Moral Psychology

Abstract: Most approaches to artificial moral agents (AMAs) apparently
take it for granted that a machine could be moral. However, to think that
the categories of morality or immorality apply to machines seems like a
category mistake. This paper inquires into the conditions necessary for a
machine to be moral. In order to do this, it first addresses the question
what is a machine? It then argues that a form of agency is characteristic
of machines in contradistinction of other technical objects and that given
their particular characteristics as machines artificial agents fail to satisfy
one of the basic pre-conditions of moral agents. In conclusion, I ask what
would be necessary for an artificial agent to be a moral agent.

In their much discussed papers Free Will, Praise and Blame and Freedom and Resentment 1 , J.C.C Smart and Peter Strawson propose different views and approaches regarding determinism and its potential effects on the "free will" problem (that which questions whether we as individuals have free will). In this article, I shall first delineate the main points and arguments presented in both papers, followed by a critical assessment of their contrasting positions and my own stand on the entire issue at hand. J.C.C Smart Free Will, Praise and Blame Smart's stand with regards to determinism is that we can live with the belief that determinism does exist, and that such a belief is also fundamentally vital to our conceptions of moral responsibility. In his paper, he casts doubts on C.A. Campbell's view that "to accept the deterministic position is to give up the notion of moral responsibility" (60). For Campbell and other libertarians, our moral choices are "neither determined nor a matter of chance". Instead, they are "instances of 'contra-causal freedom'", fleeting moments in which the agent can choose between "genuinely open possibilities" and act in a free and responsible manner accordingly. Smart makes two powerful counter-arguments in response to Campbell. Firstly, while he agrees with Campbell that "that he could have done otherwise" is a condition of moral responsibility, he rejects Campbell's attempts to conceive of this thesis in the special (Laplacian) sense, arguing that when taken in the ordinary or normative sense within the concrete context of daily life, "he could not have done

empathy is a multidimensional construct that develops on two levels: an affective level and a cognitive level. recent studies have shown that empathic abilities are compromised in some specific cases. psychopathy, in particular, is characterized by a total absence of affective empathy. subjects with a diagnosis of psychopathy would seem, however, to possess the skills related to cognitive empathy. the main areas involved in empathic processes are the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula. this work, starting from a careful analysis of the previous scientific literature, has made it possible to raise awareness of the impossibility, with psychopathic subjects, to develop therapeutic plans based on contact and management of emotions. therefore, the possibility of creating a therapeutic plan aimed at strengthening empathic abilities in psychopathic subjects has been hypothesized. In conclusion, we highlight the possibility of using meditative techniques and mindfulness to increase the self-awareness of these subjects. starting from these assumptions we hypothesize the need to investigate the effectiveness of these techniques in the treatment of subjects diagnosed with psychopathy, starting from the scientific results reported by studies in the neurobiological field.

Moral ambiguity has become an aspect of modern drama characters. Protagonists in modern movies were yesterday's antagonists, yet with detailed background to trigger empathy. They are not purely bad and can do both good and bad things. A scholarly interest can be detected in recent studies to analyze the shift from the traditional narrative to a more progressive and complicated one, from a clear-cut between good and evil, to a context that presents the evil personality as complicated and not simple, providing character background and encouraging people not to rush judging them, and even sympathizing with them. Therefore, audience perception of the villain characters, anti-heroes, and morally ambiguous characters has changed correspondingly. The disposition theory explains the moral judgment of the characters through their actions; accordingly, the audience will form favorable or unfavorable attitudes towards them. The relationship between character morality and audience liking is another raised issue due to the subversions of the character behavior. The expectancy violation theory EVT explained this perspective as the audience may positively perceive the villain character, if he behaved in a more moral way than what was expected from him. Perceived realism, character liking, and enjoyment are also related to character moral evaluation. The current study aims to examine the representation of the villain in modern drama, what can be called the "New Villain", especially in movie sequels and serial dramas, in which these characters became more complex, humanified and relatable. A qualitative approach through a focus group discussion is conducted to investigate audience perception of the evil characters, if they really sympathize with them, why and in which context.

If the field of moral philosophy had a mission statement, it might be expressed as something like “Devising strategies for increasing goodness in the world.” From Socratic yearnings for “the good life,” to Augustine’s depictions of the “City of God,” to modernist calculations aimed at “maximizing utility” within society, philosophers are continually envisioning states of goodness and thinking up pathways to them. Behind all such moral- philosophical approaches is the assumption that “good- making” is a task that is best approached with a thorough thinking-through. There is a basic optimism underlying this premise—believing that we can actively strategize our way toward ideal states, that philosophical programs, once put into action, might actually be carried out with success (“If only they would listen!”). All too frequently, however, philosophical systems struggle to find influence within the societies where they are devised. “Goodness” increases and abates in ways that are frustratingly independent of the quality of the thinking being done in book- lined offices or (depending on the tradition) by bearded sages on inaccessible mountaintops.

The goal of this chapter is not to criticize moral philosophy, still less to comprehensively summarize it. Instead, I want to review some common themes and arguments from the moral- philosophical tradition and advocate for narrative forms of their delivery. My claim is that, as carriers for moral arguments, narratives offer illustrative possibilities that are liable to make the arguments of moral philosophy more evocative and persuasive. Additionally, I argue that narrative devices can transmit moral messages and outline good- making processes in ways that philosophical argumentation can’t. These devices avoid the didacticism and elitism of much philosophical writing, while also illustrating a broader truth: that our moral sensibilities are rooted first and most deeply within sociocultural— as opposed to individual- intellective— forms of knowledge. My central claim, then, is that while philosophy approaches the problem of good- making as an intellectual exercise, storying philosophical arguments helps us to actually accomplish what they aim to do—which is to do good.

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, s...

This paper argues that although Nietzsche's rejection of free will leaves no room for a morally substantial, compatibilist conception of freedom of agency, freedom nevertheless plays an important role in his positive moral philosophy, since Nietzsche's higher human types are characterized by a heightened feeling of freedom—a qualitative affect without deeper substance. Moreover, because the feeling of freedom is increased by resistance, it requires a limitation of practical freedom—a relative constraint of ability, strength, and activity rather than their absolute promotion. Nietzsche's higher types are, if anything, less free than others. Consequently, his criterion for human enhancement cannot be that of quantitatively greater freedom, power, or agency. Rather, it is measured according to the intensity of an individual's feelings of freedom, agency and power, and of the love of fate that the illusory feeling of freedom promotes.

The aim of the current research was to identify the philosophical components of an educated person. The research approach was qualitative with an interpretative paradigm, and the methods of documentary-library, descriptiveanalytical research and the "philosophical analysis" research method of analytical analysis were used. The research field included 11 professors of Farhangian University of Kurdistan province in the academic year of 1402-1401, who were selected using criteria-based purposeful sampling. The research tool included an in-depth, semi-structured interview conducted by the researcher. The research findings were presented in three areas: knowledge components, moral components and personality components. The results showed that, in general, from a philosophical point of view, educated people have special, different, and outstanding characteristics compared to others in all three fields of knowledge, ethics and personality. So that any movement, speech or behavior of educated people shows their high level of education. However, it should be kept in mind that educated people are different from each other and have a plurality of attitudes, and despite having many commonalities, they are not all the same in all criteria; Therefore, it is difficult to find people who have all these characteristics together.

It is possible to distinguish between two modes of social criticism: the one exemplified in our intellectual and political–ideological statements about society (foundational criticism) and the other in our everyday goings about the world (ordinary criticism). Foundational criticism has an explanatory depth and systemic character that ordinary criticism lacks. However, on second glance, ordinary criticism seems to track the nature of our moral lives better and more wholesomely. This article tries to map the implications of pursuing these two modes of social criticism, even if the end results were to turn out to be similar.

The early identification of sociopathic and psychopathic traits in youth presents a crucial opportunity for forensic sciences to mitigate future criminal behavior. This research explores the ethical dimensions of profiling potential offenders in their formative years through the lens of Thomas Aquinas, whose extensive writings examined the connection between the human mind and divine intellect, synthesizing knowledge to bridge reason and faith. By analyzing the cases of Mary Bell and Ted Bundy, this paper examines how early behavioral indicators of psychopathy and sociopathy were either overlooked or mishandled, leading to devastating consequences. Special attention is given to forensic challenges in third-world countries, where limited resources, corruption, and systemic barriers complicate early detection and intervention. Additionally, the study evaluates the role of artificial intelligence in forensic profiling, weighing its benefits in enhancing accuracy and efficiency against ethical concerns regarding bias, stigmatization, and misuse. The findings emphasize the necessity of balancing scientific advancements with ethical considerations to ensure that early identification efforts prioritize rehabilitation over criminalization. Concluding with a reflective analysis, this paper considers how Aquinas' philosophical framework has influenced the researcher's personal growth and professional aspirations, envisioning a future where forensic science integrates technology, ethics, and psychology to create more just and effective crime prevention strategies.

This paper summarizes some stage theories of religious development which are rooted in the Piagetian tradition. Some of the assumptions and presuppositions of R. Goldman, D. Elkind, J. Fowler, F. Oser are discussed. On the basis of exploratory studies about the development of the concept of salvation in children and adolescents among the SDA population, some suggestions are presented as a new theoretical model of religious development applicable to many religious populations.

This study utilizes a controlled experimental design to investigate the influence of a virtual reality experience on empathy, compassion, moral reasoning, and moral foundations. With continued debate and mixed results from previous studies attempting to show relationships between virtual reality and empathy, this study takes advantage of the technology for its ability to provide a consistent, repeatable experience, broadening the scope of analysis beyond empathy. A systematic literature review identified the most widely used and validated moral psychology assessments for the constructs, and these assessments were administered before and after the virtual reality experience. The study is comprised of two pre-post experiments with student participants from a university in the United States. The first experiment investigated change in empathy and moral foundations among 44 participants, and the second investigated change in compassion and moral reasoning among 69 participants. The results showed no significant change in empathy nor compassion, but significant change in moral reasoning from personal interest to post-conventional stages, and significant increase in the Care/harm factor of moral foundations. By testing four of the primary constructs of moral psychology with the most widely used and validated assessments in controlled experiments, this study attempts to advance our understanding of virtual reality and its potential to influence human morality. It also raises questions about our self-reported assessment tools and provides possible new insights for the constructs examined.

Анотація. У статті проаналізовано вживання дефініції «педагогдослідник» і складність її однозначного тлумачення. Розглянуто проблему одночасного поєднання педагогічної та дослідницької діяльності у шкільному середовищі. Акцентована увага на наукових підходах, на які має опиратися педагог вищої школи у своїй професійній діяльності для досягнення позитивних результатів. На основі аналізу наукових джерел описано рівні втілення педагогом дослідницьких проектів. Проведений діагностувальний етап експериментальної роботи серед представників українських науково-педагогічних шкіл дав змогу виокремити професійні, дослідницькі й особистісні групи характеристик педагога-дослідника. Усі категорії досліджуваних зійшлися на думці, що основними характерними рисами педагога-дослідника є креативність, професіоналізм і готовність до самовдосконалення, що і допомогло авторові сформулювати визначення категорії «педагог-дослідник» та зʼясувати ефективні показники його професійної діяльності. Ключові слова: педагог-дослідник, наукові підходи, рівні дослідницької діяльності, характерні риси педагога-дослідника, професійнотворчий розвиток.

In this paper I explore the notion of epistemic alienation of agency in cases of self-deception. Contra Bagnoli (2019), I argue that the notion of strategic defence of the certain representation of the self, of which several authors make use to explain why self-deception occurs, should remain central to the idea that the epistemic agent who embarks on self-deception is incurring epistemic alienation of agency. This requires, however, a disambiguation of the notion of strategic defence. The advantage of such disambiguation reverberates onto a perhaps more nuanced explanation of what it takes, regarding the constitution of agency, and the related claims of responsibility, to both entering and exiting self-deception than Bagnoli diagnoses. Finally, I briefly explore a peculiar, and recently somehow more publicly visible case of resistance about exiting selfdeception in the face of healthy criticisms involving a claim of responsibility which, unfortunately, is rhetorically void.

Il giudizio di attribuzione della responsabilità per l’azione è solitamen-
te associato ad atteggiamenti ‘reattivi’, quali il biasimo o il risentimento.
Secondo l’approccio inaugurato da P.F. Strawson, le pratiche sociali di
attribuzione di responsabilità sono inestricabilmente intrecciate a que-
sti atteggiamenti emotivi. In questo intervento, propongo di indagare
la relazione concettuale tra l’atteggiamento pratico della ‘speranza no-
nostante l’evidenza’ e la categoria composita degli atteggiamenti reatti-
vi. Seguendo una traccia kantiana, sosterrò che la speranza è un atteg-
giamento razionale, le cui credenziali sono pratiche anziché epistemi-
che. Sosterrò che l’atteggiamento di speranza è un atteggiamento proat-
tivo, che sta a fondamento degli atteggiamenti reattivi. È l’atteggiamen-
to che ci predispone verso noi stessi e verso gli altri, come agenti capaci
di riorientamento e portatori di cambiamento. In quest’ultimo senso, la
speranza è un atteggiamento sovversivo, che non contraddice l’eviden-
za passata, ma impegna ad assumersi in prima persona la responsabili-
tà per il futuro...

This book, reconstructs modern constitutionalism as a legal order grounded in the mediation of our universal moral grammar with modern society and the revolutionary dynamic of cultural evolution. The work presents a theory of social evolution in extenso, arguing that the psychologically based moral constraints of evolutionary adaptation of functional systems result from independent cultural and biological learning processes.

The book explores how the egalitarian, normative, and cognitively inclusive tendency of constitutionalism (rule of law, subjective rights, democratic principles) enables the fight for rights within the law itself, fostering continuous cognitive and moral learning in modern societies. The function of constitutional law in this learning process is analyzed through a reconstructive interpretation, demonstrating how the combination of subjective rights with the organizational principles and legal norms of democratic checks and balances operates as a built-in rightswidener.

The book argues that constitutions can bridge the modern chasm between rapid cultural evolution and the slower evolution of our moral psychology, stabilizing the emancipation of the universalistic principles of the individual mind from the reactionary censorship of parochial and egocentric parameters. Inspired by evolutionary theory, including gene-culture coevolution, and the contributions of sociologists and other social scientists, the author applies an interdisciplinary perspective to understand social evolution. Furthermore, the philosophy of John Rawls, particularly the idea of an overlapping consensus and the analogy between language acquisition and normative reasoning, exerts a significant influence.

The analysis traces the history of legal theory and evolution, the Darwinian challenge to the social and legal sciences, Godfrey-Smith's multidimensional perspective on Darwinian populations, and the application of this framework to understand sociocultural evolution, including Luhmann's theories and the dynamics of the emergence of inequality and the dissolution of stratification towards modern constitutionalism, drawing on the work of Hauke Brunkhorst. Ultimately, the book seeks to recontextualize the development of constitutionalism within evolutionary thought, investigating the complex interplay between biology, culture, and institutions.

In my analysis I deal with some causes and origins of evil and of moral degeneration in the human dimension. My analysis focuses on Plato's Republic. The origins and causes of the presence of injustice and of vice lie in the very structure of the human soul. The division of the soul into parts which are at least reciprocally independent of each other implies that there is the possibility that they are in conflict with each other. This is the origin of injustice and the root of every form of evil. The correct equilibrium among the parts of the soul, which, in my opinion, are to be interpreted as authentic potencies, can be achieved only by developing the rational part. This development requires a thorough education in philosophy. Throughout my analysis I quote passages in which Plato points out the presence of bad instincts and, in general, of a morally difficult component in our soul. The kind of soul considered in my analysis is the embodied soul.

While the conversations surrounding moral cultivation in Confucianism often focus on the debate regarding the starting point of moral learning (and corresponding features of the learning process) that is inspired by the disagreements between the Mengzi 孟子 and the Xunzi 荀子, 1 there is another group of scholarship on moral cultivation which tends to the experiential qualities felt by the learning agents. 2 This essay participates in the latter group of scholarship. The majority of discussions regarding the learning experience center around mental states such as an 安 (tranquility or equanimity) and le 樂 (happiness, joy, or pleasure) of a special kind. There is, nonetheless, a minor trend that emphasizes the significance of you 憂 (worry or distress). In this essay, I raise attention to the significance of you and argue that in the Analects, an indispensable and significant part of Confucian moral cultivation is to learn to worry well, which involves learning to worry broadly about society in general, and to worry deeply about particular individuals standing in important relationship to us. Keywords Analects. You 憂 (worry). Confucian moral cultivation. Method of extension. Method of intensification * Wenhui XIE

It is well known that advanced technologies, equipped with artificial intelligence (AI), are increasingly becoming a part of our daily lives. AI is now found in smartphones, smart homes, and cars. Additionally, it is present in anthropomorphic robots used in healthcare and the entertainment industry, among many other examples. These advanced robots are also entering the realm of human relationships, including friendships and romantic/sexual connections, where humans form parasocial bonds with the robots, leading to human-robot relationships. The media has shown significant interest in these relationships, which I refer to as "technosexual relationships," where a human is romantically and/or sexually involved with an artificial entity. Often, the artificial individual takes the form of a so-called "sex doll/robot," making technosexual relationships a somewhat controversial phenomenon. Media representations of these relationships are gaining attention as public curiosity surrounding the topic continues to grow. By examining how artificial individuals have been portrayed historically in myths and popular culture through TV shows and films, it becomes evident that the idea of an artificial partner or lover is often viewed negatively, and sometimes even as dangerous—a perspective that has proven difficult to overcome

In this thesis, I explore how technosexuality is "permitted" to exist in and through filmed media, using a media content analysis of five interviews with technosexual individuals and their artificial partners. By addressing three research questions inspired by Stuart Hall’s theory of representation, I aim to answer the following: 1) How does the technosexual individual speak about themselves? 2) How does the media frame the technosexual person and their relationship during the interview? 3) Does the conversation shift from focusing on artificial sexuality as an individual phenomenon to questioning whether society’s view on relationships and sexuality is transforming?

The results indicate that technosexual individuals describe themselves as people who simply prefer a partner that is predictable and safe, often expressing greater happiness in their relationship with their artificial partner. Additionally, it is clear that the media, to some extent, allows the technosexual person and their artificial partner to tell their own story, although certain media producers attempt to manipulate the narrative by framing it within biased contexts. Finally, the study reveals that technosexuality, as an individual phenomenon, has begun to challenge traditional concepts of "normal" human sexuality. With the help of globalized media representations, it is creating divisions in society—into those who support or oppose artificial relationships and their role in reshaping our understanding of relationships and sexuality.

Over the course of the last 15 years, Constantine Sandis has advanced our understanding of the role that action plays in shaping our moral thought. In this collection of his best essays in the philosophy of action, Sandis brings together updated versions of his writings, accompanied by a new introduction. Read collectively they demonstrate the breadth of his interests and ability to relate to broader issues within the culture, connecting debates in philosophical psychology about motivation, negligence, and moral responsibility with Greek tragedy, social psychology and literature.

Along this path from action to ethics, Sandis engages with Hegel, Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Ricoeur, Davidson, and Dretske, together with contemporary authors such as Jennifer Hornsby and Jonathan Dancy. As he responds to each thinker and theme, he develops his own philosophical position, the key thesis of which is that philosophy of action without ethics is empty, ethics without philosophy of action is blind.

Link to free sample: https://issuu.com/education_library/docs/15042

Evolúciós hatások a jogelméletben: mediátor majmok, egyenlőségpárti patkányok és a morális ösztön szerepe a jogi szabályozásban 2 Absztrakt E tanulmány áttekinti a morálfilozófia, jogfilozófia és pszichológia közötti kapcsolatokat, különös tekintettel a morális érzelmek szerepére a döntéshozatalban. A morális érzelmek megkülönböztetik a Homo sapienst a Homo oeconomicustól. De mégis honnan jönnek ezek a jogi normarendszer hátterében is meghúzódó morális megérzések? Az itt bemutatott kutatások szerint ezek nemcsak társadalmi konstrukciók, hanem evolúciós múltunkhoz kötődő, belénk programozott erkölcsi intuíciók. E szemlélet szerint ugyanúgy, ahogy alapvető nyelvi ösztönnel jövünk a világra, rendelkezünk egy alapvető morális ösztönnel is. Ismétlődő szelekciós kihívásokra, mint például egy csoporton belüli osztozkodás vagy a potyautas magatartás büntetése, az élőlényekben morális viselkedéses hajlamok alakulnak ki. Ez a morális ösztön a tágabb állatvilágban gyökerezik, már a fejlett emlősökkel megjelenik a protomoralitás. A tanulmány bemutatja a morális ösztönök mellett szóló érveket, hogyan formálják azok a jog szerkezetét, illetve hogy mikor vezethetnek félre a morális heurisztikák. Az emberi és állati viselkedés hasonlóságai rávilágítanak a morális és jogi rendszerek közötti összefüggésekre, valamint az evolúciós pszichológia lehetséges magyarázataira a morális viselkedés és a jogi szabályozás kialakulásában.

Gracias a los trabajos de Gilligan aparece la ética del cuidado y la r e s p o n s a b i l i d a d que tiene en cuenta los aspectos diferenciales y las necesidades particulares de las personas. Esta ética se contrapone a la de la justicia descrita por Kholber cuyas características son el principio de igualdad y la ceguera ante las características específicas de cada ser humano. Ambas éticas parecen, sin embargo, complementarias. El trabajo que se presenta incluye ambos enfoques éticos implícitamente contrapuestos, en una situación experimental en la cual se pide a sujetos de diferentes edades (desde los 6 años hasta los 21) que tomen decisiones que implican optar por uno u otr o de estos dos enfoques o integrar ambos. El tratamiento de los datos se r ealiza anaizando los modelos organizadores que aparecen, lo cual permite diferenciar los datos de la situaci´n que r esultan más destacables para los sujetos de cada edad, el significado que atribuyen a cada uno de ellos, la forma como los or ganizan para conferir un sentido al conjunto y las implicaciones que hacen derivar de todo ello. El estudio de la evolución de los modelos or ganizadores, en las diferentes edades, muestra que la evolución de las concepciones éticas, cuando se presenta una situación próxima a las de la vida r eal, está lejos de ser lineal y de aproximarse cada vez más a la moral teórica establecida, como pr etendía Kohlberg. Ello conduce a plantearnos el análisis de los procesos psíquicos que conducen a la construcción de la ética, mediante modelos teóricos que contemplenla complejidad y al abandono de modelos lineales incapaces de describir los fenómenos observados. É tica del cuida d, ética de la justicia, aspectos diferenciales, igualdad, toma de decisiones, modelos org a n i z a d o res, reduccionismo, androcentrismo, género .

New light is shed here on the ten universal principles of morality known as New light is shed here on the ten universal principles of morality known as Yama and Niyama. These are the foundational principles of Ananda Marga’s eight-fold system of yogic spiritual practices—yama, niyama, asana, pranayama, pratyahara, dharana, dhyana and samadhi. These ten principles have universal applicability when interpreted in the light of deep spiritual understanding. Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar (1921-1990), was a spiritual preceptor and guru in the tradition of Shiva and Krishna. He founded the international socio-spiritual organization Ananda Marga (“Path of Bliss”)

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, s...

We agree with Clapp and colleagues (2024) that the representational view of language presents an impoverished account of communicative speech acts. Empirical research shows how people’s conceptual inferences and moral reactions to bioethical phenomena often respond to, or reflect, the socio-relational context of a decision among other potential background factors. In this commentary, we propose that methodologies drawn from experimental bioethics (see, e.g., Earp et al. 2021a; Lewis, Demaree-Cotton and Earp 2023) can be used to shed light on such factors and illustrate our contention with a high-level preview of forthcoming research into public perceptions of brain organoids research. This work is based on the pragmatist assumption that how we refer to these stem-cell-based models (e.g., as “mini-brains”, “brains-in-a-dish”, neural or cerebral organoids), in combination with social and contextual cues, may affect people’s intuitions about how these models are, or should be, used, or their willingness to donate biospecimens for such purposes. We explain how empirical-cum-normative investigations into the eliciting factors and cognitive processes that shape people’s perceptions and attitudes about such research -- and what the ethical upshot of such investigations might be -- can support the authors’ vision of a “pragmatist” bioethics.

Noah McKay (2023) has proposed a novel argument against naturalism. He argues that while theism can explain our ability to arrive at a body of moral beliefs that are generally accurate and complete', naturalism fails to do so. He argues that naturalism has only social and biological grounds to account for our moral beliefs, which means that naturalism can only claim pragmatic value for our moral beliefs. McKay dedicates his paper to arguing against naturalism. This paper will focus on theism and examine whether theism can explain what naturalism cannot. Theism could rely on guided evolution or the miraculous intervention of God. In contrast to naturalism, theism has revelatory and supernatural grounds for our moral beliefs. This paper will demonstrate some of the challenges that these grounds would encounter. Finally, McKay's argument implies a dichotomy between unguided evolution and theism, which rests on a problematic assumption about evolutionary theory; by abandoning the assumption, the dichotomy also dissolves.

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В статті розглянуто аспекти розробки та впровадження у навчально-педагогічний процес з фізики системи навчальних завдань з елементами математичного моделювання, що має на меті підвищення рівня навчання студентів до рівня наукового пізнання.Considered in the article aspects of developing and implementation in education of physics of training tasks with elements of mathematical modeling, aimed at raising students to the level up of scientific knowledge

Professional philosophers are members of bioethical committees and regulatory bodies in areas of interest to bioethicists. This suggests they possess moral expertise even if they do not exercise it directly and without constraint. Moral expertise is defined, and four arguments given in support of scepticism about their possession of such expertise are considered and rejected: the existence of extreme disagreement between moral philosophers about moral matters; the lack of a means clearly to identify moral experts; that expertise cannot be claimed in that which lacks objectivity; and that ordinary people do not follow the advice of moral experts. Even if moral philosophers do nevertheless have a limited moral expertise, in that they alone can fully develop a set of moral judgments, I sketch reasons -grounded in the values of autonomy and of democracy -why moral philosophers should not wish non-philosophers to defer to their putative expertise.

begrebet retfaerdighed, vel vidende at det er et begreb som mange jurister, i nogle tilfaelde under Ross' indflydelse, ikke bryder sig om at anvende. Herom mere nedenfor. 2 Retssikkerhedsprincipper indgår både i civilprocessen og i den offentlige ret, vaegten vil her blive lagt på sidstnaevnte. 108 © Författarna och Studentlitteratur 3 Begrundelseskravet er et selvstaendigt forvaltningretligt krav, der er naert beslaegtet med officialprincippet. Jeg vil se bort fra denne sondring, der ikke er vigtig for naervaerende.

In our paper, we respond to Geoffrey Roche's critique of Adorno and Horkheimer's view on Sade's impact on Enlightenment morality. We invite you to explore our analysis and share your thoughts on this intriguing intersection of philosophy and literature.

First and foremost, this paper provides a short historical reminder of the emergence of the field of psychology of development of moral reasoning. In the second part of the paper, the author offers a problem-oriented overview of the field, that is, one possible classification of particular groups of problems for empirical research. This overview does not only point out to the problems that were more and that were less studied (e.g.. evaluative moral judgment and reasoning, distinguishing between moral and extra-moral rules and norms) and to those that were relatively neglected (i.e. understanding moral situations), but also to the problems that psychologists did not even recognize as research problems. Such are the problems of development of moral concepts, meaning of moral words etc. Finally, the author also points out to the fact that this classification could be taken as one way to define the field, that is, the way to determine the boundaries of its subject of studying.

Contemporary moral development theory follows pathways laid down in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724Kant ( -1804)). For Kant, moral action consists of dutiful adherence to formal rules and has nothing to do with the pursuit of personal goals. Indeed, one can be sure that one's action is moral only if it is done out of duty and goes against all of one's "inclinations." Some contemporary moral developmentalists (for instance, Kohlberg and Turiel) are formalists: they draw from Kant the conception of moral rules as universalizable categorical imperatives, recognizable by their formal features, that pertain to social issues. Others (e.g., Eisenberg) are altruists: they draw on Kant's insistence that moral action is inherently self-sacrificial, though they also insist that moral acts be specifically motivated by the desire to benefit others. We subject both formalism and altruism to thorough critique. Both positions define the moral domain too narrowly, leaving out questions of private morality like being honest with oneself; they cannot accommodate other principled conceptions of morality, like eudaimonism, that reject their Kantian presuppositions; and they cannot answer the question "Why be moral?" Whether impersonal or anti-personal, they neglect the personal. We propose a character-based redefinition of the moral domain that reintegrates moral development with the development of the self and of values, taking advantage of the insights into these areas of development afforded by the interactivist framework. We conclude by describing the challenges that a truly adequate account of moral development will have to meet and the contributions that eudaimonism can make to meeting those challenges.

Previously, we argued that moral development research has for too long been reliant on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The Kantian legacy forces improper restrictions on the moral domain, fails to acknowledge mature but non-Kantian moral conceptions such as eudaimonism, and isolates moral development from the development of the self. Now we respond to critical commentary from advocates of post-Kantian formalism and post-Kantian altruism . Helwig et al. deny the validity of eudaimonism as a moral perspective while asserting that it has been incorporated wholesale into a post-Kantian moral synthesis. We refute each of the arguments they present. Even if their objections to eudaimonism are completely correct, they have still not explained how anyone might develop a eudaimonistic moral conception. Eisenberg questions our definitions of altruistic and prosocial behavior; we defend them on their own terms, while showing how they are largely in accord with Eisenberg's own practice, and that of other "prosocial development" researchers. We conclude that moral personality is a legitimate object of study (despite efforts by Helwig et al. to push it out of the scientific arena) and discuss the challenges posed by taking moral personality seriously.

Directores: Martín Daguerre (Universidad Nacional de La Plata) y Antonio Diéguez (Universidad de Málaga). Codirector: Leonardo González Galli (Universidad de Buenos Aires).

El objetivo general de esta tesis es establecer las condiciones de posibilidad de una 'ética de la polarización afectiva'. La hipótesis es que, cuando son ejercitados a largo plazo y asentados en una estructura institucional, los diferentes componentes de la 'metacognición' ('conocimiento metacognitivo', 'monitoreo' y 'regulación'), entendida a grandes rasgos como una cognición de 'segundo orden' y en clave del Sistema 3 argumentado por el psicólogo social Olivier Houdé (2014, 2019), pueden favorecer la promoción de un tipo de carácter que es condición de posibilidad para la disminución de la polarización afectiva, los altos niveles de conflictividad asociados y, eventualmente, la consecución de una 'normatividad intergrupal'. Según se argumenta, el tipo de carácter a propiciar es uno en el cual la humildad intelectual es alta (un reconocimiento de los límites del propio conocimiento) y la intolerancia dogmática es baja (menor tendencia a rechazar y considerar inferior cualquier creencia ideológica que difiera de la propia). Para ello, debido a los fuertes condicionamientos que los contextos altamente polarizados ejercen sobre los adultos, una 'ética de la polarización afectiva' debe entenderse como una 'ética preventiva de la polarización afectiva'. Esta argumentación lleva a concluir que las mejores chances de disminuir la polarización afectiva no están del lado de los adultos radicalizados del presente, sino del lado de los adultos metacognitivamente formados del futuro hipotético que proyecta la ética preventiva propuesta.

The general objective of this thesis is to establish the conditions of possibility of an 'ethics of affective polarization'. The hypothesis is that, when exercised over the long term and established in an institutional structure, the different components of 'metacognition' ('metacognitive knowledge', 'monitoring' and 'regulation'), understood broadly as a 'second order' cognition and in terms of System 3 argued by the social psychologist Olivier Houdé, can favor the promotion of a type of character that is a condition of possibility for the reduction of affective polarization, the high levels of conflict associated with it and, eventually, the achievement of an 'intergroup normativity'. According to the argument, the type of character to be fostered is one in which intellectual humility is high (a recognition of the limits of one's own knowledge) and dogmatic intolerance is low (less tendency to reject and consider inferior any ideological belief that differs from one's own). To this end, given the strong conditioning that highly polarized contexts exert on adults, an 'ethics of affective polarization' must be understood as a 'preventive ethics of affective polarization.' This argument leads to the conclusion that the best chances of reducing affective polarization are not on the side of radicalized adults of the present, but on the side of metacognitively formed adults of the hypothetical future projected by the proposed preventive ethics.

Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation -the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual -and norm evasion -the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair, but also believed that recipients found it fair, even though recipients of the offer considered it to be unfair. In contrast, norm evasion operated as a highly explicit process. When they could do so without the recipient's knowledge, individuals made uneven offers despite knowing that their behaviour was unfair.

This article discusses Benjamin's interpretation of Baudelaire's poetry as a key to reading modernity. Understanding the ambiguities between novelty and archaism, typical of the time, is only possible thanks to the poet's gesture of privileging radical contingency. On the one hand, the violence of unwanted encounters amid the crowd does not allow for reflection; on the other, its productive dimension makes contingency speakable. The poet's verses will make possible the encounter of the now of experience with the available past in terms of expectation: explanatory images are produced from the singularity of language. Finally, the Lacanian real is produced thanks to the understanding of the psyche as structure.

This paper criticises the two prominent interpretations of utopianism in Plato's Republic. The traditional argues that it is mere utopianism, seriously proposing that Kallipolis is, in fact, the ideal city. The ironic argues that the Republic is a critique of the ability for reason to reconstruct human nature and is, therefore, a dire warning against utopian thinking in politics. I oppose these two interpretations and instead argue that the Republic implies a paradoxical necessity in the nature of utopianism: The ideal cannot be theorised without itself being conditioned by the politics of theorising, and yet the politics of theorising is immanently motivated by the ideal. I locate this seemingly antonymic dynamic within the education of the learner/citizen in the Republic. Although this is centred on the notion of self-governance, it cannot be imposed and instead depends on the philosophical development of one's soul that is inextricably linked to justice in the city. Therefore, the utopianism of the Republic ought to be thought of as dialectical, being simultaneously situated and yet normatively transcending.

Making moral judgments is an essential step toward developing ethical AI systems. Prevalent approaches are mostly implemented in a bottom-up manner, which uses a large set of annotated data to train models based on crowd-sourced opinions about morality. These approaches have been criticized for overgeneralizing the moral stances of a limited group of annotators and lacking explainability. This work proposes a flexible top-down framework to steer (Large) Language Models (LMs) to perform moral reasoning with well-established moral theories from interdisciplinary research. The theory-guided top-down framework can incorporate various moral theories. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework on datasets derived from moral theories. Furthermore, we show the alignment between different moral theories and existing morality datasets. Our analysis exhibits the potential and flaws in existing resources (models and datasets) in developing explainable moral judgment-making systems.