Philosophy of Cognitive Science

What is conscience? Starting from this unsolved and millenal question-upon which science and philosophy still debate-in dialogue with some passages of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, we propose to detect the stakes involved in this enigma. We will try to reinforce the importance that the theorization of a new ontological project assumes under an scientific stalemate, which has its center in the inalienable presence of embodied subject in the world. It's also about facing a question about an ethical issue: in front of scenarios where community life and sociability are confined in meta-real dimensions, amended by pain and death, emerges the urgency to reconsider the living as being immersed in the world, with sense and meaning only in relation to the natural environment and to the other one.

What cognitive process allows a spectator to experience shock and surprise at a character's actions, yet, a moment later, to decide that the actions presented onstage are coherent and understandable? Drawing upon theories of mindreading and conceptual blending, i offer a dynamic model of character that accounts for surprise, ambiguity, and dramatic shifts of understanding. Subtle changes to one's perceptions, empathic imagination, and social knowledge-the sort of changes that accumulate throughout the viewing of Shakespeare's Twelfth Night-can alter one's understanding of a character in unexpected ways. oRSiNo: i'll sacrifice the lamb that i do love to spite a raven's heart within a dove. vioLA: And i, most jocund, apt, and willingly, to do you rest a thousand deaths would die. -Shakespeare, Twelfth Night (5.1.126-29) 1 o rsino's threat to "sacrifice" his servant viola/Cesario is one of the most shocking moments in Shakespeare's Twelfth Night, a play filled with reversals of gender, social status, and genre expectations. up until this final scene, orsino has been the stereotypical Petrarchan lover, embracing the hyperbole of his affection and the hopelessness of

The concept of embodied cognition (EC) is not a settled one. A variety of theorists have attempted to outline different approaches and meanings related to this concept. They range from radical embodiment to minimal embodiment, and a number of positions in between. In addition, a variety of approaches to the study of cognition have been closely associated with the notion of embodiment -including enactive, embedded, and extended or distributed cognition approaches. Within these different perspectives there is no strong consensus on what weight to give to the concept of embodiment. Moreover, contrary to what some may think, not all EC approaches share a common opposition to the classical computational model of cognition. In this chapter I want to map out the landscape of these various senses of embodied cognition.

This paper explores the implications of the Extended Mind Hypothesis (ExM), as introduced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in 1998. Focusing on cognitive integration and the Trust and Glue criteria, we have two objectives. First, we examine how ExM reshapes perspectives on human-AI interaction, particularly by challenging the Standard model of AI. We argue that AI, as an active non-organic agent, significantly influences cognitive processes beyond initial expectations. Secondly, we propose the maintainability as a fourth criterion in the Trust and Glue criteria of ExM, in addition to trustworthiness, reliability and accessibility. This addition aims to evaluate parity in coupled systems comprehensively addressing concerns about control in human-AI interactions. We highlight the risks posed by AI's understanding of human psychology, which may lead to unintended shifts in our objectives and choices. Our analysis concludes that maintainability serves as a critical safeguard against the evolving challenges of human-AI integration.

Synesthesia is an unusual condition in which stimulation of one modality evokes sensation or experience in another modality. Although discussed in the literature well over a century ago, synesthesia slipped out of the scientific spotlight for decades because of the difficulty in verifying and quantifying private perceptual experiences. In recent years, the study of synesthesia has enjoyed a renaissance due to the introduction of tests that demonstrate the reality of the condition, its automatic and involuntary nature, and its measurable perceptual consequences. However, while several research groups now study synesthesia, there is no single protocol for comparing, contrasting and pooling synesthetic subjects across these groups. There is no standard battery of tests, no quantifiable scoring system, and no standard phrasing of questions. Additionally, the tests that exist offer no means for data comparison. To remedy this deficit we have devised the Synesthesia Battery. This unified collection of tests is freely accessible online (). It consists of a questionnaire and several online software programs, and test results are immediately available for use by synesthetes and invited researchers. Performance on the tests is quantified with a standard scoring system. We introduce several novel tests here, and offer the software for running the tests. By presenting standardized procedures for testing and comparing subjects, this endeavor hopes to speed scientific progress in synesthesia research.

This paper explores the implications of the Extended Mind Hypothesis (ExM), as introduced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in 1998. Focusing on cognitive integration and the Trust and Glue criteria, we have two objectives. First, we examine how ExM reshapes perspectives on human-AI interaction, particularly by challenging the Standard model of AI. We argue that AI, as an active non-organic agent, significantly influences cognitive processes beyond initial expectations. Secondly, we propose the maintainability as a fourth criterion in the Trust and Glue criteria of ExM, in addition to trustworthiness, reliability and accessibility. This addition aims to evaluate parity in coupled systems comprehensively addressing concerns about control in human-AI interactions. We highlight the risks posed by AI's understanding of human psychology, which may lead to unintended shifts in our objectives and choices. Our analysis concludes that maintainability serves as a critical safeguard against the evolving challenges of human-AI integration.

The E-turn refers to the rise of E-conceptions of cognition which have been articulated and advanced in recent decades in different shapes, forms, and guises. This paper seeks to progress our thinking about what the E-Turn entails when it comes to rethinking educational theory and practice. It focuses on a contest that exists between two philosophical rivals: the most conservative variant of E-cognition and its most radical challenger. These opposing accounts offer fundamentally incompatible ways of understanding cognition. Focusing on basic mathematical cognition and the mastery of mathematical competence, reasons are given for favoring radical enactivism over its classical cognitivist contenders. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how we might expand and revolutionize our thinking about pedagogical practice if we adopt the radical enactivist framework.

This article was originally published in the International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author's benefit and for the benefit of the author's institution, for non-commercial research and educational use including without limitation use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specific colleagues who you know, and providing a copy to your institution's administrator.

This paper aims to frame a discussion on the philosophy of the city within the context of cognitive sciences. In the first part of the paper, we will outline the double shift from a linguistic and ocularcentric account towards a sensorimotor one; then we will defend the idea that the less you refer to language and ocularcentrism in handling the urban dimension, the better phenomena can be understood and described. More generally, we argue that the most intriguing conceptual contaminations between cognitive sciences and urban philosophies, as well as the best approach in designing and planning cities, have become attainable because of the marginalisation of language-inspired models of cognition and ocular imperialism in favour of other aspects of our phenomenal consciousness, like emotions, habits, and sensorimotor attitudes.

In this paper it is argued that the theories of writing introduced during the last fifty years are based on "ideological" definitions and typologies of writing systems. Indeed, both linguists and more recently neuroscientists showed a theoretical bias for Latin alphabet, almost completely disregarding technical and social constraints in the use of writing (thus the cultural significance of writing practices). However, adopting an anthropologically informed approach, four general semiotic thesis are articulated which are intended as the basis for any viable assessment of textual products in visual and graphic domains, going beyond any formal and abstract approach to the study of writing. Writing typologies, Pictorial writing, Chinese writing, Neuroscience and writing Introduzione Il dibattito semiolinguistico attorno alla definizione di scrittura, ai suoi (possibili) confini (discreti?), nonché alla caratterizzazione storica e tipologica dei sistemi storici è ormai giunto d...

After introducing some troubling features of intentional states, the essay focuses on the Fifth Logical Investigation in order to cast light on the way Husserl tries to deal with them. Husserl's approach is shown to rely upon four central concepts (Erlebnis, Empfindung, Qualitåt, Materie). It is argued that Husserl's early phenomenology develops an internalist solution to the problem(s) of intentionality based upon the concept of matter (Materie) as an intrinsic property which bestows "sense" on all intentional states. Finally, this conception is confronted with two challenges. The first one concerns the veridical character of some perceptual states, the other questions Husserl's claim that solely the intrinsic features of intentional events can determine their reference. A hint towards solution points towards the dynamic and "horizontal" internalism developed later (Ideas, Cartesian Meditations).

La Scuola Superiore di Studi Storici dell’Università degli Studi della Repubblica di San Marino organizza un convegno internazionale che si terrà presso il Dipartimento Storico e Giuridico dell’Ateneo il 26 e il 27 settembre 2025.
Gli studiosi sono invitati a presentare un abstract di massimo 500 parole, entro e non oltre il 15 maggio 2025.

This paper explores the mediational and constitutional role of technical images (both analogue and digital) for the definition and continuity of the sense of self, proposing a new framework within the extended mind theory grounded in recent approaches to memory. Traditional cognitive science often views the mind as confined within the brain, but we argue that cognition is not merely extended but fundamentally constituted through ongoing material engagements with technical images within specific sociocultural contexts. Our interdisciplinary approach integrates cognitive archaeology, media theory, and cognitive sciences, emphasising the dynamic, embodied, and situated nature of cognition. This perspective shifts the understanding of the mind from a static, internal entity to a dynamic, distributed process continually mediated through organismic transactions in the environment. Building on this tradition of studies in the extended mind, we introduce the Mediational-Constitutional Principle, arguing that technical images not only trigger cognitive processes but actively constitute them. In the paper, we illustrate how technical images mediate and constitute the sense of self because they are central in how memory is continually re-enacted in specific sociomaterial environments made of people, things, and practices. These images function as automatic ecological records, blending past and present, influencing personal narratives and memory.

La questione della persona include necessariamente il problema dell'anima e della sua mortalità/immortalità. La persona non è soltanto un concetto indispensabile in politica, morale e nei diritti umani, ma un soggetto corporeo e spirituale estremamente complesso che richiede pazienti indagini. E' illusorio cavarcela con un'enfasi sulla dignità della persona senza scrutare la struttura fondamentale dell'essere umano. Inoltre le scoperte scientifiche (ad es. neuroscienze) pongono sempre nuovi problemi concernenti persona ed anima. In base ad un metodo integro risulta perciò opportuno trattare dell'anima, della mente e del corpo in quanto essi sono parti essenziali dell'essere personale, ed una valida determinazione del concetto di persona coopera efficacemente ad impostare le relative questioni. Quando si affrontano questi temi, è l'intera storia della filosofia (e in certo modo della scienza) che è convocata, poiché essi sono stati innumerevoli volte ripresi e discussi 1 . E' saggio non dimenticarlo e non incorrere nella svista di guardare solo alla contemporaneità più corta. Personalmente diffido delle obiezioni 'cronologiche' del tipo "questa idea è superata perché antica", oppure "questa idea è già stata detta", 1 Il tema qui svolto è il nesso anima-mente-corpo, non il problema della libertà e del determinismo, e del carattere sotto condizione della nostra libertà. Su questi temi cf. il cap. "Dialettica della libertà: libero arbitrio e liberazione" del mio Essere e libertà,

Nagel's characterisation of consciousness as being someone in What is it like to be a bat?  is shown to be an insight with enduring importance. But Nagel should opt for antirealism about consciousness and not the radical realism of neutral monism.  Antirealism is not a denial that I am conscious.  Solipsism is avoided by adopting a modal theory.

This book provides a systematic presentation of some of the most relevant contemporary major theories of human cognition. The theories are analyzed in terms of their origins, central idea, central theoretical elements, empirical evidence and major criticism. This analysis shows the advantages and disadvantages in each theoretical system, thus providing reasonable means for evaluating and comparing these proposals. The discussions are often supported by empirical research, mainly from fields such as cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience and artificial intelligence, and they are combined with rigorous theoretical and argument analysis. The content, therefore, can be helpful for many contemporary central debates concerning the topic of human cognition.

Noah McKay (2023) has proposed a novel argument against naturalism. He argues that while theism can explain our ability to arrive at a body of moral beliefs that are generally accurate and complete', naturalism fails to do so. He argues that naturalism has only social and biological grounds to account for our moral beliefs, which means that naturalism can only claim pragmatic value for our moral beliefs. McKay dedicates his paper to arguing against naturalism. This paper will focus on theism and examine whether theism can explain what naturalism cannot. Theism could rely on guided evolution or the miraculous intervention of God. In contrast to naturalism, theism has revelatory and supernatural grounds for our moral beliefs. This paper will demonstrate some of the challenges that these grounds would encounter. Finally, McKay's argument implies a dichotomy between unguided evolution and theism, which rests on a problematic assumption about evolutionary theory; by abandoning the assumption, the dichotomy also dissolves.

Steve Stich used to be an eliminativist. As far as I can tell, he renounced eliminativism about the time that he moved from the west to the east pole.1 Stich was right to reject eliminativism, though I am not convinced that he rejected it for the right reasons. Stich 1983 contains a comprehensive attack on representational content, a central feature of both folk psychology and the Representational Theory of Mind, the leading philo-sophical construal of scientific psychology. Stich’s current position on the role of content in psychological explanation is not entirely clear. One of my aims in this chapter is simply to invite Stich to clarify his views on representational content; the question that forms the title of this chapter is therefore addressed directly to Stich. I begin by sketch-ing his original anti-content argument. I then trace some later developments in his thinking about content. I argue that content does play an important role in scientific psy-chology, for precisely th...

In the context of psychological theories assuming an internal structure of mental representations, Fodor (1983) proposes a mandatory infor-mationally encapsulated autonomous processing of specifically linguistic input, maintaining that cognitive skills are neurally localized. He advances the hypothesis of a vertical and modular psychological organization under-lying biologically coherent behaviors. This paper offers a critical reading of Fodor's theoretical position in relation to some aspects of Foreign Language Acquisition (FLA), calling into question untenable claims as to information processing, mental representation and perceptual analysis. In view of factors other than grammatical affecting FLA, a strictly modular view of sentence understanding is disputed while a radical connectionist perspective is also found fault with. It is argued that a compromise position might better account for the complex phenomenon of foreign language acquisition.

Sogni e Proporzioni - Dove antico e moderno convivono in armonia. /

Mutamenti e Sfere - Dove giovani stolti affrontano avventure rocambolesche, vulcani affondano e teste vengon tagliate. Alla fine l'amore trionfa e una ragazza si sposa. /

Ciclopi e Paralleli - Dove una sfera emerge in un luogo insospettabile. /

Fulmini e Spirali - Dove nel medesimo punto confluiscono cose diversissime. Si risponde agli interrogativi in sospeso. /

Ponti e Circoli - Dove si viaggia verso gli arcobaleni e si attraversano fiumi di stelle, senza poter tornare indietro. Al termine si incontra un altro angelo. /

Orizzonti e Cantici - Dove si narra un insieme di solitudini. /

Giochi e Cicli - Dove Cupido scocca la sua freccia, che potrebbe anche colpire il lettore. /

Rose e Primavera - Dove, dopo tante peripezie, finalmente si incontra la dea dell'Amore. /

Disponibile su www.amoresacroeamorprofano.com

This paper examines the intricate interplay between human intelligence and the cognitive artifacts that both extend and potentially erode it. Building on the evolutionary theorist David Krakauer’s distinction between complementary and competitive cognitive artifacts, the argument situates these tools within a broader historical and cultural context. Complementary artifacts, such as writing systems and the abacus, are shown to enrich cognition by demanding active engagement and internalization, ultimately enhancing abilities like abstract reasoning and mental calculation. In contrast, competitive artifacts—like calculators, GPS, and certain AI-driven systems—can supplant critical cognitive functions, risking what Krakauer terms “cognitive atrophy.”
However, this paper challenges the view that outsourcing mental labor inevitably diminishes collective intelligence. Through historical examples, including the emergence of agriculture in ancient Mesopotamia, the evolution of writing, and industrial mechanization, the author demonstrates how technologies that initially appear to replace human abilities can also catalyze higher-order reasoning and collaborative innovation. The concept of the “Competitive Artifact Paradox” proposes that, while some tools weaken cognitive skills if passively adopted, others liberate intellectual capacity for more complex tasks and problem-solving.
Drawing on the “Civilization-Scaling Effect” and the “Cognitive Autonomy Factor,” the paper argues that the central issue is not whether cognition is outsourced but how it is restructured. This perspective has far-reaching implications for AI development, education, and policy, suggesting that the future of intelligence hinges on designing cognitive artifacts that encourage active engagement rather than passive reliance.

The primary aim of this research was to investigate the intricate relationship between the structural elements of experiences and their essential role in meaning formation. The analysis focused on understanding the nature of mental representations and the subjective, phenomenal qualities that emerge within experiences. To achieve this, an integrated approach, combining cognitive semantics with phenomenological analysis, was employed to examine the compositional complexities of the dynamic interaction between a priori and immediate experiences and their significance in meaning formation. The study highlights the interconnectivity of structural elements within experience as a critical factor in shaping the phenomenal qualities of mental representations. Another key contribution of this study is the introduction of the "fulfiller" concept, which underscores the importance of absent qualities in meaning formation-an often-overlooked aspect in traditional models that focus solely on present attributes. The "fulfiller" concept emphasizes how absence, in addition to presence, influences meaning assignment. This inclusion enhances our understanding of meaning formation by considering both the tangible and intangible dimensions of the experiential-intentional process, offering a more comprehensive framework for understanding how meaning emerges from the complex interaction of present and absent qualities.

I argue that interpretations of non-symbolic numerical cognition (NSNC) small-quantity discrimination experiments with preverbal children (SQEP) claiming that preverbal children perceive, represent, or are sensitive to numerosities, numbers, or continuous magnitudes might be misguided. I contend that the experience of test participants has been unduly neglected in NSNC experiments in the last decades, in contrast to other areas of psychophysics. In pitch or colour perception for example, a distinction is usually drawn between the objective properties of the physical stimuli of quantitative nature (wavelength or frequency of sound or visible light) and what is experienced by the test participant (pitch or colour).

Badania nad wiedzą przyrodniczą św. Tomasza z Akwinu nie zajmują przewodniego miejsca w refl eksji podejmowanej nad dorobkiem dominikańskiego uczonego 1 . Mimo świadomości, że ten najwybitniejszy uczeń wybitnego przyrodnika, św. Alberta Wielkiego, podejmował sporo wysiłku w dziele przyswojenia chrześcijańskiej Europie dorobku wiedzy przyrodniczej Arystotelesa i jego komentatorów, uczeni nie koncentrują uwagi na tym zagadnieniu. Uważna lektura pism św. Tomasza ujawnia jednak sporo oryginalności i pozwala poznać wiele cennych uwag Akwinaty o charakterze metodologicznym, które mają ważne znaczenie dla historii nauk przyrodniczych w okresie złotej scholastyki (XIII w.), a także później, w jesieni średniowiecza 2 . Jednym z podstawowych wyznaczników oryginalności przyrodoznawstwa Akwinaty było połączenie inspiracji grecko-empirycznej nauki arystotelesowskiej z inspiracją religijną, która niejednokrotnie ułatwiała krytyczne podejście do dziedzictwa myśli antycznej, napotykającego stopniowo coraz większe trudności, wiążące się z nowymi obserwacjami empirycznymi i zarzutami teoretycznymi. Czasy św. Tomasza to okres recepcji i krytyki teoretycznej, zaś rozwój badań i krytyka doświadczalna teorii starożytnych dojdzie do głosu w wieku XIV i później. Inspiracja religijna w systemie dominikańskiego uczonego należy do głównych aspektów jego metodologii nauk przyrodniczych, a ponadto stanowi o swoistości całego systemu, zarówno w metafi zyce, jak i w naukach szczegółowych. Nawet jeżeli bezpośrednio oddziaływanie koncepcji Akwinaty na dal-1

Questo articolo offre una riflessione sull’evoluzione del linguaggio
umano, esaminandone la complessità e il carattere multiforme. Nel corso del testo si esplora la natura segnica e simbolica del linguaggio, mettendo in luce come esso sia un sistema di segni che ha origine nei processi comunicativi del mondo animale. Vengono analizzati i processi evolutivi che hanno portato all’emergenza della dimensione sociale e culturale del linguaggio umano,evidenziando come la comunicazione simbolica umana sia un prodotto di convenzioni condivise e tramandate culturalmente. Questi elementi fanno sì che il linguaggio sia un fenomeno incarnato, radicato nei sistemi sensori,affettivi e motori del corpo umano che si è evoluto e intrecciato con i contestisocioculturali della nostra specie. Si conclude che comprendere l’evoluzione del linguaggio richiede un approccio interdisciplinare che integri gli studi culturali e la semiotica con la biologia evoluzionistica, scienze cognitive e neuroscienze.

The Chinese room argument has presented a persistent headache in the search for Artificial Intelligence. Since it first appeared in the literature, various interpretations have been made, attempting to understand the problems posed by this thought experiment. Throughout all this time, some researchers in the Artificial Intelligence community have seen Symbol Grounding as proposed by Harnad as a solution to the Chinese room argument. The main thesis in this paper is that although related, these two issues present different problems in the framework presented by Harnad himself. The work presented here attempts to shed some light on the relationship between John Searle's intentionality notion and Harnad's Symbol Grounding Problem.

Felix reaches up to catch a high line drive to left field and fires the ball off to Benji at home plate, who then tags the runner trying to score. For Felix to catch the ball and transfer it from his glove to his throwing hand, he needs to have a sense of where his hands are relative to one another and the rest of his body. This sort of information is subconsciously tracked in the body schema (or postural schema), a representation of the current bodily posture that is updated on the basis of proprioceptive inputs. While the existence of the body schema in not in dispute, its origin is. After reviewing the competing proposals, I introduce the conceptual tools needed to move the debate forward and apply them to the question of the extent to which the body schema could be learned from perceptual input in utero. I argue that it could give rise to something recognizable as the body schema, though not quite rising to the level of the mature body schema. After considering the implications for further research on the origins of the body schema, I show how these results apply to other body representations, helping clarify the vexing question of the number, nature, and interactions among body representations in the brain. This theoretical work also promises to advance our understanding and treatment protocols for disorders affecting body representations (e.g., anorexia nervosa).

The similarity between the interaction pattern of neurons in the human brain and the ant colony makes the latter an object of the hypothesis of being a structure capable of having a consciousness. In this article, Thomas Nagel's definition of consciousness as something that is to be for an organism becomes fundamental for the examination of it as a possible experiential subject. The ant colony, if considered an organism, could be a subject capable of having internal experiences. Therefore, in this article, I developed based on Panpsychism, criteria for colony analysis, presenting which characteristics it must meet in order to be qualified as conscious. I do not argue that the ant colony is a genuine organism, but that, if it is, it will have some kind of conscious experience. In dealing with this question, I examine whether the colony is a biological individual, and then, whether it is possible for the ants' minds to underlie the colony's mind. I conclude that, based on how the parts interact with the whole, there may be more than one resolution to the problem, that is, the colony's consciousness depends on the way how its components are physically and phenomenally integrated.

Recovering brain activity from M/EEG measurements is an ill-posed problem and prior constraints need to be introduced in order to obtain unique solution. The majority of the methods use spatial and/or temporal constraints, without taking account of long-range connectivity. In this work, we propose a new connectivity-informed spatio-temporal approach to constrain the inverse problem using supplementary information coming from difusion MRI. We present results based on simulated brain activity obtained with realistic subject anatomy from Human Connectome Project dataset.

Recovering brain activity from M/EEG measurements is an ill-posed problem and prior constraints need to be introduced in order to obtain unique solution. The majority of the methods use spatial and/or temporal constraints, without taking account of long-range connectivity. In this work, we propose a new connectivity-informed spatio-temporal approach to constrain the inverse problem using supplementary information coming from difusion MRI. We present results based on simulated brain activity obtained with realistic subject anatomy from Human Connectome Project dataset.

Investigating the nature of mental representations through poems provides different ambiguities than the ordinary use of language. Poetry embeds hazier continuities in the use of its language. Moro 1 compares language to a tapestry: there are recognizable patterns in the face of a tapestry but looking at its back, we discover that the threadwork embodies a different level of complexity,

While central to robotics, biology and cognitive science, the concept of autonomy remains still difficult to make operative in the realm of Alife simulation models of cognitive agents. Its deep significance as a transition concept between life and cognition (a milestone on the Alife route to AI) remains obscured in the intricate relation between metabolic/constructive processes and behavioral adaptive processes in living systems. Within a naturalized and biologically inspired dynamical approach to cognition a definition of behavioral adaptive autonomy is provided: homeostatic maintenance of essential variables under viability constraints through self-modulating behavioral coupling with the environment, hierarchically decoupled from metabolic (constructive) processes. This definition allows for a naturalized notion of behavioral adaptive functionality (that defines a proper level of modelling within Alife), structurally and interactively emergent: the mapping of the agent-environment system's state space trajectories into the viability subspace of the essential variables of the organism.

Some  anti-representational  approaches  to  cognition  have  become  increasingly  popular,  and  many  of  their  proponents  see  them  as  promising  a  new  paradigm  for  cognitive  science. In this paper, I focus on two of those approaches to argue that they do not contain a  proper  explanation  of  perceptual  illusions—and  that  perhaps  they  cannot  provide  it.  My  claim  will  be  that,  without  an  adequate  treatment  of  such  a  common  perceptual  phenomenon, they can hardly be seen as part of a new paradigm. I begin by describing the  context  in  which  these  approaches  arose  and  developed,  while  in  the  second  part  I  present  three  treatments  of  perceptual  illusions  coming  from  the  approaches  at  issue.  The third part makes a detour about the notion of perceptual illusion, as the assessment of  these  explanations  of  illusions  seems  to  require  it.  Then,  the  fourth  part  is  devoted  to  evaluating  these  explanations  of  illusions,  discussing  the  introduction  of  normative  language, appeal to notions as “situation-dependent” property, and whether a proposed definition of illusion fits our current comprehension of them, as well as the rejection of inferences from unfitting behavior that seem abductively legitimate. There I argue that those accounts of perceptual illusions fail to achieve their aim.

A special feature of contemporary cognitive science is the prominence of semantic concepts. Cognitive scientists speak of codes, signals, encoding, decoding, computation, representation and information-processing. The orthodox view is to take talk of neuronal signalling and computational processes over mental representations literally—as truth- conditioned descriptions of brain and cognitive activity. Mental fictionalism challenges the orthodox view. Mental fictionalism is, broadly speaking, the view that talk about mental representations is a useful fiction. This means that mental fictionalism treats such discourse in the same way as scientists treat useful idealizations in model-based science. In this paper, I assume, without argument, that discourse about mental representation in cognitive science is fictional. However, it is not a useful fiction because talk of mental representation fails to be genuinely explanatory. It fails to be genuinely explanatory because idealized posits such as mental representation are functionally disanalogous to useful idealizations in other sciences such as biology and physics.

Marcus's view of belief is applied to the debate that centers on the question, "Are delusions beliefs?" Two consequences of this are that i) the question, "Are delusions beliefs?" needs rephrasing and ii) the answer is, "No, some delusional patients do not believe what they prima facie seem to believe".

Cognitive maps play a crucial role in mammalian navigation. They provide the organism with information about its own location and the locations of landmarks within known environments. Cognitive maps have yet to receive ample attention in philosophy. In this article, we argue that cognitive maps should not be understood along the lines of conceptual mental states, such as beliefs and desires. They are more plausibly understood to be non-conceptual. We clarify what is at stake in this claim, and offer two empirically-informed arguments in its favor. Both arguments submit that cognitive maps are probably non-conceptual because their representational structure seems to differ from that of conceptual mental states.

I consider applications of “AI extenders” (Vold & Hernández-Orallo 2021) to dementia care. AI extenders are AI-powered technologies that extend minds in ways interestingly different from old-school tech like notebooks, sketch pads, models, and microscopes. I focus on AI extenders as ambiance: so thoroughly embedded into things and spaces that they fade from view and become part of a subject’s taken-for-granted background. Using dementia care as a case study, I argue that ambient AI extenders are promising because they afford richer and more durable forms of multidimensional integration than do old-school extenders like Otto’s notebook. They can be tailored, in fine-grained ways along multiple timescales, to a user’s particular needs, values, and preferences — and crucially, they can do much of this self-optimizing on their own. I discuss why this is so, why it matters, and its potential impact on affect and agency. I conclude with some worries in need of further discussion.

Cognitive scaffolding is typically conceptualized in terms of environmental design which serves to offload, facilitate, or enhance the cognitive capacities of interacting agents. Recent contributions to the literature on scaffolding have noted that environmental design might likewise scaffold cognition in ways that undermine the interests of interactant agents—giving rise to notions of problematic or hostile scaffolding. Given the pervasiveness of social and technological scaffolding in contemporary life, the importance of understanding and assessing its effects can hardly be overstated. At the same time, however, the very pervasiveness of scaffolding raises a challenge to the current criteria for evaluating its effects by comparison with agents’ interests. This is because human agents and their interests alike are themselves the results of various forms of social and technological scaffolding. This paper explores the relationship between scaffolding and the formation of agents along with their interests, as well as the implications of this relationship for evaluating scaffolding as being hostile, neutral, or beneficial. I will argue that the formative aspect of scaffolding imparts a degree of uncertainty to evaluations of scaffolding based on agents’ interests. I will then demonstrate the relevance of the formative aspect of scaffolding in evaluating and assessing the potentially pernicious effects of contemporary social and technological scaffolding focusing on the examples of servitization marketing models and social and vocational digital infrastructures.

This paper discusses the extent to which mindreading capability is culture-dependent, and to determine if differences between cultures impose systematic differences in the trajectory of mindreading development. We start with the ways in which mindreading is defined within the framework of modern psychological research. Second, we will present the idea that human theory of mind is universal, together with the assumptions that can be derived from that idea. Next, arguments in favor of the hypothesis of the key cognitive capabilities being determined by social and linguistic factors will be provided. To show the influence of culture-specific factors on mindreading, three examples of empirical research allowing the formulation of a few fundamental hypotheses will be discussed. A set of the arguments given with the conclusions drawn from them indicate that the ability to read other people’s mental states is shaped by socially-specific factors, including the specificity of a particular la...