BRUNEI AND THE WORLD SINCE 1984

Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 2016

This article explains salient features of Brunei's political ethos which values peace, prosperity and security as national motto .Negara Brunei Darussalam is unique among the Southeast Asian states. Aside from being the smallest country in the region, Brunei has a novel, albeit neo-traditional form of government that is sometimes seen as anachronistic on account of the absence of elected representative institutions present in the other ASEAN member countries. Despite this, Brunei has emerged as a significant player in the region, and has attained a status well beyond its size in important international organizations, but especially so within the ASEAN group.

Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 2016

Asian Security , 2017

Some scholars believe that as China’s power grows more preponderant, it will leverage its growing might to impose its will on others in the international system. This article engages this debate by probing China’s relationship with small states, going beyond those in its region. Small states are particularly apposite because their size and power deficiencies suggest they are among the most vulnerable to pressure or coercion from big powers such as China. Beijing’s diplomacy towards small states, therefore, represents a barometer of Chinese restraint and exercise of its power in a situation of clear power superiority. The article studies this dynamic, unpacking the contours and shape of China’s relations with small states, as well as the narratives and rationales that drive this relationship.

Limes Italian Journal of Geopolitics, 2020

Published in Limes Italian Journal of Geopolitics, 13/08/2020. English version of Stephen C. Druce and Abdul Hai Julay (2020) Il Brunei Fa i Conti Con Il Futuro. LIMES - Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica, 6. https://www.limesonline.com/en/brunei-deals-with-its-future

Asian Security, 2013

This article explains Malaysia’s US policy under Prime Minister Najib. It argues that to the extent that there is a “shift” in Malaysia’s policy, its substance has been shaped by structural and domestic considerations. Structurally, in the face of a fast rising China, Malaysia is compelled to keep a more balanced relationship with all the major powers. This structural push, reinforced by Obama’s “pivot,” has been nonetheless limited by a concern about the risks of entrapment, abandonment, and antagonism. Domestically, there are economic and political motivations to develop closer ties with Washington. These, however, have been counteracted by a calculation of not wanting to align too closely with America. These structural and domestic determinants together explain the smaller state’s strategy towards the superpower at a time of systemic change.

In 1963, Brunei rejected to join Malaysia. Since its rejection of Malaysia in 1963, Brunei had never had a steady relationship with the Malaysian government. In 1960, the Malayan Prime Minister proposed the formation of the Federation of Malaysia which would consist of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. However, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III (r.1950III (r. -1967 refused to join Malaysia as he could not accept Malaysia's terms for examples on the control of Brunei's revenue and the Sultan's contribution to the federal government. Though Brunei rejected Malaysia, Britain was still planning to bring Brunei within the federation at least by 1965. 1 Brunei and the Malaysian Plan Initially, the British government hoped to see continuous co-operation from Malaysia in seconding Brunei its officers in various fields of administration even after Brunei's rejection of Malaysia in 1963. By giving Brunei this type of co-operation, the British government hoped that Brunei would become closer to and eventually enter Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaysia however, demanded that the Brunei government return the Malaysian officers to Malaysia, as he wished to teach Brunei a lesson for not joining the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. 2 Tunku Abdul Rahman hoped that by recalling the officers, their positions would be substituted by British expatriates. 3 When this happened, he expected that it would stimulate the people of Brunei to rise against the British in Brunei, push the British to grant Brunei independence and drive the Bruneians to seek membership of Malaysia. 4 Tunku Abdul Rahman's action in recalling Malaysia's seconded officers from Brunei impelled the Sultan to obtain British assistance in providing Brunei with technical and professional services. However, still seeking close co-operation between Malaysia and Brunei, the British government encouraged the Sultan to employ officers from Malaysia. 5 Although the Sultan claimed that he would review the position of the Malaysian officers 1 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, 'Brunei's Political Development and the Formation of Malaysia: 1961 -1967', Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 2002, p. 137. 2 Ibid., pp. 249 -250. 3 When Brunei rejected the proposal to join Malaysia in 1963, the Malaysian government took its seconded officers in Brunei back to Malaysia. The Malaysian government withdrew the Malaysian Police Field Force unit, Malaysian officers and Non-Commissioned Officers serving with the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment (RBMR). 4 DO169/547, Bottomley to Reed, 25 October 1966. 5 Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, 'Brunei's Political Development', p. 259.

Asia in Transition, Springer, 2025

This chapter uses an institutionalist approach to present an assessment of the key issues Brunei Darussalam currently faces in relation to its pressing need for economic diversification. Given that institutional arrangements can hinder or enhance economic growth, the institutional approach has been central in explaining policies associated with economic growth and development in various countries. The approach also offers a wealth of literature that can be used to explain Brunei's difficulties in reducing its long-standing dependency on hydrocarbons, the extent to which institutions play a role in its economic development and in understanding the complexity of Brunei's political economy. The discussion does not claim to provide a solution to Brunei's economic diversification problem but rather offers some contextualisation that can be of benefit to scholars and policymakers in understanding its symptoms. The chapter also addresses current geopolitical issues and the increasing interconnectivity between Brunei's international relations and economic diversification as it attempts to attract more foreign direct investment.

Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000

This article examines the history and functions of the Brunei State Council (1907—1959). Although a "rubber stamp" to the British Resident's decisions until 1950, thereafter the Council, dominated by the nominees of a new and strong Sultan, Omar Ali Saifuddin III, became an Achilles heel to the British officialdom that yielded maximum power to the traditional elements under the Constitution promulgated in 1959.

Viceregalism, 2020

For more than 40 years, there has been growing interest in the socio-political and economic interactions between Malaysia and individual Arab Gulf States. This is most likely because of the economic interaction between these nations and Malaysia as well as the religious affinity between Malaysia and the Arab Gulf states. This has invariably led to the proliferation and establishment of numerous non-state actors who are also playing momentous roles in enhancing bilateral relationships. The aim of this paper is not only to examine and investigate the influence and contributions of non-state actors in enhancing Malaysia's relationship with the Arab Gulf states but also to provide a significant attempt to assess the role of Malaysian non-state actors in shaping future direction with the Arab Gulf countries and the extent to which Malaysian foreign policy has intensified the role of non-state actors.

This article narrates the long-standing diplomatic relationship between Malcolm MacDonald and Brunei. MacDonald played a significant role in safeguarding Brunei’s survival as an independent Malay Islamic sultanate during decolonisation. He prevented Brunei from becoming a British crown colony in 1946 unlike the neighbouring states of Sarawak and North Borneo. Having failed to unite the three North Borneo territories into a federation, he may have concurred with Brunei’s decision to opt out of the Malaysian Federation in August 1963 and thereafter. Due to his empathy with the Brunei sultans, especially Omar Ali Saifuddin the III, MacDonald’s approach for Brunei’s future contradicted the vision of his contemporaries for democratising Brunei.

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 2024

in Georgia. He has published numerous articles on Middle Eastern diplomatic history, politics, and international relations, especially regarding Turkey and Israel as well as minorities and relations with other areas of the Global South. He is the former President of both the Association of Global South Studies and of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies.

2002

The Rumour of the Revolt 101 3.4. The Plan for the Revolt 107 3.5. The Outbreak of the Revolt 113 3.6. The Reasons for the Revolt 121 3.7. Conclusion 127 4. CHAPTER FOUR Brunei's Refusal to Join Malaysia 4.1. Introduction 130 4.2. Meeting between the Brunei and Malayan Governments 131 4.3. The Ultimatum 142 4.4. The British Position towards Brunei in 1963 149 4.5. Final Decision 154 4.6. Conclusion 158 5. CHAPTER FIVE The Limbang Dispute 5.1. Historical Background 163 5.2. Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien's Claim 5.3. The Wishes of the Limbang People 5.4. The Malaysia Argument 192

Between 1906 and 1971, Brunei's internal and external security had been fully safeguarded by the British. However, between 1971 and 1983 Britain was only consultatively responsible over Brunei's external security and after 1983 that is after Brunei independence, it had to handle its external security on its own. This paper will show how Brunei expanded and strengthened its Royal Brunei Armed Forces and how it ameliorated the shortage of military personnel that is by forming a Young Soldiers Company and the RBMR Women's Company and recruiting a Gurkha