Meta-emotions and the complexity of human emotional experience

Synthese, 2014

There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that metaemotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic harmony and that Frankfurt-style accounts, which explain a person's "reflective self-endorsement" exclusively in terms of volitional hierarchies, are inchoate and need to be augmented by a theory of metaemotions.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019

This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions-specifically their normative dimension-while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences.

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Emotion

Meta-emotions are emotions that occur in response to other emotions (e.g., guilt about anger). Although emotion theories often discuss them, much about meta-emotions remains unknown. In the present study, we aim to assess the frequency of meta-emotions in everyday life, determine whether increased attention to and clarity of emotions are associated with a greater likelihood of meta-emotions, and examine whether negative emotions about negative emotions (negative-negative meta-emotional experiences) are associated with depressive severity. We recruited a diverse adult community sample (n ϭ 79) to complete 7 days of experience sampling and a self-report measure of depressive severity. At each survey, they indicated current attention to emotion, clarity of emotion, and whether and what kind of meta-emotional experience they were having. Meta-emotional experiences were categorized as negative-negative (NN), negative-positive (NP), positive-negative (PN) or positive-positive (PP). Approximately 53% of participants reported at least 1 meta-emotional experience. Meta-emotional experiences were reported about twice a week; negative-negative experiences were most frequent. Using multilevel modeling, we found that although attention to and clarity of emotion each individually positively predicted the likelihood of meta-emotional experiences, only attention to emotion explained unique variance. Higher depressive severity was associated with higher likelihood of meta-emotional experiences and specifically negativenegative experiences. Most adults experienced meta-emotions, especially during moments of high attention to emotion, and negative-negative experiences were positively associated with depressive severity. These findings are an important step forward in understanding individual and within-person differences in reactions to emotional experience. Implications for theories of emotion generation and regulation are discussed.

Psicothema, 2006

Emotional thoughts are often accompanied by a host of additional or second order thoughts relevant for perceiving and regulating emotion and emotion-management processes. These meta-cognitive thoughts can play an important role in understanding psychological processes relevant to Emotional Intelligence. In the present article, we first provide a general meta-cognitive framework useful for classifying secondary thoughts according to dimensions, such as target, origin, valence, number, confidence, and evaluation. Having described a framework for meta-cognition, we next review different lines of research concerning 1) how primary emotional thoughts are affected by meta-cognitive confidence, 2) how emotional thoughts at the second level of cognition (meta-cognition) can influence first level cognition, 3) how emotional thoughts at the primary and secondary levels can influence one another, and 4) how mood and emotional thoughts can play multiple roles in cognition and meta-cognition dep...

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT: 52, 2003

Looking inside oneself for the springs of such passion might make a nice case of soul-searching, but is not necessarily the best means for advancing philosophical inquiry. The papers in this volume arise from an international symposium on emotions, and provide material for a continuing dialogue among researchers with different philosophical itineraries. Each essay addresses, in varying detail, the nature of emotions, their rationality, and their relation to value. Chapters I to VIII map the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the intricate relation between consciousness and the body. Chapters IX to XI analyse the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by powerful or persistent emotions. Chapters XII to XIV explore questions of normativity and value in making sense of emotions at a personal, ethical, and political level.

Paradoxes of Emotional Life, 2022

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2014

Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate to and engage with others. A phenomenological study of emotions is thus meant not only to help us to understand ourselves, but also to allow us to see and to make sense of the meaningfulness of our worldly and social existence. Within the last few decades, the emotions have re-emerged more generally as a topic of great philosophical interest and importance. Philosophers, along with psychologists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists have engaged in inter-and intra-disciplinary debates concerning the ontology and phenomenology of emotions, the epistemic and cognitive dimensions of emotions, the rationality of emotions, the role that emotions play in moral judgments, the role that our bodies play in the experience and constitution of emotions, the gendered dimension of emotions (and whether or not there is one and the extent to which it is socially constructed), the temporality of emotions, and the cultural specificity of emotions, to name just a few. Contemporary phenomenological and scientific considerations of the emotions, however, have treated and continue to treat these questions and issues quite differently. The former takes a first-personal approach to the emotions that is guided by, rooted in, and engaged with our experiences in the world, where the felt quality of emotions provides important insights into the meaningfulness of human experiences. The latter often takes a third-personal or sub-personal approach to the emotions and focuses on their cognitive architecture and neurobiological mechanisms, which can be detached from and unconcerned with the ways that emotions are experienced in and connected to contextual, complex worldly human experiences. Both kinds and levels of analysis are

Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 1993

This study tested the hypothesis, proposed by the anthropologist Catherine Lutz (1988), that emotion is devalued in Western culture (and hence in Western scientific psychology) relative to cognition, although it is valued over " est ra ngement ." Alternate versions of an emotion versus cognition and an emotion versus estrangement questionnaire were developed using terms taken directly from Lutz or supplied by the authors; the questionnaire format was designed to match as literally as possible the wording of Lutz's argument. Each of 187 undergraduate students responded to one of the four questionnaires by indicating on thirty 10-point rating scales which of two anchor words (e.g., rational, irrational; masculine, feminine) was closer to the concept, cognition (as contrasted with emotion) or, in the alternate version, emotion (as contrasted with cognition); similarly, the subjects responded to one of two symmetrical versions of an emotion versus estrangement questionnaire. They also indicated which member of the pair of words defining each of the 30 scales was the more positive. The data were supportive of the Lutz hypothesis, both globally and with respect to most of the individual scales, and for both male and female subjects. There were also some interesting unexpected findings with regard to the questionnaire version.

Cognition and Emotion, 2001