Developmental Psychology

Developmental psychologists have a long history of using triangle metaphors to conceptualize the social constitution of psychological development. In this paper, we present a genealogy of triadic theories, to clarify their origins, distinctions between them, and to identify key themes for theoretical development. The analysis identifies three core triangle models in the developmental literature. Each theory relies on some combination of the terms subject, object, other and sign, and they can be distinguished by the core psychological dynamic which they entail. We distinguish an emotional triangle rooted in psychoanalysis, a mediational triangle rooted in the work of Vygotsky, and a sociocognitive triangle originating with Piaget. Despite their differences, the analysis reveals a common theme of the transformation from external mediation to internal mediation. Contemporary research and possible future directions are discussed in the light of the theoretical distinctions that our genealogy has revealed.

In this paper I draw on Piaget and Habermas to underline the importance of the theoretical distinction between social relations of constraint and social relations of cooperation for reflecting upon inter-institutional projects. I argue that the socio-cultural approach to collaboration has some important limitations that restrict ideological critic and emancipatory research. The limitations of this approach can be located in its epistemological assumptions, a homogenized notion of culture and a weakness in articulating the intrapersonal, inter-personal, inter-group/positional and social representational/ideological levels of analysis. As an empirical example of this I discuss the SLOAN centres for family research.

While the productive role of social interaction between peers in promoting cognitive
development has been clearly established, the communicative processes through which this is achieved is less clearly understood. Earlier work has established that different types of conversation become established between children as they work together on a problem, and that these types have different implications for the progress of a nonconserver. The paper focuses on the forms of recognition that emerge within these different conversation types. It reports further analyses of a study in which 226 6.5- to 7.5-year-old children were presented with a Piagetian task of conservation of liquid. Conservers and non-conservers were asked to discuss in pairs their conflicting answers and agree upon a joint response. Cognitive progress was assessed by pre- to post-test gains. Analyses of the conversational moves made by each of the participants to the conversation indicates that both non-conservers and conservers not only make characteristic contributions, but that these contributions vary across the conversation types, and hence also relate differentially to the non-conserver’s progress. More detailed qualitative analyses of the different conversation types provide insights into the ways in which different forms of recognition emerge through these interactions. These results are discussed in relation to a socio-cognitive account of development.

While the productive role of social interaction between peers in promoting cognitive development has been clearly established, the communicative processes through which this is achieved have not been clearly identified. This paper reports a study in which 184 6.5 to 7.5 year old children were presented with a Piagetian task of conservation of liquid. Both male and female non-conservers worked with a conserving partner in either same or mixed-sex dyads, thus creating four different pair types. The pairs were asked to discuss their conflicting answers and agree upon a joint response. Cognitive progress was assessed by pre to post-test gains. The results indicated that the type of conversation established during the interaction was strongly related to the outcome. The results also indicate that the gender composition of the pairs influenced the type of conversation which occurred and the outcome measures. These results are discussed in relation to the general model of socio-cognitive conflict, and highlight the role of representations and expectations of gender in the way in which the conflict is expressed and resolved in conditions of aligned or conflicting knowledge and gender asymmetries.

This paper introduces the idea of symbolic resources as the use of cultural elements to mediate the representational work occasioned by ruptures or discontinuities in the smooth experience of ordinary life, moments when the “taken-for-granted” meanings cease to be taken for granted. In particular we are concerned with the use of symbolic resources in moments of developmental transitions, that is, the mobilisation of symbolic elements ranging from shared bodies of knowledge or argumentative strategies to movies, magazine, or art pieces. The paper begins with a brief theoretical sketch of these ideas, and then presents three case studies, each of which involves the use of a different type of symbolic resource within a particular age group. In the first, children are observed in interaction with a peer about a conservation problem. In the second adolescents are observed negotiating the meaning of their art productions with their peers, teachers and parents. The third example looks at Western tourists searching for spirituality, adventure and freedom in Ladakh as an alternative to the materialism of modernity. In each case the analysis of the symbolic resources employed indicates the significance of the gaze of the other in the construction of meanings, and of the various constraints operating within specific situations. The analysis also reveals different modes of use, which, we suggest, are linked to psychological development. Modes of uses of symbolic resources are linked to changing forms of reflexivity, from the non-reflective use exhibited by the children, through becoming-reflective among the adolescents, to reflective uses by the adults. It is suggested that this be considered as a developmental sequence in the socio-cultural use of symbolic resources.

In this paper it is proposed that a central topic of inquiry in the study of social knowledge should be the clarification of the conditions of communication that are likely to lead to the attainment of knowledge rather than to the transmission of belief. Insights and empirical evidence from social developmental psychology are presented that shed light on this issue. It is argued that social relations established between the partners in communication in the form of different conversation types are differentially linked to representations of an object based on the construction of new knowledge or transmission of beliefs. A central mechanism that constrains or enables the establishment of particular conversation types is social recognition, as this is manifested in different behavioural styles in communication.

This research proposal is a qualitative study that aims to investigate two dimensions of the horse-human relationship from the perspective of two quadrants of experience grounded in Ken Wilber’s model of Integral Methodological Pluralism (IMP). One aspect/quadrant of the study addresses the essence nature of horse-human interaction from a phenomenological perspective. The second aspect/quadrant of the study addresses how people who work with horses construct specific language and dimensions of meaning as members of an equine culture.

The investigator’s purpose was first, to describe what the inner world of equines looks likes to a human observer. In what ways do horses communicate or express emotion and how does the human perceive these? A second purpose of this research paper was to conduct an ethnographic exploration of how horses help humans enact non-verbal communication and construct systems of shared meanings. 

How people who interact with horses describe their experience, and how horses help people to construct communities of shared values and beliefs might be a key to deepening our understanding of the potential of the horse-human relationship in fields such as: a) equine-facilitated psychotherapy/healing; b) competitive and pleasure riding; c) experiential education, including leadership development; and d) natural horsemanship training.

Part of a special issue on 'swarm methodology,' this paper, written by a swarm participant, reflects upon the purpose and value of this kind of interdisciplinary research methodology. First, by way of a recognition of the interdisciplinary status of this paper itself, the question of what we hope to accomplish when we engage in conversations across disciplinary boundaries is broached. Second, a discussion of the practice of peer-review provides an approximate view of one paradigmatic understanding of how we produce a 'conversation' within a given established research methodology. We are then, third, able to consider a number of possible related ways in which we might understand the value of a conversation between research methodologies. Finally, the common intuition that there is a concrete value specifically within a 'holistic' or 'synergistic approach' is addressed, and the swarm methodology put forth as a likely place for such a value to emerge, if it is to emerge anywhere.

School-based health care and school-based health centers are the premier care models for children in schools. School nurses, school nurse practitioners, physicians, dentists, social workers, and psychologists are all involved in the comprehensive services offered to children through schools throughout the country. In Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Coalition for School Based Health Care, headed by Dr. Denise Seigart at Mansfield University, promotes the establishment and expansion of school-based health care services for children. Dr. Seigart has completed extensive research on various models for school-based health care, including her dissertation work at Cornell University and on an international level. Individuals interested in learning more about school-based health care can contact her or visit the web site for the National Assembly on School-Based Health Care

Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? In their famous 1998 paper “The Extended Mind,” philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers posed this question and answered it provocatively: cognitive processes are not all in the head. The environment has an active role in driving cognition; cognition is sometimes made up of neural, bodily, and environmental processes. Their argument excited a vigorous debate among philosophers, both supporters and detractors. This volume brings together for the first time the best responses to Clark and Chalmers’ bold proposal. These responses, together with the original paper by Clark and Chalmers, offer a valuable overview of the latest research on the extended mind thesis.

  The contributors first discuss (and answer) objections raised to Clark and Chalmers’s thesis. Andy Clark himself responds to critics in a paper that uses the movie Memento’s amnesia-aiding notes and tattoos to illustrate  the workings of the extended mind. Contributors then consider the different directions in which the extended mind project might be taken, including the need for an approach that focuses on cognitive activity and practice.



Contributors

Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa, David Chalmers, Andy Clark, Stephen Cowley, Susan Hurley, James Ladyman, Richard Menary, John Preston, Don Ross, Mark Rowlands, Robert D. Rupert, David Spurrett, John Sutton, Michael Wheeler, Rob A. Wilson



Richard Menary is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Wollongong. He is the author of Cognitive Integration and the Philosophy of Cognition.

In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive integration: completing a complex cognitive, or mental, task is enabled by a co-ordinated interaction between neural processes, bodily processes and manipulating written sentences. In section one I introduce Harris’ criticisms of ways in which writing has been said to restructure thought (Goody 1968; McLuhan 1962, 1964; Ong 1982). This will give us a preliminary idea about possible pitfalls for a cognitive integrationist account. The second section outlines, firstly, how integrated cognitive systems function. Secondly, the model is applied to a hybrid mental act where writing allows us to complete complex cognitive tasks. The final section outlines the sense in which, following Harris, there is “a more realistic picture of how writing restructures thought” [Harris, R., 1989. How does writing restructure thought? Language and Communication 9 (2/3) 99–106] that is concealed by the ‘romantic fantasies’ of theorists such as the above. This picture is one of writing providing an autoglottic space in which a new form of theoretical thinking becomes prevalent. The cognitive integrationist understands this in terms of the nature of the written vehicles and how we manipulate them

"Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from this work, there appear to be a
variety of ways in which we can think of the narrative construction of the self and the relationship between the narrative self and the embodied agent. I wish to examine two such ways in this paper. The first I shall call the abstract narrative account, this is because its proponents take the
narrative self to be an abstraction (Dennett, 1991; Velleman, 2006). Dennett, for example, refers to the self as a centre of narrative gravity, to be thought of as analogous to a mathematical conception of the centre of gravity of an object. The second I shall call the embodied narrative account and this is the view that the self is constituted both by an embodied consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives themselves, which can play a variety of roles in the agent’s psychological life."

This book argues that thinking is bounded by neither the brain nor the skin of an organism. Cognitive systems function through integration of neural and bodily functions with the functions of representational vehicles. The integrationist position offers a fresh contribution to the emerging embodied and embedded approach to the study of mind.

Infants who suffer severe neglect fail to thrive emotionally as well as bodily. The absence of early coexistential structures that provide well-being leads to a narrowing of the child’s perceptual and social developmental horizon. What is the nature of these early structures? In this essay, an ontology of well-being or housedness is elaborated through phenomenological refections on breast-feeding and infant perception. Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh makes a contribution to the ontology of well-being: it gives us a conceptual and evocative language to describe human existence in its pre-verbal, syncretic, and non-dualistic manifestations. It also allows for a re-evaluation and re-interpretation of the results of current research
in infant perception. Through the structures of infant perception we perceive the coexistential fit between infants, other human beings, and the world of things. An infant’s fundamental housedness in the flesh is taken up and cultivated or destroyed by the child’s social and cultural environment.

This article compares the structures of illness schemata of healthy children demonstrating varying degrees of knowledge about illness. Three age groups participated (6-7-year-olds, 9-10-year-olds, and 13-14-year-olds). The younger children were more likely to use non-illness-related concepts when sorting illness-related stimuli. Performance on recognition of illness and cause of i Ilness tasks further suggested that younger children used concepts related to human behavior, rather than to illness, in completing these tasks. They believed changes in behavior, rather than symptoms, signaled illness and that most illnesses were contagious. With increased knowledge, however, illnessrelated concepts gained primacy. Older children believed symptoms signaled disease and had a broader understanding about the many factors that might cause illness.

Human illness is largely a phenomenon that is constructed within social networks where people and events are interdependent. At an individual level, every human forms his or her own cognitive conceptual models/ontologies as a part of her/his social cognitive interactions labeled social cognitive ontological constructs (SCOCs). Other than this, individuals also form similar conceptual constructs from collective social learning. Health professionals develop their main constructs (medical ontology) from collective social learning and top down knowledge. This chapter makes the case to merge dominant centralized health professional expert generated medical ontology with decentralized, naïve, patient user generated common sense medical ontology, in a manner that generates minimum conflict and negative emotions. User driven health care provides collaborative learning networks among patients, families and care networks, and professionals and other actors, across a web interface. Sharing human experiences documented in persistent clinical encounters stored in web based electronic health records through available web 2.0 technologies can transform medical ontology and augment patient-centered care.


Key words, Illness, Social constructs, Social cognition, Medial ontology, User driven health care, persistent clinical encounters, electronic health records

The article is a phenomenological description of the lived world of an autist (J.) and a discussion of a prominent theory in autism research: the theory of mind. Is the autistic child actually “mindblind” as proposed by Baron-Cohen? I argue that J. has a difficulty in situating himself in the bodily expressive world of children and adults. Mainly three areas are discussed in the article: 1) J.’s relationship to other children, especially his way of playing. 2) J.’s communicative relationship to others. 3) J.’s fragmentary experience of time. Focus is on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory of the relation between body and world. In a concluding chapter I finally suggest that an educational practise has to be bodily expressive (playful and humorous) if you want to get into contact with the autistic child.

Key words:

Autism, theory of mind, phenomenology, body, meaning, life-world, play, experience of time, educational practise.

The use of apparent motion cues to guide discriminations on the inspection time (IT) task has been taken to imply the vulnerability of IT to strategic processes by higher IQ subjects, and the questionable generality of the IT/IQ correlation. The current study examined verbal and non-verbal intelligence, personality and IT in 74 young adults, using light-emitting diodes to present IT, obtaining perceptual self-reports during IT itself. Forty-three (58 per cent) subjects in the sample reported using motion cues to guide IT discriminations; these subjects had faster ITs than individuals who did not use motion cues (t = 2.97, p < .005; effect size = .73). Cue users did not have higher verbal or non-verbal IQ than non-users. Although cue users were lower in neuroticism than non-cue users, this did not account for their faster ITs. Slower IT correlated with lower scores on a measure of non-verbal intelligence (r = -0.41, p < .001); the size of this correlation remained similar when the sample was divided into groups reporting the use of motion cues or not. Thus, despite motion cues enhancing performance on an IT task, the perception of these cues neither causes, nor reduces, the correlation between IT and IQ.

The aim of this paper is to discuss different approaches to creativity and underline the cultural nature of its genesis. Biological genius (the “He-paradigm”) and psychological-individualistic (the “I-paradigm”) standpoints are contrasted with social and cross-cultural ones (the “We-paradigm”) and the cultural psychology of creativity is introduced and positioned. This emerging paradigm, drawing from both social accounts of creativity and the latest developments in cultural psychology and the theory of social representations, emphasises the contextual and generative nature of creative acts and employs a person (creator) – other (community) – object (artefacts) model. Creativity is conceptualized as a complex process that leads to the generation of new artefacts by working with “culturally-impregnated” materials within a representational space. This particular viewpoint highlights the meaning-oriented nature of creativity, its link to personal and group identities, and also calls for ecological research and situational interventions. One of the central issues addressed by the cultural psychology of creativity is the problem of “genesis” or how creativity is developed and manifested within cultural settings. The pioneer in this field is undoubtedly D.W. Winnicott who asserted at the beginning of the 70’s that creativity and cultural experience are twin-born. Children experiment culture creatively and they do so in the “third” or “potential” space, one that we can identify today with the social world of representations. In his view of ontogenesis the origins of creativity are found in the first forms of playing and are shaped by the nature of the mother – child relationship. The final part of the paper will develop further this account and show how creativity emerges from early childhood within a symbolic space where children “play” with artefactual resources, a space of dialogue between self and significant others, constantly alimented by social and collective systems of beliefs and practices, life experiences and communication.

Key-words: creativity paradigms, the cultural psychology of creativity, representational space, genetic account, culture, artefacts, play

The use of development is ubiquitous in everyday language, and theories regarding it can be found in the social sciences and humanities. Although much work has been done to examine the meaning of development and its history, little attention has been paid to Hegel's role as the philosophical anchor for the modern life of development. By revisiting Hegel's Philosophy of History and analyzing some of the most influential thinkers in modern theories of human development - spanning economic, social, cognitive and moral - the author argues that these theories are far from escaping the Hegelian logic of Development. Furthermore, he warns of the potential violence necessarily assumed in such theories, and that revolutionizing the philosophical framework upon which developmental theories rest would be a worthwhile endeavor.

In their attempts to provide educational services to their
citizens with exceptionalities, Kenya and Canada continue
to experience debates on how to ensure equity and
universality in special education provision while at the same
time respecting the rights of the students. In Canada, such
debates have included litigation, inclusion, and transition
from school to workforce. In Kenya, controversies surround
identification and intervention policies, attitudes towards
children with disabilities, and legislation. This study
discusses how both countries have responded to these
issues, and recommends that the curriculum provisions of
special education in Kenya and Canada be restructured to
enhance a more effective transition of youth with
disabilities. As well, regular training and retraining of
special education professionals and enactment of enabling
legislations in Kenya are recommended.

We examined children's and adults' numerical estimation and the representations that gave rise to their estimates. The results were inconsistent with two prominent models of numerical representation: the logarithmic-ruler model, which proposes that people of all ages possess a single, logarithmically spaced representation of numbers, and the accumulator model, which proposes that people of all ages represent numbers as linearly increasing magnitudes with scalar variability. Instead, the data indicated that individual children possess multiple numerical representations; that with increasing age and numerical experience, they rely on appropriate representations increasingly often; and that the numerical context influences their choice of representation. The results, obtained with second graders, fourth graders, sixth graders, and adults who performed two estimation tasks in two numerical contexts, strongly suggest that one cause of children's difficulties with estimation is reliance on logarithmic representations of numerical magnitudes in situations in which accurate estimation requires reliance on linear representations.

We applied overlapping waves theory and microgenetic methods to examine how children improve their estimation proWciency, and in particular how they shift from reliance on immature to mature representations of numerical magnitude. We also tested the theoretical prediction that feedback on problems on which the discrepancy between two representations is greatest will cause the greatest representational change. Second graders who initially were assessed as relying on an immature representation were presented feedback that varied in degree of discrepancy between the predictions of the mature and immature representations. The most discrepant feedback produced the greatest representational change. The change was strikingly abrupt, often occurring after a single feedback trial, and impressively broad, aVecting estimates over the entire range of numbers from 0 to 1000. The Wndings indicated that cognitive change can occur at the level of an entire representation, rather than always involving a sequence of local repairs.

We examined children's and adults' numerical estimation and the representations that gave rise to their estimates. The results were inconsistent with two prominent models of numerical representation: the logarithmic-ruler model, which proposes that people of all ages possess a single, logarithmically spaced representation of numbers, and the accumulator model, which proposes that people of all ages represent numbers as linearly increasing magnitudes with scalar variability. Instead, the data indicated that individual children possess multiple numerical representations; that with increasing age and numerical experience, they rely on appropriate representations increasingly often; and that the numerical context influences their choice of representation. The results, obtained with second graders, fourth graders, sixth graders, and adults who performed two estimation tasks in two numerical contexts, strongly suggest that one cause of children's difficulties with estimation is reliance on logarithmic representations of numerical magnitudes in situations in which accurate estimation requires reliance on linear representations.

We applied overlapping waves theory and microgenetic methods to examine how children improve their estimation proWciency, and in particular how they shift from reliance on immature to mature representations of numerical magnitude. We also tested the theoretical prediction that feedback on problems on which the discrepancy between two representations is greatest will cause the greatest representational change. Second graders who initially were assessed as relying on an immature representation were presented feedback that varied in degree of discrepancy between the predictions of the mature and immature representations. The most discrepant feedback produced the greatest representational change. The change was strikingly abrupt, often occurring after a single feedback trial, and impressively broad, affecting estimates over the entire range of numbers from 0 to 1000. The Wndings indicated that cognitive change can occur at the level of an entire representation, rather than always involving a sequence of local repairs.

Spontaneous transfer of learning is often difficult to elicit. This finding may be widespread partly because pretests proactively interfere with transfer. To test this hypothesis, 7-year-olds’ transfer was examined across 2 numerical tasks (number line estimation and categorization) in which similar representational changes have been observed. As predicted, children given feedback on numerical estimates learned to use a linear representation of numerical quantity instead of a logarithmic one, but providing practice on a categorization pretest led children to continue using a logarithmic representation on the same task, which they otherwise abandoned with surprising frequency. These findings imply unsupervised practice of inappropriate representations impedes transfer, and studies of learning can greatly underestimate children’s potential for transfer if pretest effects are uncontrolled.

Studies have reported high correlations in accuracy across estimation contexts, robust transfer of estimation training to novel numerical contexts, and adults drawing mistaken analogies between numerical and fractional values. We hypothesized that these disparate findings may reflect the benefits and costs of learning linear representations of numerical magnitude. Specifically, children learn that their default logarithmic representations are inappropriate for many numerical tasks, leading them to adopt more appropriate linear representations despite linear representations being inappropriate for estimating fractional magnitude. In Experiment 1, this hypothesis accurately predicted a developmental shift from logarithmic to linear estimates of numerical magnitude and a negative correlation between accuracy of numerical and fractional magnitude estimates (r=−.80). In Experiment 2, training that improved numerical estimates also led to poorer fractional magnitude estimates. Finally, both before and after training that eliminated age differences in estimation accuracy, complementary sex differences were observed across the two estimation contexts.

The physical, emotional, and psychological changes that occur in adolescence prompt youths to have serious questions about their bodies, relationships, and health that are often personal, sensitive, or embarrassing. Past research has shown that adolescents are often reluctant to consult physicians, peers, and others for personal health questions due to concerns about confidentiality. One new venue for health information is the Internet, which is a promising resource due to its accessibility, interactivity, and anonymity. This study is a snapshot investigation of a popular health support website, which utilized a peer-generated bulletin board format to facilitate the discussion of adolescent health and social issues. Analyses of two health bulletin boards-one on teen issues and one on sexual health-were conducted on the questions and replies found on 273 topics of mainly anonymous adolescents collected over a 2-month period. Results revealed that the questions most frequently posted and viewed reflected interests and concerns about their changing physical, emotional, and social selves: Romantic relationships were the most frequent topic on the teen issues bulletin board; sexual health was the most frequent topic on the sexuality bulletin board. The bulletin boards proved to be a valuable forum of personal opinions, actionable suggestions, concrete information, and emotional support and allowed teens to candidly discuss sensitive topics, such as sexuality and interpersonal relations. D

In this article, we propose that adolescents' online interactions are both a literal and a metaphoric screen for representing major adolescent developmental issues, such as sexuality and identity. Because of the public nature of Internet chat rooms, they provide an open window into the expression of adolescent concerns. Our study utilizes this window to explore how issues of sexuality and identity are constructed in a teen chat room. We adapt qualitative discourse methodology to microanalyze a half-hour transcript from a monitored teen chat room, comparing it, where relevant, to a second transcript, used in a prior study [Greenfield, P.M., Subrahmanyam, K., 2003. Online discourse in a teen chat room: New codes and new modes of coherence in a visual medium. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 24, 713-738.]. Our microanalysis reveals that participants use the online space of teen chat to air adolescent concerns about sexuality and to develop creative strategies to exchange identity information with their peers. This exchange is critical to the activity of bpairing offQ, an important teenage expression of emerging sexuality. Developmental issues from adolescents' offline lives are reconstructed online with some important differences. The virtual world of teen chat may offer a safer environment for exploring emerging sexuality than the real world. Through the verbally explicit exchange of identity information, participants are able to bpair offQ with partners of their choice, despite the disembodied nature of chat participants. D

Computational models of analogical inference have assumed that inferences about the target are generated solely by "copying with substitution and generation" from the source, guided by a mapping based on similarity and parallel structure. In contrast, work in philosophy of science has stressed that analogical inference is based on causal models of the source and target. In two experiments, we showed that reducing analogical overlap by eliminating a matching higherorder relation (a preventive cause) from the target increased inductive strength even though it decreased similarity of the analogs. Analogical inference appears to be mediated by building and then "running" a causal model.

Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as "one of degree and not of kind" (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) . We show that this symbolic-relational discontinuity pervades nearly every domain of cognition and runs much deeper than even the spectacular scaffolding provided by language or culture alone can explain. We propose a representational-level specification as to where human and nonhuman animals' abilities to approximate a PSS are similar and where they differ. We conclude by suggesting that recent symbolicconnectionist models of cognition shed new light on the mechanisms that underlie the gap between human and nonhuman minds.

When we attend to other people in pain, the neural circuits underpinning the processing of first-hand experience of pain are activated in the observer. This basic somatic sensorimotor resonance plays a critical role in the primitive building block of empathy and moral reasoning that relies on the sharing of others' distress. However, the full-blown capacity of human empathy is more sophisticated than the mere simulation of the target's affective state. Indeed, empathy is about both sharing and understanding the emotional state of others in relation to oneself. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, 17 typically developing children (range 7-12 yr) were scanned while presented with short animated visual stimuli depicting painful and non-painful situations. These situations involved either a person whose pain was accidentally caused or a person whose pain was intentionally inflicted by another individual. After scanning, children rated how painful these situations appeared. Consistent with previous fMRI studies of pain empathy with adults, the perception of other people in pain in children was associated with increased hemodynamic activity in the neural circuits involved in the processing of first-hand experience of pain, including the insula, somatosensory cortex, anterior midcingulate cortex, periaqueductal gray, and supplementary motor area. Interestingly, when watching another person inflicting pain onto another, regions that are consistently engaged in representing social interaction and moral behavior (the temporo-parietal junction, the paracingulate, orbital medial frontal cortices, amygdala) were additionally recruited, and increased their connectivity with the fronto-parietal attention network. These results are important to set the standard for future studies with children who exhibit social cognitive disorders (e.g., antisocial personality disorder, conduct disorder) and are often deficient in experiencing empathy or guilt.

Different perspectives on personality development propose a range of possible degrees to which traits are free to change, from hardly at all to very much. This essay reviews the empirical evidence on just how consistent and changeable personality traits are across the life course. To gain a thorough perspective on personality trait development, we review developmental studies that focus on three different types of change: rank-order consistency, mean level change, and individual level change. Starting in late childhood, personality traits exhibit modest levels of rank-order consistency that increase with age. In addition personality traits show mean level changes, especially in young adulthood, that are consistent with the idea of increasing maturity. Finally, despite these general trends in personality continuity and change, there is evidence that individuals may change in ways that contradict general trends and that these individual differences in change are related to life experiences.

The ability of personality traits to predict important life outcomes has traditionally been questioned because of the putative small effects of personality. In this article, we compare the predictive validity of personality traits with that of socioeconomic status (SES) and cognitive ability to test the relative contribution of personality traits to predictions of three critical outcomes: mortality, divorce, and occupational attainment. Only evidence from prospective longitudinal studies was considered. In addition, an attempt was made to limit the review to studies that controlled for important background factors. Results showed that the magnitude of the effects of personality traits on mortality, divorce, and occupational attainment was indistinguishable from the effects of SES and cognitive ability on these outcomes. These results demonstrate the influence of personality traits on important life outcomes, highlight the need to more routinely incorporate measures of personality into quality of life surveys, and encourage further research about the developmental origins of personality traits and the processes by which these traits influence diverse life outcomes.

This volume is the first to bring together the fast-growing research on self-continuity from multiple perspectives within and beyond social psychology.

The book covers individual and collective aspects of self-continuity, while a final section explores the relationship between these two forms. Topics include environmental and cultural influences on self-continuity; the interplay of autobiographical memory and personal self-continuity; the psychological function of self-continuity; personal and collective self-continuity; and resistance to change. The volume is rounded off with commentaries on the central issues and themes that have been discussed.

The book provides a unique sourcebook for this important topic and will appeal not only to upper-level students and researchers in social psychology, but, in view of the multiple perspectives represented in the volume, it will also appeal to cognitive, developmental, and personality psychologists.

The article discusses a topical issue in contemporary Bulgaria: the crime among the underage offenders aged 14–17. National Statistical Institute data for a 17 year period is reconfigured, analyzed and then interpreted from the standpoints of sociology of delinquency and criminology. As a result a quantitative generalized profile of the juvenile offender is constructed and presented both in short and in detail.
The article also traces the structure and dynamics of the convicted underage offenders throughout the period. Using the correlation method of statistical analysis, the author offers a periodization of the transitional period. The periodization emerges on the basis of changing dynamics explained by the finding that the convicted criminal activity of underage and full age offenders is determined by different factors during the sub-periods. A number of hypothetical explanations, pending verification, are offered in relation to the changes in convicted criminal activity in Bulgaria. The periodization is exclusively based on data and statistical coefficients provided and estimated by the National Statistical Institute.
Furthermore, the article discusses the structure and dynamics of convicted underage offenders by a number of demographic and social attributes, e.g. sex, age, education, ethnicity, type of crime, family type, situation in the family, physical and mental health, and all types of inflicted punishments. As a result of all analyses and interpretations based on the available data it is generalized that there are approximately 190 underage (aged 14–17) offenders per year whom can be referred to as dangerous offenders active in Bulgaria.