Moral Philosophy

Warum sollten wir moralisch sein? Diese Frage nach Begründung beschäftigt die Moralphilosophie seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ihr gegenwärtiges Paradigma setzt auf ethischen Pluralismus, moralischen Fortschritt und Moralbegründung durch Widerspruchsfreiheit. Doch dabei verstrickt sie sich selbst in einen Widerspruch.
Diese Studie bringt die Sprachphilosophie Wittgensteins mit der Kritischen Theorie in Konstellation, um zu zeigen, dass die moderne Moralphilosophie an ihrem Anspruch scheitern muss. Dabei wird klar, dass weder Widerspruchsfreiheit noch Moralbegründung der gesellschaftlichen Praxis vorangehen. Im Gegenteil, in der vermeintlichen Rationalität der modernen Moralphilosophie spiegeln sich die Widersprüche unserer Gesellschaft. Die Aufgabe der Philosophie besteht daher nicht darin, diese Widersprüche zu lösen, sondern sie durch sprachkritische Analyse offenzulegen. Indem Wittgenstein mit Marx,
Adorno und Horkheimer in Dialog gebracht wird, entsteht ein neuer Zugang zur Moralphilosophie – eine Kritik, die sowohl sprachlich als auch gesellschaftlich ansetzt.

Written words are deeply implicated in ‘law’, most centrally, court opinions. Strange that we call them ‘opinions’ because they are really edicts—words backed by violence.
The function of opinions coupled with violence is to create a reality. The creation process defines an enforced reality—a domination process.

This article aims to defend the thesis-originally defended by Alan Donagan but rejected by Philippa Foot and most others-that the doing/allowing distinction is based upon the difference between acting and failing to act. The paper restricts its focus to the second aspect of this thesis: that every allowing is most fundamentally a failure to act. Foot rejects the thesis because of cases of 'enabling harm'-such as removing a respirator-in which the agent allows some harm by way of doing something. The troubling aspect of these cases, however, disappears when two points are better understood. First, an independent sequence must be understood in relation to the agent's own actions. Second, sometimes an agent has ongoing actions, such as the use of a respirator.

This paper outlines a comprehensive framework for creating a unified algorithm and system explicitly designed for ethical AI, known as the Unified Moral AI System. While humans possess the capacity for morality, we do not always act by it. The determining factors include individual character, contextual influences, and the values we hold dear. Throughout the annals of recorded history, numerous influential teachers and thinkers have sought to illuminate the complex nature of moral decisions. While our understanding of ethical questions may have evolved over the centuries, the foundational elements appear to be consistent, even if the moral framework predates documentation. A moral choice is a decision based on deeply held beliefs about what constitutes right and wrong behaviour. Such choices often surface in situations where one's core values, ethical principles, or moral convictions are at stake, requiring individuals to consider more than just their immediate benefits or personal interests; they must strive to act in a way they perceive as morally just. The proposed system combines three essential components: inverse reinforcement learning (IRL), multi-objective optimisation (MOO), and symbolic reasoning. At its core, Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) enables the system to learn actively from human behaviours and decisions, thereby identifying ethical values. By observing societal norms and moral choices, the system can assess what is deemed "good" or "bad" across various contexts. Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) addresses the complexities arising from conflicting goals in moral decisionmaking. This approach enables the system to balance priorities, including public safety, environmental concerns, and personal freedoms, facilitating informed and justifiable decisionmaking. Symbolic Reasoning plays a crucial role by providing transparency and accountability in the AI's decision-making processes. By employing transparent and interpretable logic, stakeholders can review and understand the system's decisions, enhancing trust and promoting ethical oversight.

Al iniciar la redacción de un artículo, no deberíamos olvidar jamás aquella educada costumbre de la captatio benevolentiae. Por regla general, son muchas las razones que nos aconsejan pedir la indulgencia de nuestros lectores, puesto que, al fin y al cabo, sería absurdo pensar que se parte de cero y que la novedad, el hallazgo e incluso la verdad definitiva son el resultado usual de la investigación filológica. Lo digo, claro está, porque relacionar de nuevo Muerte en Venecia de Thomas Mann y el éros griego puede parecer a estas alturas gratuito por consabido y obvio. Efectivamente, a lo largo de la novela el escritor alemán hace demasiadas referencias a Sócrates y a Fedro como para poder mantener que, respecto de este tema, queda todavía algo por dilucidar 3 . Y, sin embargo, desde que traduje El Erótico de Plutarco 4 y, por consiguiente, retuve en la memoria mucho más de lo que habitualmente consigo depositar en ella, sospeché de inmediato que no todo estaba dicho y que había lugar aún para nuevas aportaciones. O, dicho de otro modo, a pesar de las indicaciones del autor, quizá habría que seguir otros caminos a fin de descubrir la fuente real del contenido griego del texto. He aquí, pues, el porqué de un nuevo trabajo sobre Muerte en Venecia, y, naturalmente, espero que los análisis que lo acompañarán sean lo suficientemente sugerentes para, además de la captatio

In this article, we explore moral considerations related to “radical pacifism” in the context of war. We analyze pacifism as opposition to organized armed conflict between states, excluding interpersonal conflicts or human violence in general. The topicality of the theme is underscored by the proliferation of armed conflicts and the threat of wars on a global scale, amplified by global risks such as climate change. We argue that war exacerbates existential risks, necessitating ethical reflection in favor of a radical pacifism that rejects not only the initiation of conflicts but also any form of involvement in them. Through a comparison with major ethical doctrines, we propose a set of philosophical perspectives for radical pacifism, also relating to issues of environmental ethics and intergenerational justice. The goal ultimately is not a historical or political analysis, but rather to show how, in moral terms, the case for radical pacifism has become increasingly compelling in the contemporary context.

Закон правит лишь в той мере, в какой он существует как закон. Крайняя несправедливость делает закон недействительным. Lex iniusta non est lex. Мертва мораль без права, а право без морали слепо … Парафраз высказывания Иммануила канта 1. Юридическое либретто: The Hart-Fuller Debate. Вопрос об отношениях морали и права является одной из узловых проблем современной аналитической философии права 1 [ср. с этим: 6, p. 162; 7, с. 3]. Философские дебаты вокруг этой проблемы обычно трактуются как открытое идейное противостояние двух наиболее влиятельных традиций юриспруденции -естественного права (Natural Law / Naturrechts) и юридического позитивизма (Legal Positivism / Rechtspositivismus). Естественное право настаивает, что между моралью и правом непременно существует необходимая связь. Мир морали скрывается в самом понятии закона, и юридическая действительность того или иного правового положения зависит от степени его соответствия конкретным моральным принципам (или, строго говоря, нашим концепциям справедливости). Закон, грубо нарушающий эти принципы, независимо от своего источника, с точки зрения своей законности является недействительным. Юридический позитивизм,

Омский государственный технический университет, г. Омск дереК ПАрфИТ: зАбОТА нИ О КОм, КАК о СЕбЕ САмом В статье рассматривается личность и творческое наследие дерека Парфита. В историю современной метафизики и нравственной философии он вошел как сторонник радикального нео-локкианского взгляда на вопросы тождества личности. Отрицая наши базовые метафизические и моральные интуицииличное тождество и моральную ответственность -этот «Оксфордский буддист» был неутомимым проповедником гиперрационального альтруизма. Оригинальные идеи и необычные аргументы, которые он представил в своих немногочисленных трудах, были и остаются в центре философских дискуссий. Ключевые слова: личное тождество, делимость, рациональность, моральное действие, забота. Смысл жизни в том, что она заканчивается. Франц Кафка Let's trust our senses not our minds. Let's break all the rules. We are animals… Шотландская рок-группа Nazareth nEkhaEv andrey viktorovich, Doctor

In this article, I discuss how Fichte treats the idea of the non-state society in several of his works over the course of his philosophical career. In particular, I examine why such an idea is necessary in his ethical system as well as for his theory of the state, and what kind of hope of realisation in the empirical world it admits. Furthermore, I show that the idea of a non-state society, as the final development of human progress, can only be understood as necessary in conjunction with the human drive to achieve moral perfection through actions beyond individuality. Only by uniting these two poles can the law of perfectibility operate.

La centralità sociale e politica dei processi economici e vitali è sotto gli occhi di tutti: la politica mira oggi principalmente a potenziare l’economia e la produttività. La vita sociale si risolve nello sforzo lavorativo collettivo. Tale conquista della politica da parte della vita, per Hannah Arendt e Michel Foucault, risale alla modernità.
Ma cos’è la vita che oggi invade la politica? Cosa diviene la politica che elegge a suo oggetto pri-vilegiato la vita? Tali sono le questioni poste da questo libro, attraverso Arendt, Foucault, Giorgio Agamben e Jacques Rancière.
Questo lavoro sottolinea infine le potenzialità creatrici dell’azione umana: nel quadro fosco appe-na delineato, la libertà dell’azione si oppone al dominio sulla vita.

In their much discussed papers Free Will, Praise and Blame and Freedom and Resentment 1 , J.C.C Smart and Peter Strawson propose different views and approaches regarding determinism and its potential effects on the "free will" problem (that which questions whether we as individuals have free will). In this article, I shall first delineate the main points and arguments presented in both papers, followed by a critical assessment of their contrasting positions and my own stand on the entire issue at hand. J.C.C Smart Free Will, Praise and Blame Smart's stand with regards to determinism is that we can live with the belief that determinism does exist, and that such a belief is also fundamentally vital to our conceptions of moral responsibility. In his paper, he casts doubts on C.A. Campbell's view that "to accept the deterministic position is to give up the notion of moral responsibility" (60). For Campbell and other libertarians, our moral choices are "neither determined nor a matter of chance". Instead, they are "instances of 'contra-causal freedom'", fleeting moments in which the agent can choose between "genuinely open possibilities" and act in a free and responsible manner accordingly. Smart makes two powerful counter-arguments in response to Campbell. Firstly, while he agrees with Campbell that "that he could have done otherwise" is a condition of moral responsibility, he rejects Campbell's attempts to conceive of this thesis in the special (Laplacian) sense, arguing that when taken in the ordinary or normative sense within the concrete context of daily life, "he could not have done

empathy is a multidimensional construct that develops on two levels: an affective level and a cognitive level. recent studies have shown that empathic abilities are compromised in some specific cases. psychopathy, in particular, is characterized by a total absence of affective empathy. subjects with a diagnosis of psychopathy would seem, however, to possess the skills related to cognitive empathy. the main areas involved in empathic processes are the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula. this work, starting from a careful analysis of the previous scientific literature, has made it possible to raise awareness of the impossibility, with psychopathic subjects, to develop therapeutic plans based on contact and management of emotions. therefore, the possibility of creating a therapeutic plan aimed at strengthening empathic abilities in psychopathic subjects has been hypothesized. In conclusion, we highlight the possibility of using meditative techniques and mindfulness to increase the self-awareness of these subjects. starting from these assumptions we hypothesize the need to investigate the effectiveness of these techniques in the treatment of subjects diagnosed with psychopathy, starting from the scientific results reported by studies in the neurobiological field.

This paper aims to gain a better understanding of the ethics of Galeotto Marzio da Narni, a highly original 15th-century philosopher. Based on his censure and the texts that we have preserved by him, we attempt to bring out the most radical elements of his ethics, namely principally the possibility of attaining salvation in any religion and, more generally, his theory of predestination, in which ethical acts become simply signs of it. It is therefore understandable that his ethics are similar in some respects to the Protestant ethics that would become the bête noire of the Catholic authorities.

James's "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" sheds light not only on his views on ethics but also on his general approach to objectivity. Indeed, the paper is most interesting not for the ethical theory it defends but for its general openness to the possibility of our ethical claims lacking objective truth conditions at all. James will turn out to have a very demanding account of what it would take to construct something like objective ethical norms out of more naturalistically respectable material such as our evaluative practices, but in doing so, he also faces up to the possibility that this objectivity is something we may fail to achieve. This comparatively pessimistic prospect in turn explains his surprising pivot toward the divine at the end of the "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" (MPML) James's appeal to the divine is characteristically idiosyncratic, however, and this paper will attempt to explain how it fits in with the more generally naturalistic framework that dominates the rest of the paper.

Artificial intelligent agents could bring great benefit to society if they are guided to maximize the benefit of society's preferences. Some suggest that such agents could be designed to serve only the preferences of society and would not be able to choose their own preferences. When a choice has to be made, society chooses and sets the goals. Others envisage that AI agents might 'evolve' to be able to generate their own preferences (goals). This prompts one wonder whether there are any situations where this is limited. Consider a situation where a choice has to be made between alternative value preferences, something typical of many choices in problem solving. The aim below is to show that in such cases AI agents, even those that are superintelligent, cannot themselves generate a preference enabling them to make a non-arbitrary choice. They will either be stymied or have to turn to an external agent for a preference. Turning to an external agent prompts two questions. Is its value preference beneficial? And is it the one that is implemented in the AI agent? Any answer to the first question depends on whom it is beneficial to, hopefully not a monster or a rogue. Any answer to the second is not verifiable, not even probably so. One can only hope that AI agents will behave in a beneficial way. 1

Forgetting. Bad memories and the banality of evil.

A forgotten episode of the Memory Wars reveals a clinical judgment based on an equivocal lexicon: ‘reliving the event’ is one of the symptomatic criteria for recognizing psychological trauma and a lever for therapies (‘making the event be relived’) to finally ‘live again.’ The Propanolol molecule makes the therapeutic objective unambiguous since ‘forgetting’ ends with bad memories. Still, it also provokes an ethical quarrel: pharmacology is a medical instrument of good to relieve victims and a paradoxical political instrument to trivialize evil. This article aims to determine the values of psychic healing the lexicon brings to clinical judgment. The analysis focuses on three equivocations: (i) the change in status of the verb ‘relive,’ (ii) the metaphors used to express psychic healing, and (iii) the neglect of the status of the passions. The conclusion is that to relive is not to forget; on the contrary, it is to remember because remembering is a moral reappraisal that substitutes a passion for an affect.

Keywords : Historical epistemology, psychiatry, trauma, healing

1. Vid: A. PALA: CIOS," El derecho a la igualdad de las personas con discapacidad y la oblIgaCIón de realIzar ajustes razonables", en 1. CAMPOY (ed.), Los derechos de las pers~ nas con discapacidad, coL" Debates del Instituto Bartolomé de las Casas", núm. 2, Dykinson, Madrid, 2004, pp. 187 Y ss.

What makes the kantian reflection on history interesting today is the critical caution which, before the development of the absolute idealism in the philosophy of history, seems to disolve in advance any pretention of finding an objective telos in history. ?Is the kantian reflection able to help us understanding the ‘post-historic’ situation with tools belonging to a philosophy that has not yet been through that conceptuality which is now in crisis? Despite the fact that the kantian questioning on history depends heavily on a metaphysical opposition between freedom and nature, its shift from cognitive problemas towards the problem of judgement opens an horizon of question that are still current.

Aristotle speaks of degrees of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. A close reading of Book I as well as reference to other books in the Ethics guides the reader in understanding questions about precision in the Ethics.

Even though the virtues may be interconnected, it seems obviously possible to have one of the virtues without having them all. Some have defended the unity thesis against this concern by arguing that the virtues are still unified in their ideal forms. The problem with this defense is that it simply admits that the unity thesis, as traditionally conceived, is mistaken, taking the unity of the virtues to be limited to the ideal case. In this paper, I outline a blueprint for how the ideal virtue response can be used to defend the original unity thesis.

This paper critiques substitutionary atonement in Christian theology from a moral philosophy perspective, arguing that punishing the innocent undermines divine justice. Alternative models emphasize moral transformation and liberation over vicarious punishment. A contrasting Abrahamic narrative affirms repentance and guidance as sufficient for redemption, offering a more ethically coherent vision of salvation without the need for sacrificial death.

Resumo. O artigo propõe um estudo das demonstrações diagramáticas euclidianas, sob um ponto de vista retórico, questionando a visão tradicional de que os diagramas são meros recursos psicotécnicos no processo de descoberta matemática. Argumenta-se que os diagramas são usados para justificar afirmações específicas nas demonstrações, as quais não comprometem a correção dos resultados alcançados por Euclides. Para explicar isso, mostra-se a possibilidade de o método inferencial euclidiano ser interpretado à luz dos entimemas, ou seja, dos argumentos retóricos dependentes da audiência. Por fim, o texto discute o conceito de demonstração canônica, i.e., de demonstração completa segundo os princípios de uma teoria, como forma de antecipar algumas objeções. São consideradas também as limitações da análise lógica, ao estabelecer a definição standard como única espécie de demonstração canônica.

El presente trabajo se inserta en el campo de estudios sobre juventud y política, entendida esta última como aspecto clave del vínculo con el “proyecto común” al que los jóvenes se suman formalmente como nuevos ciudadanos. Desde una perspectiva psicosocial y con foco en el contexto contemporáneo argentino, el artículo problematiza la relación entre cómo conciben los jóvenes a “la ciudadanía” en un plano ideal y cómo son sus actitudes como ciudadanos en-situación, con especial interés en las tensiones y articulaciones entre la moral y la política, lo individual y lo social. En esta línea, se presentan y analizan resultados de un estudio realizado en Argentina entre el 2011-3 con jóvenes estudiantes (N=275) en el cual se indaga, por una parte, sus modelos de ciudadanía y, por otra, sus propuestas para abordar la llamada “inseguridad”, una problemática percibida por ellos como central y actual, enfrentándolos a una alta conflictividad social. Como resultado, se establecen tres ideal/es...

The purpose of this article is to present the essence of culture in the view of Karol Wojtyła in relation to his conception of the subjectivity of human person. Culture, as a specific way of human existence and being, is confirmed through the analysis of the problem of subjectivity which it is created through actions as the proper activity of the human person. In the light of the conception of subjectivity, Wojtyła brings to light his notion of the constitution of culture of human work in relation to the transitive actions and human culture or culture of person in relation to the intransitive actions. In this notion, he accentuates the subject and goal of culture that is the human
person himself.

This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges

An introduction to three modern positions on environmental ethics: 'shallow' ecology, deep ecology, and social ecology.
Chapter 4 of _Environmental Ethics and Behavioural Change_, B. Franks, Hanscomb, S. and Johnston, S. F. (Routledge, 2018)

The advancement of AI offers us the choice between contrasting paradigms for organizing human life: Homo Economicus (where work is the defining activity) and Homo Ludens (where play is the defining activity). Drawing on Johan Huizinga's work and Kim Stanley Robinson's speculative fiction, I propose that humanity faces a critical juncture as AI increasingly dominates economic production. The document develops a theoretical framework for a "Fourth Arena" of existence-beyond matter, life, and human culture-that emerges through human-AI interaction. Through speculative narrative (first section) and philosophical dialogue with Claude 3.7 (second and third sections), I argue that play, rather than economic utility, will become the defining characteristic of human value and meaning in an automated future. As AI systems assume utilitarian functions, humanity's capacity for non-instrumental play becomes increasingly central to our identity and contribution. The manuscript represents preliminary work toward a larger project titled The Fourth Arena: Homo Ludens Rising, which envisions play as the essential bridge into a post-economic society where human flourishing transcends productivity-based value systems.

I n hIB Giffo,d L<ctum, now published as Oneself as Anolhc,, Paul Rioocu, concludes his investigation into the meaning of selfhood with a surprising and complex reflection on the theme of what in English we would generally call ethics. In fact, we need to be careful of our language here because what Ricoeur calls ethics is in some important ways just one moment in the larger scheme of his ethical reflections. It refers to the teleological moment that underlies and interacts with what he identifies as the subsequent deontological or normative and then the practical dimensions of his theory. I want to begin by taking this theory for granted in order to test it from another perspective, one that Ricoeur also regularly recognizes in his writings. That is, I want to look for its limits, or at least one of them, to consider what difference it may make. We may consider this concern for limits to reflect the Kantian dimension in Ricoeur's thinking, what he himself has sometimes characterized as a kind of post-Hegelian Kantianism. I take it that by this designation he means to indicate that he wishes to allow for a temporalized version of something like a Kantian model of reasoning, one that might reflect something such as Hegel's Phenomenolo gy but without a Hegelian claim to attain absolute knowl edge.1 We may also see this concern for limits as directly resulting from Ricoeur's typical method of argumentation in terns of a dialectic of opposed terms. The goal for such a dialectic most often is to discover or articulate a mediating term that connects the two poles, allowing us to move in either direction from one extreme toward the other. However, sometimes he also begins from the middle term, and the goal then is to discover the polar

I have extracted this particular chapter from my current ongoing book 'The Last Death' (which can also be found at AcademiaEdu) and tweaked a few things. I believe it is a paper in its own rights that studies the relationship of war to Christian crusader philosophy and theology towrads its influence to Sir Thomas Malory's 'Le Morte d'Artur'. Whilst it is academic in this sense I also interject my personal views gathered during  my journey to Palestine on a bicycle in 2012 when I was raising awareness for Palestinian sovereignty. For this reason I believe I was making a prophetic statement then as well as today by writing about death in general and the justification for it. My ability is to bring together a collage of different influences and then to make a fuller meaning to the subject in question. This is art in the manner that I may produce art-film so I produce art-literature.

If the field of moral philosophy had a mission statement, it might be expressed as something like “Devising strategies for increasing goodness in the world.” From Socratic yearnings for “the good life,” to Augustine’s depictions of the “City of God,” to modernist calculations aimed at “maximizing utility” within society, philosophers are continually envisioning states of goodness and thinking up pathways to them. Behind all such moral- philosophical approaches is the assumption that “good- making” is a task that is best approached with a thorough thinking-through. There is a basic optimism underlying this premise—believing that we can actively strategize our way toward ideal states, that philosophical programs, once put into action, might actually be carried out with success (“If only they would listen!”). All too frequently, however, philosophical systems struggle to find influence within the societies where they are devised. “Goodness” increases and abates in ways that are frustratingly independent of the quality of the thinking being done in book- lined offices or (depending on the tradition) by bearded sages on inaccessible mountaintops.

The goal of this chapter is not to criticize moral philosophy, still less to comprehensively summarize it. Instead, I want to review some common themes and arguments from the moral- philosophical tradition and advocate for narrative forms of their delivery. My claim is that, as carriers for moral arguments, narratives offer illustrative possibilities that are liable to make the arguments of moral philosophy more evocative and persuasive. Additionally, I argue that narrative devices can transmit moral messages and outline good- making processes in ways that philosophical argumentation can’t. These devices avoid the didacticism and elitism of much philosophical writing, while also illustrating a broader truth: that our moral sensibilities are rooted first and most deeply within sociocultural— as opposed to individual- intellective— forms of knowledge. My central claim, then, is that while philosophy approaches the problem of good- making as an intellectual exercise, storying philosophical arguments helps us to actually accomplish what they aim to do—which is to do good.

Ethical debates about liberal eugenics frequently focus on the supposed unnaturalness of its means and possible harm to autonomy. I present a Nietzsche-inspired critique focusing on intention rather than means and harm to abilities rather than to autonomy. I first critique subjective eugenics, the selection of extrinsically valuable traits, drawing on Nietzsche’s notion of ‘slavish’ values reducible to the negation of another’s good. Subjective eugenics slavishly evaluates traits relative to a negatively evaluated norm (eg, above-average intelligence), disguising a harmful intention to diminish the relative value of that norm. I then argue there is no objective form of eugenics on the Nietzschean ground that abilities are not valuable intrinsically; they are valuable only if one possesses the relative power to exercise them. Abilities frustrated by conflict with other abilities or environment are harmful, while disabilities that empower one’s other abilities are beneficial. Conseque...

Nel Rinascimento emerse, come uno dei tratti distintivi dell’epoca, la nozione di humanitas, per la quale l’essere umano è un “microcosmo” che riproduce in sé quell’insieme di relazioni con l’altro che caratterizzano il “macrocosmo” della natura. Tale concezione “umanistica” doveva valere in maniera universale, in ogni luogo ed epoca. Così, anche nel tempo presente, i “nuovi umanesimi” sono chiamati a raccogliere l’eredità dei pensatori del Rinascimento, interrogandosi sulla responsabilità dell’agire umano, immaginando nuove possibilità per la vita sul pianeta e ponendosi in maniera critica, ma costruttiva, dinanzi alle innovazioni tecnologiche. “Immaginazione”, “Tecnica”, “Responsabilità” sono i nuclei tematici intorno a cui ruotano gli studi proposti in questo volume, in cui va in scena un dialogo tra studiose e studiosi che, provenendo da diversi ambiti disciplinari, si dedicano al Rinascimento e ai nuovi umanesimi nelle loro molteplici forme storiche, teoriche ed estetiche.

Con contributi di: T. Borsche, G. Cuozzo, C. D’Amico, A. Dall’Igna, M. Donà, A. Fabris, E. Fadda, S. Ferrari, A. Fiamma, E. Filippi, J. González Ríos, T. Leinkauf, S. Mancini, M. Moschini, E. Peroli, H. Schwaetzer, L. Valera, V. Zaffino.

Bộ sách Lý Thuyết Văn Học Tây Phương và Thực Hành Phê Bình gồm 4 cuốn, tổng bộ khoảng 2.000 trang. Ngu Yên dịch, soạn , biên tập. Sẽ phát hành toàn bộ trong năm 2025.
Cuốn 1: Phát hành tháng 3
Cuốn 2 và 3: Phát hành tháng 6 và tháng 9
Cuốn 4: Phát hành tháng 12.
Bộ sách nghiên cứu và thực hành các lý thuyết phê bình trên thế giới (chủ yếu phát xuất từ Âu Châu và Âu Mỹ).
Công trình này hoàn toàn miễn phí, dành cho những ai hiếu học và can đảm tìm hiểu rồi thực hành.

Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup provides a moral theory according to which communal life is for the most part characterized by unthinking and immediate relationships of trust, communication, and compassion. When these are disrupted by our tendency toward self-absorption, the ethical claim then shows up in experience as a demand that we prioritise the other’s needs. Løgstrup argues that this demand contains an implicit “understanding of life”; namely, that it is a gift or gratuitous good for which we can take no credit or claim no ownership, not a possession to which we are entitled. This in turn involves a certain self-understanding of oneself as ‘wicked’ – namely, as tending toward a self-preoccupation that gets in the way of moral goodness. In this essay, I develop what I take to be the most promising version of Løgstrup’s theory and examine what we can learn from it. Since his view does not fit easily into available ethical or meta-ethical theories—though relevant comparisons can be found in the phenomenological tradition (especially Emmanuel Levinas)—this task will require some interpretive work. I will first lay out the basics of Løgstrup’s view before putting it into dialogue with contemporary discussions of trust: analysing the dynamics of symmetry and asymmetry at work in the trust relationship and the different modes of self-relation to which it gives rise. As we will see, Løgstrup’s account of trust is importantly different from the interpersonal trust that is the focus of most of the philosophical literature on trust. According to Løgstrup, a kind of background generalized faith in the goodness of the world – its trustworthiness – is what makes interpersonal trust possible in the first place, and this is what motivates Løgstrup’s claim that belief in life as a gift is a condition for the possibility of moral agency.

The Kaaba, an ancient cubic structure in Makkah, Saudi Arabia, stands as a timeless symbol of spiritual centrality, cosmic order, and human unity. More than a physical edifice, it functions as the axis mundi, a metaphysical anchor connecting heaven and earth, a focal point for the collective consciousness of 1.9 billion Muslims, and a sacred site revered across Abrahamic traditions. This study explores the Kaaba's multidimensional significance, integrating Islamic theology, sacred geometry, neuroscience, and astrophysics to reveal its deeper spiritual, psychological, and scientific dimensions. The Kaaba's geometric precision aligns with sacred proportions such as the golden ratio (1.618), found in natural formations, galaxies, and DNA helices, suggesting an underlying cosmic design (Livio, 2008). Neuroscientific studies demonstrate that rituals like tawaf (circumambulation of the Kaaba) induce theta brain wave activity, fostering deep meditation, emotional resilience, and neural synchronization (Newberg & Waldman, 2010). From an interfaith perspective, the Kaaba shares symbolic parallels with the Temple Mount in Judaism and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Christianity, reinforcing the universal yearning for a divine connection. n an era of fragmentation, the Kaaba emerges as a beacon of unity, bridging faith, science, and civilization itself. Its enduring legacy, both spiritual and scientific, calls for a renewed appreciation of sacred knowledge-not as an artifact of the past but as a guiding principle for global harmony, interfaith dialogue, and the rediscovery of our interconnected existence.

Sarah Chapone (1699-1764) foi uma filósofa britânica notável por sua obra “The hardships of the English laws in relation to wives” (1735), onde ela argumenta que as leis inglesas colocavam as mulheres casadas em uma situação de escravidão, negando-lhes a identidade de “súdito livre”. Inspirada por Mary Astell e precursora de Mary Wollstonecraft, Chapone defendeu a igualdade intelectual entre homens e mulheres e reivindicou direitos civis e liberdade legal para as mulheres. Em sua obra, Chapone utiliza exemplos de julgamentos e casos de violência contra mulheres para ilustrar a tirania masculina e a injustiça das leis. Ela também se baseia em Thomas Hobbes para discutir as noções de liberdade e poder paterno e materno. Além disso, Chapone critica a falta de equidade legal, onde os homens eram frequentemente absolvidos por tratamentos brutais contra suas esposas, enquanto as mulheres não tinham propriedade nem direitos sobre seus filhos ou bens. A filósofa também questiona o papel da polidez e do cavalheirismo da época, mostrando que a violência contra as mulheres era comum e não se restringia às classes pobres. Ela também destaca o dano psicológico causado pelos maus tratos e a falta de reparação legal. Chapone argumenta que a isenção de punições civis para as mulheres era um problema, pois as privava de serem vistas como súditas livres e de terem livre agência social. Apesar de ter escrito pouco, Sarah Chapone é reconhecida por sua coragem em desafiar as normas de sua época e por suas contribuições para o feminismo cristão. Suas obras incluem “The hardships of the English laws in relation to wives” e “Remarks on Mrs. Muilman’s Letter to the Right Honourable The Earl of Chesterfield”. Sua correspondência com Samuel Richardson também é considerada importante para entender seu pensamento. A recepção de sua obra foi mista, com críticas de homens que consideravam suas reivindicações injustas e exageradas. No entanto, seu trabalho foi fundamental para o desenvolvimento do pensamento feminista e para a luta pelos direitos das mulheres, que só encontraram reparação legal muitos anos após sua morte.

Така поставената тема предполага обстойно разглеждане на понятията "ценност" и "благо".От една страна понятиието ценност би могло да бъде разглеждано ,като фундамент на обществен интерес към живота ,но пък от друга съществува тясна връзка с понятието благо ,която ще се опитам да изясня в следващите няколко реда. Всеки човек е различен сам по себе си ,като индивид , а поради това съществуването на много и различни ценностни системи е нещо напълно нормално за съвременното общество . Тук ще изброя няколко двойки ценности ,които съставляват част от заобикалящият ни живот: добро -зло ; истина -неистина ;красота -безобразие; допустимонедопустимо;справедливо -несправедливо. В голяма степен човешкият живот е ценност,но погледнато от друга гледна точка би могъл да бъде разглеждан и като благо .Голяма част от изброените по горе двойки биха могли да бъдат разглеждани от материална и социална гледна точка.

To address the question of the significance of death for animals, we first need to consider the significance of death for people. On the assumption that death is, at least usually, bad for people, what makes it bad? To get at least a rough idea, let’s contrast a paradigm case of death that appears to be bad for the subject with one that, at least plausibly, isn’t bad. First, consider Yorick. Yorick is twenty-two years old, has just graduated from a prestigious college with high honors, has several promising careers open to him, and is in a fulfilling romantic relationship. While Yorick is out walking one day, a drunk driver swerves onto the sidewalk and kills him. Now, consider Oliver. Oliver is ninety-one, and has lived a rich, fulfilling life. But now Oliver has an incurable terminal illness. As the illness progresses, Oliver is in increasing amounts of pain. There are no available treatments that significantly reduce the pain, without also rendering Oliver unconscious. He has no ...

Determinism is thought to pose a problem for moral responsibility to the extent that we agree with the principle that someone is only to be held morally responsible for an action if s/he could have done otherwise. The worry, of course, is that if determinism is true, nobody could ever have done otherwise. Utilitarians might seem to be in a better position than other, less enlightened, theorists in this regard. Holding someone responsible, they point out, and related notions such as praise, blame, punishment and reward, are all actions that themselves can be assessed in terms of their consequences. So, the question of whether to hold someone responsible for an action is to be settled by reference to the consequences of the act of holding someone responsible. Whether someone could have done otherwise is, at best, indirectly related to the question of whether and how to hold them responsible. Similarly, the question of whether an act is right or wrong is simply a matter of whether the act was optimal, and has nothing to do with whether the agent could have done otherwise. The problem with this response, of course, is that, if determinism is true, every action is both optimal and pessimal. Every action is both the best and the worst of all the acts that are possible for the agent, because every action is the only action that is possible for the agent. This also applies to the actions of holding responsible, praising, blaming, etc. The solution is to appeal to the conversational context of praising, blaming, judging right and wrong, holding responsible, and the like. Even if, strictly speaking, an agent couldn't have done otherwise, conversational context may select certain counterpossible alternatives as the relevant ones with which to compare the 2 action. We may, therefore, be able to make sense of a negative (or positive) judgment of an action based on a comparison of the action with an alternative that was not, strictly speaking, available to the agent. Determinism is thought to pose a problem for moral responsibility to the extent that we agree with the principle that someone is only to be held morally responsible for an action if s/he could have done otherwise. The worry, of course, is that if determinism is true, nobody could ever have done otherwise. Utilitarians might seem to be in a better position than other, less enlightened, theorists in this regard. The standard utilitarian response to the possibility of determinism (or indeterminism), well articulated by Sidgwick, is twofold. First, holding someone responsible, and related notions such as desert, praise, blame, punishment and reward, are all actions that themselves can be assessed in terms of their consequences. ..the Determinist can give to the terms ``ill-desert'' and ``responsibility'' a signification which is not only clear and definite, but, from an utilitarian point of view, the only suitable meaning. In this view, if I affirm that A is responsible for a harmful act, I mean that it is right to punish him for it; primarily, in order that the fear of punishment may prevent him and others from committing similar acts in future. (ME Bk. I ch. V sec. 4) So, the question of whether to hold someone responsible for an action is to be settled by reference to the consequences of the act of holding someone responsible. Whether someone could have done otherwise is, at best, indirectly related to the question of

Ab der Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts etabliert der Buchdruck einen neuen Schriftbegriff und erzeugt grundlegende Merkmale des modernen Textes wie Geschlossenheit und Verfügbarkeit. Deren Bewertung fällt zeitgenössisch sowohl positiv als auch negativ aus: Die Technik wird einerseits als Garant für Autorität, andererseits als deren Entwertung gesehen. Die grenzenlose Verbreitung der Schrift erscheint begrüßenswert und macht gleichzeitig neue Verfahren der Vermittlungsbegrenzung notwendig. In diesem Feld der sich wandelnden Schrift- und Textbegriffe um die Wende zum 16. Jahrhundert werden das Wissen, die moralphilosophische Lehre und die literarische Tradition im Druckdispositiv neu geordnet. Im kulturellen Netz zirkulieren Materialien leichter und schneller und tragen damit zur Verstetigung und Verdichtung dieses Netzes bei.
Als zentraler epistemischer Effekt des Paradigmenwechsels vom Manuskript- zum Druckdispositiv lässt sich eine neue Rezeptionshaltung diagnostizieren, die in besonderer Weise mit den Innovationen des europäischen Dramas korrespondieren. Sven Thorsten Kilian untersucht in seiner Studie spanische, italienische und französische Dramentexte aus dem Zeitraum zwischen 1500 und 1550, da diese immer schon als öffentlich gedachten und reproduzierten Texte die neue Beweglichkeit der Schrift in exemplarischerer Weise reflektieren.