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2000
A developmental study of diildren's sensitivity to opaque contexts is reported. Sentences are cowidered opaque if the substitution of a term with a co-referential term can change the truth of the sentence (e.g., "John thinks that Venus is the Moming Star"). Opaque contexts often involve propositional attitude verbs such as 'know' and 'think'. Sensitivity to opacity requires understanding that a referent c m be represented in different ways, and that the specifïc description that is used is important. Two studies were conducted investigating children's ability to deal with opacity. In the first, 4-to &year-olds were given a variety of opacity tasks (referential, linguistic and intentional), false belief tasks, digit span, and vocabulary measures. The results of the first study indicated that children were more successful on opaque contexts with action referents than those with objed referents. The results also demonstrated that children find referential opacity easier than linguistic opaaty, and both easier than intentional opacity. Nonetheless, performance across the three types of opacity was related even when age, vocabulary and digit span were statistically controiled, supporting the view that there is an underlying comrnonality for the three contexts. The second study examuied whether performance on referentially opaque contexts could be predicted by metarepresentational ability and metalinguistic awareness. Metarepresentational ability was measured using false belief tasks and metahguistic abiiity was measured using ta& requuing dùldren to compare and evaluate statemenk containing referring expressions. In this second study, 5to 7-year-O lds were given opacity (referen tial and quo ta tional), false belief, metalinguistic awareness, digit span, and vocabulary measures. Hierarchical regressions indicated tha t even after the vanability from diildren's age, vocabulary scores and digit span performance is taken into account, metarepresentational ability and metalinguistic awareness still significantly, and independently, explained some of the remaining vanabiLity in performance on referential opacity tasks. These results are taken as support for the view that both metarepresentational ability and metaiinguistic awareness are necessary in order to deal with referentially opaque contexts. These studies are of interest to anyone concemed with: (1) children's understanding of the representational nature of language; and (2) the necessary abilities for sensitivity to opaque contexts. 1 would rike to thank Professor David Olsori for his advice and encouragement. His comments and questions were always helpful. One of the reasons I decided to pursue a Ph.D. was because of how much fun David made the leaming process; I am grateful to him for making my time at OISE/UT enjoyable. I also want to thank Professor Janet Astington for sharing her time and ideas with me. Over the years, she has been a source of support, guidance and expertise, for which I a m very grateful. 1 also appreciate the comments that Professor Phi1 Zelazo offered, both during the thesis preparation, and during the defence. I would like to thank Professor Ron Smyth for his thought-provoking (and challenging) questions during the defence, and Professor Daniela O'Neill for raising interesting questions for discussion. I would like to acknowledge the generous help of the principals, teachers, and students of The Scarborough Board of Education, especiaily my parents-in-law, Don and Donna MacLeod, who welcomed me into their schools. 1 am also grateful to Sue Elgie for sharing her statistical knowledge with me; her help was invaluable. Thanks also to my parents for their ongoing support and for their continuous words of encouragement. Their pride was always evident, and much appreciated. Finally, to my husband Mark: thee, thee, thee.
Cognitive Development, 1999
Around four years of age, children recognize that action is less a consequence of the way the world is than the way it is represented by the actor. This understanding is characterized as a "theory of mind." This study examines the possibility of the development of a parallel theory of language; specifically, the understanding that, in opaque contexts, terms do not simply map on to the referent of the expression, but rather indicate how that object is to be represented. 120 3-to 7-year-olds were tested on their theory of mind (using false belief tasks) and sensitivity to opaque contexts. Children who passed false belief tasks performed more successfully on the opacity measure than those who did not, even when age was partialled out (r (117) ϭ .2453, p Ͻ .01). It is concluded that children come to realize that language does not refer to the world directly, but rather via one's representation of it. The results are consistent with the view that both abilities are manifestations of a more general understanding of representation, and that children's theories of mind and language follow similar developmental paths. Around the end of their first year, children begin to refer to objects by pointing to and naming them. Their terms may initially refer too broadly, commonly called overextensions, or too narrowly, called underextensions (
g For my mother, Mary M. Carroll, and in memory of my father, Patrick E. Carroll DAVID W. CARROLL received a B.A. in psychology and philosophy from the University of California at Davis (1972) and an M.A. (1973) and Ph.D. (1976) in experimental and developmental psychology from Michigan State University. He has taught at the University of Wisconsin-Superior since 1976. He is currently a Professor of Psychology and previously served as chair of the psychology program. Dr. Carroll teaches courses in introductory psychology, psychology of language, cognitive psychology, and child development, and he conducts research on discourse comprehension, critical thinking, and the teaching of psychology. He is a
Journal of Child Language, 1984
The verbal responses of 22 second graders, 24 fourth graders and 22 sixth graders to ambiguous and clear messages were recorded. Children's referential choices were analysed. After the ambiguous messages, children (from the age of seven years) chose preferentially a referent with only the feature described in the message rather than a referent with this feature plus another one. The results support the Jackson & Jacobs' hypothesis (1982) that children use an interpretative strategy based on a presupposition about the speaker's cooperation. But the results may also support a hypothesis that children use an information-processing rule not necessarily related to a presupposition about the speaker's cooperation .
Trends in Language Acquisition Research, 2015
This chapter reviews the literature on preschool children's sensitivity to cognitive accessibility in selecting linguistic forms to realize referents in speech. Both spontaneous speech and experimental production studies are reviewed, encompassing thirteen languages for monolingual children and five different language pairs for bilingual children. Across languages, children show sensitivity to referent accessibility from as early as 1;6, with sensitivity to discourse factors such as explicit contrast and prior mention emerging first and becoming adult-like by about 3;0. Sensitivity to perceptual factors such as perceptual availability and joint attention emerges slightly later and develops into the school years. Both caregiver speech and language structure play a role in how children's sensitivity emerges. This sensitivity to accessibility points to children's understanding of discourse structure and early stages of theory of mind.
Journal of Child Language, 2003
We propose that parental reformulations of erroneous child utterances provide children with information about the locus of an error and hence the error itself. Since the meanings of the child utterance and the adult reformulation are the same although the forms are different, children infer that adults must be offering a correction. Analyses of longitudinal data from five children (three acquiring English and two acquiring French) show that (a) adults reformulate their children's erroneous utterances and do so significantly more often than they replay or repeat error-free utterances; (b) their rates of reformulation are similar across error-types (phonological, morphological, lexical, and syntactic); (c) they reformulate significantly more often to younger children, who make more errors, and these reformulations decrease significantly with age. Evidence that children attend to such reformulations comes from three measures: (a) their explicit repeats of such reformulations in their next turn; (b) their acknowledgements (yeah or uh-huh as a preface to their next turn, or a repeat of any new information included in the reformulation); and (c) their explicit rejections of reformulations where the adult has misunderstood them.
In learning language, children have to acquire not only words and constructions, but also the ability to make inferences about a speaker's intended meaning. For instance, if in answer to the question, 'what did you put in the bag?', the speaker says, 'I put in a book', then the hearer infers that the speaker put in only a book, by assuming that the speaker is informative. On a Gricean approach to pragmatics, this implicated meaning -a quantity implicature -involves reasoning about the speaker's epistemic state. This thesis examines children's development of implicature understanding. It seeks to address the question of what the relationship is in development between quantity, relevance and manner implicatures; whether word learning by exclusion is a pragmatic forerunner to implicature, or based on a lexical heuristic; and whether reasoning about the speaker's epistemic state is part of children's pragmatic competence. This thesis contributes to research in experimental and developmental pragmatics by broadening the focus of investigation to include different types of implicatures, the relationship between them, and the contribution of other aspects of children's development, including structural language knowledge. It makes the novel comparison of word learning by exclusion with a clearly pragmatic skill -implicatures -and opens an investigation of manner implicatures in development. It also presents new findings suggesting that children's early competence with quantity implicatures in simple communicative situations belies their ongoing development in more complex ones, particularly where the speaker's epistemic state is at stake.
Pragmatics and Cognition
Binary judgement on under-informative utterances (e.g. Some horses jumped over the fence, when all horses did) is the most widely used methodology to test children’s ability to generate implicatures. Accepting under-informative utterances is considered a failure to generate implicatures. We present off-line and reaction time evidence for the Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis, according to which some children who accept under-informative utterances are in fact competent with implicature but do not consider pragmatic violations grave enough to reject the critical utterance. Seventy-five Dutch-speaking four to nine-year-olds completed a binary (Experiment A) and a ternary judgement task (Experiment B). Half of the children who accepted an utterance in Experiment A penalised it in Experiment B. Reaction times revealed that these children experienced a slow-down in the critical utterances in Experiment A, suggesting that they detected the pragmatic violation even though they did not reject ...
Specific language impairment (SLI) has traditionally been characterized as a deficit of structural language (specifically grammar), with relative strengths in pragmatics. In this study, comprehensive assessment of production, comprehension, and metalinguistic judgment of referring expressions revealed that children with SLI have weaknesses in both structural and pragmatic language skills relative to age-matched peers. Correlational analyses highlight a relationship between their performance on the experimental tasks and their structural language ability. Despite their poor performance on the production and comprehension tasks, children with SLI were able to recognize pragmatically under-informative reference relative to other types of utterance, although they imposed a less severe penalty on such expressions than typically developing peers, a pattern that supports the pragmatic tolerance account. Our novel methodology (which probed structural abilities from both the speaker's and hearer's perspectives as well as metalinguistic and pragmatic skills in the same sample) challenges the assumption that pragmatic errors stem from deficits in social cognition and instead supports recent findings suggesting that when the impact of structural language is isolated, pragmatic deficits may be resolved.
2020
Intensionality (or opacity) is a core property of mental representations and sometimes understanding opacity is claimed to be a part of children's theory of mind (evidenced with the false belief task). Children, however, pass the false belief task and the intensionality tasks at different ages (typically 4 vs. 5;1-6;11 years). According to two dominant interpretations, the two tests either require different conceptual resources or vary only in their executive or linguistic load. In two experiments, involving 120 children aged 3-6 (Experiment 1) and 75 children aged 4-6 (Experiment 2), we tested two variants of the executive load hypothesis: The differential linguistic complexity of the two tests, and the dual-name problem of the intensionality task. The former was addressed by standardizing and minimizing the linguistic demands of both tasks (contrasted with the typical narrative intensionality task), and the latter by introducing the dual-name problem into the false belief task as well, so that it was present in both tasks. We found that (1) two structurally different intensionality tasks shared more variance with each other than with the structurally similar false belief task, and that (2) introducing a dual label problem into the false belief task did not reduce the developmental gap. Our results speak against interpreting the difference between the time children pass the two tests entirely in terms of performative issues, and support the conceptual enrichment hypothesis. We discuss the theoretical relevance of these results, suggesting that they are best explained by fine-grained increments within the concept of belief, rather than a radical conceptual change. We conclude that understanding opacity of minds-which emerges between age 5 and 6-is an important step toward a more advanced form of ToM.
2012
Recent research on moment-to-moment language comprehension has revealed striking differences between adults and preschool children. Adults rapidly use the referential principle to resolve syntactic ambiguity, assuming that modification is more likely when there are 2 possible referents for a definite noun phrase. Young children do not. We examine the scope of this phenomenon by exploring whether children use the referential principle to resolve another form of ambiguity. Scalar adjectives (big, small) are typically used to refer to an object when contrasting members of the same category are present in the scene (big and small coins). In the present experiment, 5-year-olds and adults heard instructions like "Point to the big (small) coin" while their eye-movements were measured to displays containing 1 or 2 coins. Both groups rapidly recruited the meaning of the adjective to distinguish between referents of different sizes. Critically, like adults, children were quicker to look to the correct item in trials containing 2 possible referents compared with 1. Nevertheless, children's sensitivity to the referential principle was substantially delayed compared to adults', suggesting possible differences in the recruitment of this top- down cue. The implications of current and previous findings are discussed with respect to the development of the architecture of language comprehension.
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 2018
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology jo urnal homepage: www.elsevier.co m/locate/jecp informative language structures that uniquely identify referents provide limited benefits to children for effective communication where children's short-term memory and executive functions also matter.
Developmental Psychology, 2002
First Language, 1988
Children 4 to 10 years of age were presented with referential messages that varied in message adequacy and speech quality and were required to choose the intended referent from a set of four alternatives. Following feedback regarding their choice, they evaluated the message as good or bad and provided reasons for their evaluation. Half of the messages had sufficient information to define the referent uniquely; half had insufficient or ambiguous information. Moreover, half of the messages were produced by hearing children and half by deaf children. Children's comprehension and evaluation of messages changed systematically with age, as did the basis for these evaluations. The 4and 5-year-olds performed poorly on the picture selection task but evaluated most messages as good; 6-year-olds rated messages as good if they had chosen the correct referent, even by guessing. From 8 years of age, children judged the adequacy of messages independent of outcome and linked their justifications to relevant details of the messages. Messages that were fully intelligible to adults but had atypical speech quality resulted in poorer performance and evaluations than did messages with normal speech quality for children of all ages.
psych.stanford.edu
The question of how children learn what words mean is one that has long perplexed philosophers and psychologists. As Quine famously pointed out, the problem of accounting for word learning is a deep one: simply hearing a word uttered in the presence of an object tells a learner ...
The Processing and Acquisition of Reference, 2011
Studies of adult sentence processing have established that the referential context in which sentences are presented plays an immediate role in their interpretation, such that features of the referential context mitigate, and even eliminate, so-called 'garden-path' effects. The finding that the context ordinarily obviates garden path effects is compelling evidence for the Referential Theory, advanced originally by and extended in . Recent work by Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill and Logrip, (1999) suggests, however, that children may not be as sensitive as adults to contextual factors in resolving structural ambiguities. This conclusion is not anticipated by the Referential Theory and it also runs counter to the Continuity Assumption, which supposes that children and adults access the same cognitive mechanisms in processing language. The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the observations that have led researchers to conclude that children, unlike adults, may lack sensitivity to features of the referential context in comprehension and ambiguity resolution. Adopting a research strategy which we call the method of subtraction, we present evidence that the performance systems of children and adult differ minimally, that children are sensitive to the same features of the referential context as adults are, and that children make use of the context to resolve structural ambiguities in sentence interpretation. Many experimental investigations of human sentence processing have shown that listeners do not wait until they reach the end of a sentence before they begin to compute an interpretation. Rather, listeners incrementally make commitments to an interpretation as the linguistic input unfolds in real time. A consequence of this feature of sentence comprehension is that it sometimes gives rise to so-called garden-path effects. In the presence of a temporary ambiguity, listeners may assign an interpretation that later turns out to be unworkable and must, therefore, be abandoned in favor of an alternative interpretation. Various explanations have been proposed to account for the garden path effects that have been documented in certain experimental contexts Trueswell and Tanenhaus, 1994; MacDonald, 1994, among others). One line of research has claimed, however, that the referential contexts in which sentences ordinarily appear often mitigate, or even eliminate, garden-path effects. This is the Referential Theory proposed by and extended by . According to the Referential Theory, listeners experience gardenpath effects primarily when sentences are interpreted outside any referential context or in infelicitous contexts. If the Referential Theory is correct, garden path effects are largely experimental artifacts. Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill and Logrip, (1999) suggests that children might not be sensitive to features of the referential context to the same extent as adults are in resolving temporary syntactic ambiguities. If so, children would be expected to
1974
The role of infeLi.nce in children's comprehension and inemor, is the subject of this re-,larch report. In underlying proposition is that in order for a child to effectively understand and remember linguistic or nonlin4nistic information, he must actively embellish the given sti.ulus material with his own implicit knowledge. In the experiment described the authors sought to assess the developmental changes in the child's ability to infer and remember different kinds of linguistic information with children in grades K through five. Six paragraphs were read to each child; after each of these they were asked 8 Tea/No questions. Four questions were of verbatim information and four were of the different linguistic inferences being studied (presuppositions, inferred consequences, semantic entailment, and implied instruments). Age-related improvements were found for the verbatim information and for the spontaneous processing of implicit information, as well. There is an increased proficiency with age sliontaneously performing inUrential operations on linguistic material, which may be useful information for those constructing language ur reading comprehension instruments.
Journal of Child Language, 2005
This paper reports on an investigation of children's (aged 3;5-9; 8) comprehension of sentences containing ambiguity of prepositional phrase (PP) attachment. Results from a picture selection study (N=90) showed that children use verb semantics and preposition type to resolve the ambiguity, with older children also showing sensitivity to the definiteness of the object NP as a cue to interpretation. Study 2 investigated three-and five-year-old children's (N=47) ability to override an instrumental interpretation of ambiguous PPs in order to process attributes of the referential scene. The results showed that while five-year-olds are capable of incorporating aspects of the referential scene into their interpretations, three-year-olds are not as successful. Overall, the results suggest that children are attuned very early to the lexico-semantic co-occurrences that have been shown to aid ambiguity resolution in adults, but that more diffuse cues to interpretation are used only later in development.
2006
Abstract In the current studies we investigated English-speaking pre-school and young school-age children's choice of referential expressions in a referential communication game. In study 1 we crossed two variables: the type of question asked (general vs. specific) and the availability of the listener (present vs. absent). In study 2 we manipulated the number of referents (one vs. two) and the availability of the listener (present vs. absent).
2016
Research on acquisition has established a clear asymmetry between subject (1) and object (2) A’-dependencies, with the former being mastered earlier than the latter (Avrutin, 2000, de Villiers, de Villiers, Hoban, 1994, Goodluck & Tavakolian, 1982, for English; Corrêa, 1995, Costa et. al, 2011, for Portuguese; Arnon, 2005, 2010, Friedmann & Novogrodsky, 2004, for Hebrew; Adani et al., 2010, Adani, 2011, Arosio, Adani & Guasti, 2011, for Italian).
Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics, 2003
The present study investigates children"s syntactic and pragmatic processing when specifying referents presented in short video clips. Within Relevance theory, the assumption of 'optimal relevance' implies that utterances are intended to involve the least processing effort on the part of the listener. In the present context, lexically specified NPs are assumed to be more in line with optimal relevance than pronouns. Subjects were 48 normally developing children aged 3;4-8;10 and 30 SLI children aged 5;1-8;9, divided into a low and a normal MLU group. Children's responses were coded according to levels of pragmatic processing and syntactic positions. Normally developing children' referent specifications were found to be increasingly relevant with increasing age. Differences between SLI and normal children were only found for the low MLU group with SLI who used fewer pronouns than the younger children, thereby showing that syntactic limitations alone cannot account for children's specification of referents.
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