonizm ortalamaları ile cinsiyet, ekonomik
düzey ve dinî durum faktörleri arasında nasıl bir ilişkinin olduğu saptanmaya çalışılmıştır.
Çalışmada kartopu ve kolayda örnekleme teknikleri bir arada kullanılmış ve toplam 425
üniversite öğrencisine çalışma yüz yüze ve telefon aracılığıyla 1.04.2024-15.05.2024 tarihleri
arasında uygulanmıştır. Eksik ya da hatalı anketlerin elenmesiyle analizler 386 üniversite
öğrencisi üzerinden gerçekleştirilmiştir. Verilerin analizinde SPSS programından
yararlanılmıştır. Araştırmanın sonucunda üniversite öğrencilerinin dinî tutum düzeylerinin
düşmeye başladığı, deizm ve ateizm eğilimlerinin yükseldiği, üniversite gençliğinin
%72,3’ünün yoga, meditasyon, reiki gibi spiritüel pratiklere karşı olumlu tutum sergilediği,
spiritüel iyi oluş halinin orta düzeyde olduğu, kadınların, dindarların ve ekonomik düzeyi
orta ve düşük olanların spiritüel iyi oluş düzeyinin daha yüksek olduğu, hedonizm
düzeyinin orta üstü olduğu, kadınların, ekonomik düzeyi yüksek olanların ve dinden uzak
olanların hedonizm düzeyinin daha yüksek olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Çalışmada hedonizm ile
spiritüel iyi oluş arasında negatif yönlü ve düşük düzeyli bir ilişkinin var olduğu
saptanmıştır. Sonuç olarak üniversite gençlerinde spiritüel iyi oluş halinin hedonizmi
sınırlandırdığını söylemek mümkündür.

In questo lavoro ci si propone, partendo da alcune tesi sostenute da studiosi di media e intermedialità, di tentarne un'analisi, cercare di capirne e approfondirne i presupposti, nonché di approfondire gli aspetti critici che queste sembrano presentare, partendo da una obiezione fondamentale e preliminare che riguarda la legittimità di utilizzare il concetto di cambiamento per negare la possibilità di concepire e criticare gli effetti delle nuove tecnologie. Possiamo ritenere che il disagio che si prova davanti a questi “cambiamenti” sia dovuto al fatto di appartenere ad una literacy moderna, gutemberghiana, ossia legata allo scritto e al libro, ma forse non si tratta solo di questo. La sola descrizione dei fenomeni non basta e dichiarare il cambiamento dell'esperienza non aiuta ad affrontare alcune questioni. É possibile concepire un essere tecnologico sovrumano, pensare o immaginare la sua forma di intelligenza connettiva, ma rimane una domanda disattesa: che ne sarà di no...

MODERNA * EN ESTE ARTÍCULO quiero examinar los trabajos r~cientes (desde 1959 hasta la actualidad) sobre dos áreas de problemas c~ntrales en la ontología: (1) problemas acerca de la existencia y naturaleza de los universales, y (2) problemas acerca de la estructura e individuación de los particulares. Un estudio de este tipo pueda intentar resaltar una visión amplia o en detalle; se puede trabajar de un modo general con un amplio número de artículos y libros o se pueden seleccionar ciertos escritos importantes y discutirlos con mayor amplitud. Ambos enfoques tienen sus ventajas e inconvenientes. En este trabajo trataré de acentuar el detalle. Para compensar esta carencia de amplitud he completado el estudio con un número casi completo de notas a pie de página en las que cito los escritos que no examino en el cuerpo del artículo. No hay duda de que algunos habrían preferido una bibliografía comprehensiva; pero, aunque provechosas, las bibliografías tienen frecuentemente el efecto de confundir al lector. La dificultad estriba en que los títulos, por sí mismos, no logran dar una información suficiente acerca del contenido de un artículo o libro. 1 Al relacionarlos con las afirmaciones hechas en le estudio mismo he intentado * Este artículo apareció originalmente en American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 9 (1972), n. 2, págs. 119-138, cuyo director, Profesor Nicholas Rescher, ha cedido amablemente a Teorema los derechos para la presente versión castellana. 1 Para bibliografía sobre las cuestiones abarcad as por .este estudio, ver Guido Küng, Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language, trad. al inglés por E. Mays (Dorcrecht, Holland, 1967) y también Michael Loux (ed.), Universals and Particulars (New Y<>rk, ] 970).

Powers have, in recent years, become a central component of many philosophers' ontology of properties. While I have argued that powers exist at the fundamental level of properties, many other theorists of powers hold that there are non-fundamental powers also. In this paper I articulate my reasons for being sceptical about the existing reasons for holding that there are non-fundamental powers. However, I also want to promote a different argument for the existence of a certain class of non-fundamental powers: properties whose existence and nature have natural selection to thank. Such properties will include functional properties of organisms and so may include their mental properties also.

Dotičući se nekih aspekata i elemenata koji čine civilizaciju
te koristeći se relevantnim izvorima, rad ukazuje na to da je
tesavvuf ostavio veliki utisak na islamsku civlizaciju, te da je
nezabilazan elemenat među onim elementima koji su vijekovima
oblikovali islamsku civlizaciju i doprinijeli da ona bude onakvom
kakvom je danas poznajemo. Ekonomija, politika, nauka i
umjetnost, koje nazivamo materijalnim elementima koji čine
civilizacije, svoje vrijednosti crpe iz religije na kojoj se zasniva te
njenih duhovnih i moralnih vrijednosti. Tesavvuf, kao škola
duhovnosti i morala, dobrano je utjecala na oblikovanje islamske
civilizacije. Futuvvet i ahije, odnosno cehovi, koji su bili i
sljedbenici tesavvufskih škola, tarikata, utjecali su na ekonomiju
kroz svoje bavljenje zanatima i trgovinom, a što se ne ističe često.
Sufije su, iako se ni o tome također ne govori puno u literaturi
b/h/s/c. jezičkog areala, dobrano učestvovali u vojnama i na taj
način uzeli učešća u društevnom i političkom životu. Također su
doprinijeli svojim lijepim ophođenjem da mnogi narodi prihvate
islam, a kao što je slučaj sa narodima Malajskog arhipelaga, centralne Azije i supsaharske Afrike. Ukoliko se vratimo u XVIII I XIX vijek, period u kojem su se postavljali temelji za obnovu i
reformu, uočit ćemo da su mnogi pokreti za obnovu i oslobađanje
muslimanskih zemalja od kolonijalističkih sila bili zapravo pokreti
koje su osnovali sufije. Doprinos tesavvufa islamskoj civilizaciji je
značajan i vrijedan naučne pažnje.
Ključne riječi: tesavvuf, civilizacija, kultura, islam, ahije, futuvvet