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1988, The Historian
A C K S O N W ideology, its rhetoric abounding in references to the "common man," remains a source of misunderstanding among historians, especially in regard to J economics. The Jacksonians have often been viewed as champions of laissez-faire economics as well as proponents of small government. In at least one important area, however-that of banking-the Jacksonian program moved in a direction exactly the opposite of laissez-faire and small government. Banking stood center stage as a national issue from the time of Andrew Jackson's bank veto in 1832 until the demise of the Whig-backed national bank schemes at John Tyler's hand in 1841. During these nine years the Jacksonians often attacked Whig attempts to establish a national bank. Many Democratic spokesmen such as William Gouge, Thomas Hart Benton and, at different points in their careers, Alexander McNutt and Thomas Ritchie, advocated an entirely metallic currency, with the implication that the party opposed paper money for ideological reasons, condemning it as a source of inequality. Several of these spokesmen suggested that their dislike of the Bank of the United States [BUS] rested on grounds that it was in essence a national bank.' W R Y SCHWEIKART*
Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1978
This article examines the political construction of the money market in the United States between 1800 and 1836. In particular, it explicates the relationship between the state and the banking system by explaining the demise of the two Banks of the United States. It demonstrates that changes in the banking system could be traced primarily to the interaction between the executive on one hand, and financial investors on the other. Such changes are explained by the degree of unity among investors, and the ability of the executive to fracture that unity. To be more precise, the article shows that disunity among financial capital holders was a necessary precondition to the destruction of both ‘national’ banks. Further, the executive could sufficiently create dissention by suggesting policy measures aimed at having differential distributive consequences for different subgroups of financial capital holders. These measures, however, had to meet certain conditions to have the desired impact: they had to conform to certain vital preexisting institutions. These institutions therefore essentially defined the limits of autonomous executive action.
This article examines the political construction of, and change in, the money market in the United States between 1800 and 1836. Borrowing from the theoretical literature on institutions in political science and sociology, it explains the demise of the two Banks of the United States. It demonstrates that changes in the banking system could be traced primarily to the interaction between the executive on one hand, and financial investors on the other. Such changes are explained by the degree of unity among investors, and the ability of the executive to fracture that unity. To be more precise, the article shows that disunity among financial capital holders was a necessary precondition to the destruction of both 'national' banks. Further, the executive could sufficiently create dissension by suggesting policy measures aimed at having differential distributive consequences for different subgroups of financial capital holders. These measures, however, had to meet certain conditions to have the desired impact: they had to conform to certain vital preexisting institutions. Finally, this article seeks to offer a suggestion as to how ideational explanations for institutions can be combined with those that stress power relationships and distributional consequences (of institutions), within a single coherent theoretical framework.
American Nineteenth Century History, 2016
President Andrew Jackson’s protracted conflict with Nicholas Biddle, known colloquially as the “Bank War,” endures as a seminal chapter in the nation’s political and economic history. This article analyzes Biddle’s interactions with lawmakers, financiers, newspaper editors, and intellectuals during the Second Bank’s campaign for recharter from early 1830 to mid-1832. It brings together research from numerous manuscript collections, bank balance sheets, newspapers, and legislative debates to show how Biddle orchestrated one of the earliest business lobbies and public relations campaigns conducted on a nationwide scale. Biddle developed a nationwide lobby primarily because of the Bank’s branch structure and vast financial holdings, because he mobilized a large army of campaign surrogates, because he targeted voters with a standardized campaign message, and because recent advancements in transportation and communication enabled him to correspond with scores of subordinates separated by hundreds of miles of distance. Pursuing this analysis sheds light on one of the nation’s most powerful businesses and contains valuable insights for scholars interested in the burgeoning history of capitalism.
For two hundred and sixty years the US Federal Government has claimed that the most demo-cratic money is a scarce form of money. This claim is built off the notion that an abundant sup-ply of money would threaten class relations (the rights of private property) and ultimately the free Alow of commerce (capitalist exchange). Since the writing of the Federal Constitution the government's focus has always been on creating reliable and abundant supplies of credit. The idea of scarce money and abundant credit has been challenged twice: In the 1860's by the Greenback Party who claimed the most democratic money is money created by government. The second challenge in the 1980s by the Community Currency movement uniquely focuses not on banks or government instead claiming that democratic money is money created by local communities and/or individuals. *
International Journal of Political Economy, 2006
This dissertation explores the growth of federal monetary powers in the United States during the American Civil War and how it realigned American political economy in the nineteenth century. Contrary to works that highlight how class interests guided Republican economic policy, my dissertation shows how the new national currency of the 1860s grew out of the failure of financial markets and state governments to create and regulate paper money. This new centralized currency of greenbacks and national bank notes expanded federal authority, rearranged national politics, remade economic exchange, and promoted a new brand of political conflict in postwar America. Part 1, "Problems and Traditions," recounts both the immediate and deep origins of the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Banking Acts of 1863-64, and their relationship to the war and the political economy of the nineteenth-century. Chapter one considers the financial crisis faced by the Union in 1861-1862 and roots those problems, and the solutions offered by Republicans, in in the practices and traditions of the prewar past. Chapter two provides a history of the constitutional law of money and legal tender and its relationship to Congress's hesitation to pass the Legal Tender Act in early 1862. Chapter three argues for the significance of Union nationalism and the depth of the financial emergency in 1862 in pushing a reluctant Congress to create the first fiat currency in U.S. history. Chapter four lays out the problem of law and politics iii surrounding the issue of state banks in the prewar period and the resolution of the problem of state bank notes in the form of the National Banking Act. The second section "Conflict and Consolidation" documents the various reactions of northerners for and against this intrusion into their economic affairs. Chapter five deals with the immediate reactions of the northern public to these policies in the Civil War years, arguing that the centrality of the greenbacks to the war and northern commerce stifled resistance to the act in places like New York, with the lone exception of California, where legislators and jurists found a way to secede from the new monetary union created by the war, while remaining in the political union of the United States. Chapter six traces efforts to do away with the greenbacks and national banks in Congress and before the U.S. Supreme Court during Reconstruction, and the ultimate failure of these efforts to destroy the new regime of national currency. Chapter seven explains how greenbacks and national banks altered the worlds of finance, statecraft, and politics for the rest of the century.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
Publicly owned or commissioned banks were common in Europe from the 15th century. This survey argues that while the early public banks were characterized by great experimentation in their design, a common goal was to create a liquid and reliable monetary asset in environments where such assets were rare or unavailable. The success of these banks was, however, never guaranteed, and even well-run banks could become unstable over time as their success made them susceptible to fiscal exploitation. The popularization of bearer notes in the 18th century broadened the user base for the public banks' money but was also accompanied by increased fiscal abuse. Wartime demands of the Napoleonic Era resulted in the reorganization or dissolution of many early public banks. A prominent exception was the Bank of England, whose adept management of a fiscally backed money provided a foundation for the development of central banks as they exist today.
The paper analyzes briefly the changing ideas on the role of money and banks from William Petty to Thomas Tooke, including the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. It analyzes the role of ideas in shaping the evolution of central bank regulation. Particular importance is given to the Bank of England's inconvertibility period, from 1797-1821, and the ensuing debate in shaping Robert Peel's Bank Act of 1844, which is often seen as the birth of modern central banking. The importance of the Say's Law, and the absence of an alternative theory of the determination of output, is shown to play an essential role in the policy prescriptions of the so-called Bullionist authors, that won the debates that shaped central banking practices in the 19th century. The paper concludes with a brief analysis of what is a central bank according to the dominant (marginalist) mainstream of the profession, and what an alternative conception based on what may be termed classical-Keynesian political economy would be.
, the seventh president of the United States, is undoubtedly the most influential and controversial American politician of the 1830s. His presidency was an era that featured critical positive developments in the social, political, and economic spheres of domestic policy. On the social scene, the removal of the Native American tribes from the territory of the United States that culminated in the Indian Removal Act of 1830 is one of such critical developments that occurred during the presidency concerned. Additionally, the era's impact on the American economy is best exemplified by Jackson's contribution to the deconstruction of the Second Bank of the United States and the subsequent panic in 1837. Further, Jackson's political ideology shaped the relationship between the federal government and the states, and defined the states' rights and prerogatives through his approach to the Nullification Crisis. However, there is a lack of consensus among scholars of history regarding the legacy of Andrew Jackson's presidency. Some scholars view him as a defender of the common citizen's rights and interests while others believe that he was a dictator, a racist, and an enemy of the Union. Consequently, this paper seeks to undertake a critical assessment of Andrew Jackson's presidency to illustrate the proposition that his legacy is both positive and negative. The implication of this discussion's position is that the dominant opposing points of view are both true for the following three reasons. First, Jackson's role in the Nullification crisis was positive with regard to its long-term stabilization of the Union, although it also extensively increased the power of the central government at the expense of the states. Secondly, the policy stance towards the Native Americans led to the loss of their ancestral land and caused them suffering but it also introduced a civil and more effective framework for Indian-Anglo relations. Lastly, although Jackson's aggressive position towards the national bank during the Bank War led to an aftermath of
Studies in American Political Development, 2015
When President Andrew Jackson removed the public deposits from the Bank of the United States, he set off an economic and political crisis from which, scholars agree, the Whig Party emerged. We argue that petitioning in response to removal of the deposits shaped the emergence of the Whig Party, crystallizing a new line of Jacksonian opposition and dispensing with older lines of National Republican rhetoric and organization. Where petitioning against removal of the deposits was higher, the Whigs were more likely to emerge with organization and votes in the coming years. We test this implication empirically by using a new database of petitions sent to Congress during the banking crisis. We find that petitioning activity in 1834 is predictive of increased support for Whig Party candidates in subsequent presidential elections as well as stronger state Whig Party organization.
2010
In the midst of the US Civil War, in 1863, the Northern states of the federal Union established the National Banking System. It contributed to financing the war effort and to the circulation of banknotes. Following the civil war, this system was retained and extended across the reunified country, surviving 50 years, coming to an end with the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. The aim of this article is to analyze the features of this system; its weaknesses, brought into relief during the debates surrounding the US 1907 economic panic, and its strengths, such as the role it gave the federal government of guaranteeing the liquidity of national banknotes. We analyze in particular the types of banks and banknotes that existed at the time. We explain in detail what a “bond-backed currency system” means, as well as the meaning of the alternative proposals for an “asset-backed currency system”. By pointing out the impact of seasonal variations in credit demand made on the...
Unregulated Banking, 1991
There has been considerable interest in recent years in historical experiments with "free banking." This paper examines once again the American experiments in the decades before the Civil War, and the recent literature on them. The lessons of this experience for four issues are considered: (1) the appropriate mechanism for controlling the monetary base, (2) the need for a lender of last resort, (3) the costs and benefits of a bank issued currency, and (4) the potential under a regime of free banking for wildcat banking.
The Journal of Economic History, 1976
This paper examines the impact of the Bank War on the economic events of the 1830's. An economic model of the antebellum money market is developed and tested. Specifications for money demand and supply are drawn from contemporary monetary literature and empirically estimated. Next, the historical hypotheses are tested by exploring the structural stability of the model. The results clearly indicate that: the Bank War affected the economy because it altered the pattern of financial behavior; wildcat banking was not characteristic of the post-Bank period; and finally, the Panic of 1837 was the result of a severe monetary contraction.
The Journal of American History, 2019
The Journal of Economic History, 1975
It is sometimes asserted that a laissez-faire policy toward financial intermediaries tends to deepen financial development and accelerate economic growth. The two decades preceding the American Civil War provide a challenging case for this proposition because they witnessed something approaching a natural experiment. During those years the Federal government withdrew from the regulation of banking, a policy that was the final outcome of Andrew Jackson's war with the Second Bank of the United States. A wide range of experiments concerning entry into commercial banking were tried, from “free” banking to “socialized” banking. Moreover, other kinds of legislation affecting banking varied from state to state as well. While the regions of the United States differed in terms of economic structure, a common language, a common legal tradition, and, to some extent, a common culture permeated all regions. Thus, the period provides excellent conditions for observing the effects of financial...
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