Incompatible strategies in international mergers: the failed merger between Telia and Telenor

2009

This paper tries to analyze the interrelationship between possibilities of conflict in cross border mergers and acquisitions and firm and market characteristics in a two country three firm model. We show that in general an increase in asymmetry across firms reduces the possibility of conflict between jurisdictions over merger review decisions. We also show that possibility of conflict increase with the increase in market asymmetries across countries. We also discuss interaction of asymmetry in firm and market size with the distribution of firms across countries and its effect on the possibilities of conflict.

European Competition Journal, 2011

Using a combination of public and internal information, this paper compares and contrasts EU and US merger policies. Common economics seems to lead both authorities to consider remarkably comparable portfolios of mergers once the nominal differences in the regimes (US reviews more cases) are addressed. Vertical mergers account for less than ten percent and potential competition matters for around five percent of all mergers in both jurisdictions, while purely conglomerate mergers are extremely rare or non-existent. The share of collusion investigations fall over time in both jurisdictions. However, the US relies on collusion theory more than three times as often as the EU, where 85 percent of the horizontal cases concern dominance. Across both regimes, roughly one eighth of all recent horizontal mergers have been analyzed as non-dominance unilateral-effects cases. Only minor differences in the average probability of challenge are observed when controlling for market share. We also find that the EU is more prone to accept (or require) weak remedies and much less likely to consider efficiencies. The 2004 EU reforms seem to be leading towards at least some convergence on enforcement policy.

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003

This paper analyzes the effects of mergers around the world over the past 15 years. We utilize a large panel of data on mergers to test several hypotheses about mergers. The effects of the mergers are examined by comparing the performance of the merging firms with control groups of nonmerging firms. The comparisons are made on profitability and sales. The results show that mergers on average do result in significant increases in profits, but reduce the sales of the merging firms. Interestingly, these post merger patterns look similar across countries. We also did not find dramatic differences between mergers in the manufacturing and the service sectors, and between domestic and cross-border mergers. Conglomerate mergers decrease sales more than horizontal mergers. By separating mergers into those that increase profits and those that reduce them and by then examining the patterns of sales changes following the mergers, we determine the effects of mergers on efficiency and market power. Our results suggest that those mergers that decrease profits and efficiency account for a large proportion. However, we can also identify mergers that increase profits by either increasing market power or by increasing efficiency. The first conclusion seems to be a more likely explanation for large companies, whereas the latter is likely to be true for small firms. We also thank J. Jung for excellent research assistance. Financial support of the "Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank", project 8861, is gratefully acknowledged.

Debreceni Jogi Műhely

This paper will discuss the role that Mergers and Acquisitions play in the global economy. It will deliberate on the challenges, benefits and issues of the implementation of these transactions in terms of legality, society and culture. It also contains an empirical enquiry that investigates the application of Mergers and Acquisitions in the presence of different social and cultural working environments. It also demonstrates attempts of entering into such transactions with incorrect intentions such as domination and the negative outcomes of such approach. Throughout this work, I will investigate the legal instruments governing these types of transactions in different areas of the world, specifically the European Union. It will touch on the legal instruments governing Mergers and Acquisitions in the European Union and will challenge the applicability of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union in light of the cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions directives. The paper will chall...

Journal of European Integration, 2012

The European Union (EU) and United States (US) are the world's two largest and most influential legal jurisdictions for corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The pressures of international economic competition have lead to a flurry of M&A activity in these locales in the post-Cold War period. Given the economic impact and, in many cases, political sensitivity of some M&As, it has become critical that transatlantic regulators reach similar decisions with regard to M&A approval, denial, or modification. Incongruent decisions lead to uncertainty in the marketplace, and the possible loss of global economic competitiveness and respect for regulatory processes and outcomes. In this paper, we explore the efforts made by the US and EU over the past two decades to enhance cooperation in merger policies and processes. We argue that, despite a couple of high-profile cases to the contrary, the US and EU have made great strides in reducing uncertainty in the M&A regulatory process by institutionalizing a series of formal agreements and working groups that have served to provide the foundation for a transatlantic merger environment that may serve as a model for cross-border regulatory cooperation in the 21 st century.

Oxford Economic Papers, 2008

We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyse under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, ...

International Review of Law and Economics, 1995

The authors wish to thank H.B. Sch~ifer, an anonymous reteree, the participants of the EALE conference '94 at Leuven, and the members of the information economics research group at the C.E.S., K.U. Leuven, for valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

2011

2019

In this chapter we present the main conclusions of the book. Given that the Cross-border Mergers Directive (‘the Directive’), as codified and repealed by EU Directive 2017/1132/ EC, is, as Blanaid Clarke put it in Chapter 1, ‘dauntingly complex’, we will not be touching upon all its aspects. For example, creditor rights have been cited as an area that needs to be addressed in a revision of the Directive. Although creditors often have overlapping interests with workers, as both of these stakeholders have an interest in the financial stability and sustainability of the post-merger company, this issue is not addressed here.