Can Democracy Educate a Society?
Lars Siemers2005, SSRN Electronic Journal
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Abstract
We examine whether democratic societies can escape poverty traps. Unrestricted agenda setting with simple majority rules fail to educate a society, because education-enhancing redistribution will not occur. We show that a combination of suitable constitutional rules overcomes this impossibility result: rotating agenda setting and agenda repetition in combination with flexible majority rules or with a tax protection rule.
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