Cumbria Nuclear Material Storage Scheme in Mudstone Proposal

More Economical Nuclear Materials Permanent Storage Facility, 2024

United Kingdom can include a more economical approach to designing and constructing the safe permanent storage facilities for nuclear materials Here is a solution to the interminable problem of a UK GDF: To be tunnelled on shore within the Cumbrian Fells and financed with other nations A possible solution After assessing and addressing some of the challenges for nuclear materials permanent storage by looking back to the 1980s and forwards through the next 20 years and applying what is now possible, the United Kingdom can include other approaches than proposed for the current GDF. Finance and time required can be reduced to permanently store all the legacy intermediate, spent fuel and high level/activity materials. Tunnelling within the Cumbrian Fells under Corney Fell and Whitfell, if agreed to by the Copeland Communities can provide a feasible approach to solve the vital issue of providing safe permanent storage of the UK’s nuclear materials. This area in the National Park, can deliver the long-term solution that will provide the United Kingdom and Cumbria with the economic and long-term employment opportunities from fulfilling this vital need. A value for money capability must be delivered in order to progress the UK’s path to the greener and cleaner nuclear economy vision of the future which will include the deployment of a range of sizes, types and applications of nuclear reactors and nuclear applications. The construction of very long-lasting storage tunnels above sea level with gravity drainage can be designed and constructed. The topology of the Fells and their bedrock geologies and gravity enable a significant volume of the rainfall falling across these Fells to run off quickly, not penetrate, as noted in a review of the River Esk and River Duddon hydrological and rainfall records, and from the existence of the open channels across the Fells. Drained water from tunnels will be processed safely through treatment facilities similar to those installed at nuclear power station sites. To verify this proposal’s feasibility, further site investigation work will check the data obtained and calibrate bedrock geological strengths and hydrological information within Fell areas to augment what has been determined to-date. Information gaps exist since the extent of boreholes and logging investigations undertaken in the 1980 and 1990s near Sellafield/Longlands were not replicated across Corney Fell and Whitfell. Sealing clay to backfill tunnels, materials and TBMs can be brought into the jetty by ship and surplus crushed rock exported from the jetty. Proven TBM engineering construction methods and capabilities are available now, that were not available in the 1980 and 1990, which make this hard rock tunnelling proposal possible. Large tunnelling projects in the United Kingdom include the Channel Tunnel, Thames Bypass Super Stormwater Drain, HS2 Chiltern Tunnels and Shafts with the HS2 Denham tunnelling engineering facilities, Woodsmith Mine Tunnelling and Shafts. All are significant tunnelling projects where challenges were, or are being overcome. Cooperation with tunnelling and mining engineers working on these projects provided guidance. The financing of tunnelling projects has evolved and it is proposed that tunnels for the permanent nuclear material storage facility can be funded through bond issues, for a dedicated construction special purpose vehicle (SPV) to have the available funding of £1Billion to £2Billion per year over the 20-to-25-year delivery period. There will be a guaranteed return to the funders due to the very long term the facility will be in existence. The bond rates will be fixed and will address the progressive delivery from 2025 for the investigations, front-end design, engineering and consents and phased construction of the facility, for the agreed build rate and the storage operations. Another nation or several nations may be interested in participating with the UK in the financing of the facility for shared strategic purposes.

Intellectual Property Office (IPO UK) application, 2022

Construction of a storage site for nuclear material(s) require(s)local geological variability to be mitigated. Reducing impacts of radioactive substances, radiation, fluids, or gases emitted by nuclear materials, within and outside storage infrastructure requires lined and/or zoned tunnelled/shaft storage configurations, drained fluid processing and ventilation filtering. Impacts are reduced by increasing effectiveness of containment methods and reducing impacts of variations within local geology/hydrology where the site is located, at or above sea level. Tunnel(s)and zones, ventilation routes and drainage routes can be configured and aligned within the local geology, terrain, at elevations, to meet spatial and overburden requirements, are suited to operations, type(s)of nuclear material(s), thermal loadings, hydrological and geochemical conditions, so storage conditions are secure ,and safe. Subject to local consent and policy land use permissions and feasibility.

2015

West Cumbria is an area in which the landscape and the working lives of local people are dominated by the underlying geology.

Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers - Energy, 2015

This paper discusses Radioactive Waste Management Limited's plans for implementing UK government policy for the safe geological disposal of UK's higher-activity radioactive waste. As a pioneer of nuclear technology, the UK has accumulated a diverse legacy of higher-activity radioactive waste. The paper provides a brief history of the project to date and key developments to be expected in the coming years. The paper gives an overview of the safety of geological disposal, and provides examples of the approach to ensure confidence in safety during the transport, operational and post-closure phases. It discusses the challenges in the design, construction and operation of a project with a lifetime of more than 100 years. Finally, the paper considers commonalities between the UK project and international experiences in this topic. 206 Energy Volume 168 Issue EN4 Delivering safe geological disposal of nuclear waste in the UK Tweed, Ellis and Whittleston

Sunderland Civic Centre, Nuclear Bunker and Railway Tunnel: Historic Buildings Recording, 2022

2021

Generating power with nuclear energy accumulates radioactive spent nuclear fuel, anticipated not to be diversified into any unknown purposes. Nuclear safeguards include bookkeeping of nuclear fuel inventories, frequent checking, and monitoring to confirm nuclear non-proliferation. Permanent isolation of radionuclides from biosphere by disposal challenges established practices, as opportunities for monitoring of individual fuel assemblies ceases. Different concepts for treatment and geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel exist. Spent nuclear fuel disposal facility is under construction in Olkiluoto in Southwest Finland. Posiva Oy has carried out multidisciplinary bedrock characterization of crystalline bedrock for siting and design of the facility. Site description involved compilation of geological models from investigations at surface level, from drillholes and from underground rock characterization facility ONKALO. Research focused on long term safety case (performance) of engineered and natural barriers in purpose to minimize risks of radionuclide release. Nuclear safeguards include several concepts. Containment and surveillance (C/S) are tracking presence of nuclear fuel through manufacturing, energy generation, cooling, transfer, and encapsulation. Continuity of knowledge (CoK) ensures traceability and non-diversion. Design information provided by the operator to the state and European Commission (Euratom), and further to IAEA describes spent nuclear fuel handling in the facility. Design information verification (DIV) using timely or unannounced inspections, provide credible assurance on absence of any ongoing undeclared activities within the disposal facility. Safeguards by design provide information applicable for the planning of safeguards measures, e.g., surveillance during operation of disposal facility. Probability of detection of an attempt to any undeclared intrusion into the repository containment needs to be high. Detection of such preparations after site closure would require long term monitoring or repeated geophysical measurements within or at proximity of the repository. Bedrock imaging (remote sensing, geophysical surveys) would serve for verifying declarations where applicable, or for characterization of surrounding rock mass to detect undeclared activities. ASTOR working group has considered ground penetrating radar (GPR) for DIV in underground constructed premises during operation. Seismic reflection survey and electrical or electromagnetic imaging may also apply. This report summarizes geophysical methods used in Olkiluoto, and some recent development, from which findings could be applied also for nuclear safeguards. In this report the geophysical source fields, involved physical properties, range of detection, resolution, survey geometries, and timing of measurements are reviewed for different survey methods. Useful interpretation of geophysical data may rely on comparison of results to declared repository layout, since independent understanding of the results may not be successful. Monitoring provided by an operator may enable alarm and localization of an undeclared activity in a cost-effective manner until closure of the site. Direct detection of constructed spaces, though possible, might require repeated effort, have difficulties to provide spatial coverage, and involve false positive alarms still requiring further inspection.

Underground Spaces I, 2008

It is possible that hundreds to perhaps thousands of new nuclear power reactors could be deployed this century to help meet the growing global demand for electricity. Underground reactor siting is proposed as a potentially superior alternative to surface siting. Past studies and experience with underground siting proved the engineering feasibility and revealed numerous safety, security, environmental and aesthetic advantages, but in spite of these advantages the added cost associated with underground siting continues to be viewed as an impediment. Recent work on the underground nuclear park (UNP) concept, however, indicates the potential to reduce per-reactor capital and operating cost below that for conventional surface siting. In addition, under a closed fuel-cycle policy, reprocessing plant, fuel re-manufacturing facilities, fast spectrum reactor(s), and waste disposal facilities could also potentially be located underground as part of the UNP. Work to date has included underground design concepts and excavation cost estimates for UNPs in bedded salt and granite, and ideas for UNP-based energy system applications. The UNP approach has the potential to reduce many of the cost, waste management, safety, and security concerns currently associated with nuclear power.

The research programme for disposal of High-Level radioactive Waste in Belgium (HLW) is reaching the demonstration stage. Designs are finalised for a large-scale demonstration of the current disposal concept. To this extent, the Economic Interest Grouping (EIG) EURIDICE, a joint venture between the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCKCEN and the Belgian Waste Management Agency NIRAS/ONDRAF is managing the extension of the existing HADES underground research facility with a second shaft and connecting gallery to allow for the large-scale nature of the works. SCKCEN started the construction of the existing facility 20 years ago, aiming at performing in situ research in the Boom Clay, a tertiary clay formation identified as a potential host rock for HLW disposal. The gallery construction in this clay allowed improving the excavation techniques in this type of rock, evolving from a feasibility test to a mechanised technique causing minimal damage to the surrounding host rock. The origina...