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Instant winners: Legal change in transition and the diffusion of state lotteries

1994, Public Choice

Abstract

This paper investigates the determinants of legal change in a public choice framework. An empirical model explaining the timing and probability of decisions to adopt state-operated lotteries is developed. Employing a Tobit estimator and explicitly considering the effects of statespecific constitutional and political structures, spending and tax policies, and federal revenue importation, evidence is presented showing that legal change is much like economic change: Lotteries are more likely to be adopted and to be adopted earlier where the costs are lowest relative to expected benefits. State legislatures appear to be the main beneficiaries of this public choice process. * We are especially indebted to Tim Sass for many helpful suggestions. Roger Folsom, Thomas Husted, Lydia Ortega, Robert Tollison, and an anonymous referee also provided useful comments. Saurman gratefully acknowledges financial support from the College of Social Sciences at San Jose University. Any remaining errors are our own. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. (1988 and other various years of issue).