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2021, Nuova Antologia Militare - NAM 2, 6
This article traces the evolution of the well-known Legiones Cannenses from a citizen army into a professional force, possibly the first in the history of the Roman army. I shall focus on three main aspects of this transformation. First, I shall deal with the split of the legionaries from civic life, in the wake of the battle of Cannae. The Roman senate in 215 BCE decided to strip the survivors of the battle of their civil rights and sent them to garrison Sicily. The decision of the Senate created a mercenary force, different from the rest of the Roman army. Then, I shall examine the peculiar commitment of the soldiers to some of the most important warlords, such as Marcellus, Scipio, and Flamininus, who in turn were in command of the Legiones Cannenses during the Second Punic War and the Second Macedonian War. The last topic discussed in this part are the changes in the tactical composition of the Legiones Cannenses, evident in the African campaign. By then, the tactical composition of the Legiones Cannenses looked very much akin to that of the Late Republican legions. The cohors had taken the place of the manipulum as the main tactical unit.
This research is part of four volumes "A Critical Analysis of the Roman Army: 513 BC to 410 AD," in which all Roman army and unit sizes, plus organisation, both army and navy are placed under intense scrutiny. The premise of the study is to try and understand how the ancient sources had differing and conflicting army numbers for the same land or naval battle. Sixteen years of investigating the primary sources, plus reconstructing the Roman tribal organisation from the Servian Constitution has proven categorically that Polybius' legion of 4,200 infantry is at fault, with Polybius' 1,200 hastati being in error, as opposed to Livy's 1,800 hastati. With this newfound knowledge, the Roman legion and the Roman army began to reveal itself.
Nuova Antologia Militare (NAM 2, 6), 93-122, 2021
Fascicolo 2 / N.6 (2021)-storia Militare aNtica duty between the age of 17 till the age of 46, while seniores were older citizens, from the age of 46 till the age of 60 years old. After the age of 60, Roman citizens were exonerated from military service. Their enlistment, oath and training were not different from that of their fellow citizens. 1 Once the Senate passed the relative decree to decide how many men must be levied, the two consuls began the dilectus (in Latin selection) or levy. By the end of the second century BCE, each year were generally levied four legions, two for each consul. According to Polybius, first, the consuls appoint all the 24 tribunes, of whom 14 already had seen five years of military service and 10 had seen already ten years of service. The dilectus itself began when a red flag was raised on the Capitol to indicate the beginning of the levy. Then, all the citizens were called up and divided according to their tribe. Of all the citizens called up, however, were selected according to lots only the quantity necessary to form four legions. Afterwards, the 14 younger tribunes called the names of the citizens selected by lot and divided them in four groups as the four legions. Subsequently, the tribunes, or the junior officers, were assigned to the legions. At the same time that the dilectus was performed in Rome, the consuls sent a message to the Italic allies, or socii, requiring to levy a contingent. The local authorities administer the oath to the soldiers of the allied contingent. 2 After the levy, all the citizens soldiers, by now each assigned to his own unit, or legio, took the oath of allegiance. This oath was symbolic because it represented for the citizen the transition between the civic environment with its laws to the military discipline, to which he was now subjected. The oath of allegiance to the Roman Republic was taken under the auspices of Fides, a goddess that embodied the virtue of good faith or trust. The idea of fides stood at the foundation of the Roman state. To the virtue of fides was associated the idea of fas, or what was right in the eyes of the gods. Once an agreement was made under the aegis of fides, it was perceived as fas, or right in the eyes of the gods. On the other hand,
The American Historical Review, 1986
PLATES Between pages 112 and 113 1 Italian hoplites 2 The battle of Pydna, 168 BC, as depicted on the monument of Aemilius Paullus at Delphi 3 Roman soldiers of the later second century BC: detail from the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus 4 The army on the coinage: (a) military standards, 82 BC (b) military standards, 49 BC (c) colonisation programme, c.40 BC (d) Gallic arms (e) the Gauls defeated 5 Soldiers of the Late Republic (a) L. Septumius (b) L. Appuleius (c) C. Raius Perulla (d) P. Gessius 6 Bust of Julius Caesar 7 Caesar's bridge across the Rhine 8 Alesia: general views of the site 9 Alesia: details of the Roman fortifications 10 Gravestone of the brothers Canuleius, who served under Caesar in Gaul 11 A warship of the Late Republic 12 Antony's military coinage, 32-31 BC (a) Antony's fleet (b) legio XII Antiqua (c) cohortes praetoriae (d) cohors speculatorum 13 Catapult-shield of the legio IIII Macedonica 14 Emblems and standards: (a) legio IIII Scythica (b) a monument at Venafro 15 Statue of Augustus from Prima Porta, Rome 16 Augustan colonies on the coinage: (a) Emerita (b) Caesarea Augusta (c) Philippi (d) Patrae 17 Imperial propaganda on the coinage: (a) recovery of standards from the Parthians (b) Germanicus recovers an aquila lost with Varus (c) Caligula addressing the men of four legions, AD 39 (d) Nero addressing the German Bodyguard, AD 64-66 18 Cenotaph of Marcus Caelius, a centurion who 'fell in the Varian War' 19 The army of the Early Empire: (a) Cn. Musius, aquilifer (b) C. Romanius, cavalryman of the ala Noricorum (c) Monimus, a Syrian archer (d) P. Flavoleius, a soldier of legio XIV Gemina 20 The Praetorian Guard LINE ILLUSTRATIONS 1 Rome and Italy c. 400 BC 2 The 'Servian Constitution' 3 Roman roads and colonies in Italy 4 The Roman legion, c. 340 BC, as described by Livy 5 Italy and the western Mediterranean 6 A: The battle of Cannae, B: The battle of Zama 7 The battle of Ilipa 8 The Roman legion, c. 160 BC, as described by Polybius 9 The Roman camp according to Polybius 10 The eastern Mediterranean world, c. 200 BC 11 The battle of Cynoscephalae 12 Roman camps at Renieblas 13 Camp III at Renieblas: general plan 14 Camp III at Renieblas: plan of barracks 15 Siegeworks round Numantia 16 Siegecamp at Peña Redonda 17 Siegecamp at Castillejo
2017
This hardcover monograph tries to represent how the main historical events and circumstances determined the transformation of Roman armour, weaponry and tactics in the years of the Severan Dynasty and soldier emperors. Paul Elliott, the author has a degree in archaeology and ancient history, he writes books on military history (The Last Legionary, Warrior Cults etc.), and recently his articles have been published in the Ancient Warfare magazine. As an archaeologist Elliott has tested bronze casting and fabrication of Roman shields so he utilized the acquired experiences to his book. The Legions in Crisis was published in 2014 by Fonthill Media and the dust jacket itself already rouses the readers' interest: on the front as well as on the back we can see Elliott himself as a third century Roman legionary in cross-bracing helmet, ringmail and sagum ("cloak"). On the first pages the author summarizes the main guidelines of his research: after Commodus' death the Roman army gained the political power with the aid of Septimius Severus who was also the distributor of the new types of weapons, armours and tactics (Introduction pp. 7-8). This thesis is the starting point of Elliott's whole logical contexture which can be separated into three blocks. After a List of Emperors (pp. 11-12) from Trajan to Diocletian, chapters 1-3 (pp. 13-48) represent Marcus Aurelius' Marcomannic Wars as the first crucial period, the rise and military reforms of Septimius Severus whence the late imperial "defence in depth" tactics is originated by Elliott, and the contracted history of the Severan Dynasty and soldier emperors until 253, the accession to power of Valerian and his son, Gallienus. Chapters 4-8 (pp. 49-115) brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk provided by SZTE OJS Journals (University of Szeged / Szegedi...
This short article takes a fresh approach to untangle Livy's two 'snapshots' of the early Roman Republican army supposedly c.550 BC; and 340 BC and resolves interpretation of 'rorarii' and 'accensi' in the latter and points to anachronisms in the former as described by Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Traditional scholarship has argued that during the fourth and fifth centuries the waning Roman Empire came to rely to a large extent on recruits of foreign, barbarian origin for its defence. Such a pro-barbarian recruitment policy resulted in the weakening and collapse of Roman military capability in the West, and in the fragmentation and disappearance of the Western Roman state. The article reexamines the " barbarization " theory, following models postulated by M. J. Nicasie and Hugh Elton, as well as the recent results of identity studies focusing on the ancient world. By using the concept of the " barbarian " in political, rather than ethnic terms, the article presents the " barbarization " process not as a prime suspect for the empire's fall, but as another way for the Roman state to maximize its resources and bolster its defences.
R J Brewer (ed.), Roman Fortresses and their Legions, 2000
The typescript of my contribution to the George Boon Festschrift, Roman Fortresses and their Legions.
The paper aims the study of the equipment of the Roman Army in the first two centuries of the second millennium. It is the peak period of the Roman Empire. Roman Empire attained its greatest expansion under the emperor Trajan. From England to Africa and from Syria to Spain, one in every four people on earth lived and died under Roman law.
The Civilian Legacy of the Roman Army, 2024
Summary and presentation
Director of Thesis: Dr. Frank E. Romer Major Department: History The goal of this thesis is, as the title affirms, to understand the military reforms of Gaius Marius in their broader societal context. In this thesis, after a brief introduction (Chap. I), Chap. II analyzes the Roman manipular army, its formation, policies, and armament. Chapter III examines Roman society, politics, and economics during the second century B.C.E., with emphasis on the concentration of power and wealth, the legislative programs of Ti. And C. Gracchus, and the Italian allies’ growing demand for citizenship. Chap. IV discusses Roman military expansion from the Second Punic War down to 100 B.C.E., focusing on Roman military and foreign policy blunders, missteps, and mistakes in Celtiberian Spain, along with Rome’s servile wars and the problem of the Cimbri and Teutones. Chap. V then contextualizes the life of Gaius Marius and his sense of military strategy, while Chap VI assesses Marius’s military reforms in his lifetime and their immediate aftermath in the time of Sulla. There are four appendices on the ancient literary sources (App. I), Marian consequences in the Late Republic (App. II), the significance of the legionary eagle standard as shown during the early principate (App. III), and a listing of the consular Caecilii Metelli in the second and early first centuries B.C.E. (App. IV). The Marian military reforms changed the army from a semi-professional citizen militia into a more professionalized army made up of extensively trained recruits who served for longer consecutive terms and were personally bound to their commanders. In this way these reforms created an army which could be used against other Roman commanders or the city itself. Military eligibility was no longer exclusive to landowners, and the capite censi had new opportunities for spoils and social and political advancement. Marius’ reforms were not completely novel, but the practices that he introduced he also cause to be established as standard operating procedure. He implemented these reforms in a time of crisis, and subsequently the extraordinary military careers of both Marius and Sulla acted to preserve his measures and to move the army far down the road of professionalization. What I have shown in this thesis is the larger economic, social, and political context which formed the background and provided the incubator in which Marius’ reforms were generated and developed. Once Marius crystallized his ideas and put them in place, the stage was set for Sulla and the new kind of military action that would seal the fate of the Republic.
In this article we undertake a study about the training process of the Roman soldier in the Epitoma rei militaris, document written during the last years of the fourth century a.D. We aim here to analyze the procedure reported by Vegetius view that aimed to to turn the recruit in soldier in the Roman army. We are supported in the concept of the Military Paideia, defining the process based on an ideal model of a soldier to problematize some essential points for the formation of the Roman soldier. We expect this work to develop an analysis of the elements of the Vegetius vision that they could form a Roman military matrix that would beat all the enemies.
A view on the Roman cavalry Forces, especially the equites legionis. The article describes a possible organizational chart of the legionary cavalry Formation in imperial times. By analyzing Primary sources the organization, command and Manpower of the equites legionis will be described in a new manner. There is also given a view on auxiliary cavalry organization and command to demonstrate differences between auxiliary cavalry, legionary horsemen and equites singuläres Augusti. As Primary sources often times contradict each other and epigraphy or papyrology only can give snapshots of situations, it is not an easy work to take a look on the legionary cavalry in Roman imperial times. But combining all sources given a proper view on the subject and so this article will give a new examination. Because of the discrepanscies, which already are given by Primary sources the article only can be a try to open more discussions in this Special subject.
This paper examines what it is possible to say about who commanded the non-Italian, auxiliary troops which frequently served in the armies of the Roman Republic. The discussion is restricted to land forces, looking firstly at the evidence for Romans in command of auxilia – mostly found at the upper levels of command – and secondly at the evidence for non-Romans commanding auxilia – mostly found at the level of individual unit commanders. The problem of classification of auxilia (allies, auxiliaries, or mercenaries?) is briefly considered, with reference to their military autonomy. The final section explores the potential value of ‘native’ commanders and Roman recognition of this, through clientela and mechanisms of reward and civic incorporation. The paper concludes with brief speculation on developments in practice over the course of the Republic.
Armstrong, J. and M.P. Fronda (eds.) Romans at War: Soldiers, Citizens, and Society in the Roman Republic. Routledge: London., 2019
This volume addresses the fundamental importance of the army, warfare, and military service to the development of both the Roman Republic and wider Italic society in the second half of the first millennium BC. It brings together emerging and established scholars in the area of Roman military studies to engage with subjects such as the relationship between warfare and economic and demographic regimes; the interplay of war, aristocratic politics, and state formation; and the complex role the military played in the integration of Italy. The book demonstrates the centrality of war to Rome's internal and external relationships during the Republic, as well as to the Romans' sense of identity and history. It also illustrates the changing scholarly view of warfare as a social and cultural construct in antiquity , and how much work remains to be done in what is often thought of as a "traditional" area of research. Romans at War will be of interest to students and scholars of the Roman army and ancient warfare, and of Roman society more broadly.
BRILL eBooks, 2007
Lukas de Blois and Elio Lo Cascio-978-90-47-43039-1 Downloaded from Brill.com07/13/2022 11:33:54AM via free access nature and impact of the roman war effort in spain 31 that in 217, 211, 210, 206, 204, 201 and 200, the leges regarding the supreme command in Spain were always passed on the initiative of the Senate, which was doubtlessly also the case for the extraordinary proconsulships of M. Claudius Marcellus and Sempronius Tuditanus in 215 and 205. Especially Livius 30.41.4f. offers a striking example of how the Senate, if necessary, took the initiative to involve the Comitia in the decision-making within a preconceived framework, although this instance necessitates an important annotation. A number of indirect or secondary but valuable indications in the account of Livius and, to a lesser extent, Appianus and Dio Cassius, indeed point to the fact that during the Second Punic War some important tensions and frictions arose between the Senate on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the decision-making in the Comitia at the instigation of/for the beneÀ t of charismatic protagonists like M. Marcellus and Scipio Africanus. At the outset of 210, Scipio's rather unexpected election by the comitia centuriata was contested by the powerful senatorial seniores to such a degree that Scipio decided to call for an additional contio to strengthen his position. After Scipio's position as proconsul and summus imperator of Spain had become unquestionable in this way, the Senate sent the senior praetorius M. Iunius Silanus along with Scipio, obviously with the intention of providing Scipio with a more mature counsellor and of having a kind of 'supervisor' in the À eld. The Senate moreover raised the imperium of pro praetore Silanus to the level of a consulare imperium and entitled him to share the supreme command, which, among other things, must have served the purpose of strengthening his position vis-à-vis young P. Scipio. At all events, Scipio departed for Spain in 210 against the will of an important and inÁ uential part of the Senate, armed with the powerful and quite exceptional legitimation of a lex centuriata. The careers and extraordinary prouinciae/ imperia of C. Claudius Nero and especially M. Claudius Marcellus and P. Scipio Africanus reveal that even after the crushing defeats at Lake Trasimene and Cannae in 217 and 216, the advocates of an aggressive military policy could continue to depend on the undaunted support of the Roman People, and that the protagonists of the hawkish faction in Rome eventually did not refrain from making use of their popularity among the commons in order to pressure the Senate and, if necessary, obtain imperium and/or prouincia 'extra ordinem'. Nonetheless, the authority of the Senate remained by far the foremost factor in the Roman decision-making process during the Second Punic War. Polybius in 6.51.5f. expressly explains the Roman victory Lukas de Blois and Elio Lo Cascio-978-90-47-43039-1 Downloaded from Brill.com07/13/2022 11:33:54AM via free access 65 As has been conclusively demonstrated with respect to the annexation of Macedonia À fty years later by W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism in the Roman Republic 327-70 bc (Oxford 1979), 74ff. 66 This practice seems to have been an unwritten law in the Roman administration
Acta Scientiarum. Education, 2014
In this article we undertake a study about the training process of the Roman soldier in the Epitoma rei militaris, document written during the last years of the fourth century a.D. We aim here to analyze the procedure reported by Vegetius view that aimed to to turn the recruit in soldier in the Roman army. We are supported in the concept of the Military Paideia, defining the process based on an ideal model of a soldier to problematize some essential points for the formation of the Roman soldier. We expect this work to develop an analysis of the elements of the Vegetius vision that they could form a Roman military matrix that would beat all the enemies.
Integration in Rome and in the Roman World, 2013
IntegratIon or DIsIntegratIon? the roman army In the thIrD Century a.D. Lukas de Blois my issue in this paper is: what was the main trend within the roman military forces in the third century ad? Integration, or disintegration into regional entities? this paper is not about cultural integration of ethnic groups in multicultural parts of the roman empire, such as the city of rome, thriving commercial centres, and border regions to which the armies had brought people from various parts of the empire, and where multicultural military personnel lived together with indigenous groups, craftsmen from different origins, and immigrants from commercially active regions, either in canabae adjacent to castra stativa, or in garrison towns, as in the eastern parts of the empire. In variatio upon an issue raised by Frederick naerebout in another paper published in this volume, I might ask myself in what sense an army, which in the third century ad was progressively composed of ethnically and culturally different units, kept functioning as an integrated entity, or in actual practice disintegrated into rivalling, particularistic regional forces whose actual or potential competition for money and supplies constantly threatened peace and stability in the empire, particularly in times of dangerous external wars, when the need for supplies increased. the discussion should start with septimius severus. after his victories over Pescennius niger, some tribes in northern mesopotamia, and albinus in gaul, severus had to replenish the ranks of his armies, for example at the Danube frontiers, which had yielded many men to severus' field armies and his new praetorian guard. Besides he had to compensate for the many losses that niger's eastern army and albinus' British troops had sustained, and find recruits for his new legiones Parthicae I, II and III. he had to do so in a post-plague period, in which many mobile young men (soldiers!) were missing because they-as always in times of plaguehad died first and foremost, prices were rising, workers could demand higher wages, and demographic recovery at best was just taking off.1 this 1 on the so-called antonine plague and its consequences see r.s. Bagnall & B.W. Frier,
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