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2016, Osiris
This essay introduces our call for an intertwined history-of-emotions/history-ofscience perspective. We argue that the history of science can greatly extend the history of emotions by proffering science qua science as a new resource for the study of emotions. We present and read science, in its multiple diversities and locations, and in its variegated activities, products, theories, and emotions, as constitutive of the norms, experiences, expressions, and regimes of emotions. Reciprocally, we call for a new reading of science in terms of emotions as an analytical category. Assuming emotions are intelligible and culturally learned, we extend the notion of emotion to include a nonintentional and noncausal "emotional style," which is inscribed into (and can reciprocally be generated by) technologies, disease entities, laboratory models, and scientific texts. Ultimately, we argue that emotional styles interrelate with broader emotional cultures and thus can contribute to and/or challenge grand historical narratives. Descartes would have been more nearly right in saying, "I feel, therefore I am." -Ralph W. Gerard, 1941 1 Over the past two or three decades, the study of emotions has revolutionized our conceptions of human nature. What we now call the "Emotional Turn" challenged earlier scientific understandings of humans-our brains, our bodies, and the laws that govern their functions within and between individuals-and of society as a whole. Research on emotions has contributed to the invention of new scientific techniques and instruments, to the development of new ways of seeing and making visible, to the reorganization of the hierarchy of disciplines in science, as well as to the public visibility of and political interest in science. This turn to emotions is now visible in the neurosciences, economics, sociology, anthropology, criminology, philosophy, and literary and media studies. 2 In history, the
This essay introduces our call for an intertwined history-of-emotions/history-of-science perspective. We argue that the history of science can greatly extend the history of emotions by proffering science qua science as a new resource for the study of emotions. We present and read science, in its multiple diversities and locations, and in its variegated activities, products, theories, and emotions, as constitutive of the norms, experiences, expressions, and regimes of emotions. Reciprocally, we call for a new reading of science in terms of emotions as an analytical category. Assuming emotions are intelligible and culturally learned, we extend the notion of emotion to include a nonintentional and noncausal “emotional style,” which is inscribed into (and can reciprocally be generated by) technologies, disease entities, laboratory models, and scientific texts. Ultimately, we argue that emotional styles interrelate with broader emotional cultures and thus can contribute to and/or challenge grand historical narratives.
Science in Context, 2012
Emotion and feeling have only in the last decade become analytic concepts in the humanities, reflected in what some have called an “affective turn” in the academy at large. The study of emotion has also found a place in science studies and the history and philosophy of science, accompanied by the recognition that even the history of objectivity depends in a dialectical fashion on a history of subjectivity (Daston and Galison 2010, esp. chap. 4). This topical issue is a contribution to this larger trend across the humanities and the history of science, and yet is circumscribed by attention to a particular kind of emotion or condition for feeling: one centered not in an individual body, but in the interstices between bodies and things, between selves and others – what we call empathy.
2016
ln Moral Tribes, Greene (2013) promotes the proposition that emotions are crucial for everyday decision making. The author thereby introduces subjectivity into the contemporaryphilosophical landscape, which is dominated by an analytic orientation and a need for objectivity. This perspective has philosophical and practical implications.
Philosophy of Education Archive, 2014
Within the discipline of psychology, the conventional history outlines the development of two fundamental approaches to the scientific study of emotion-"basic emotion" and "appraisal" traditions. In this article, we outline the development of a third approach to emotion that exists in the psychological literature-the "psychological constructionist" tradition. In the process, we discuss a number of works that have virtually disappeared from the citation trail in psychological discussions of emotion. We also correct some misconceptions about early sources, such as work by Darwin and James. Taken together, these three contributions make for a fuller and more accurate account of ideas about emotion during the century stretching from 1855 to just before 1960.
Human Affairs: Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly, 2010
s collection represents a timely and ambitious survey of the affective turn in the social sciences. The first part of the reader reveals the importance the textual turn had for the affective turn to take place. Within the former turn, the universality of emotions was, at least, deeply challenged. The extracts in this part, mostly authored long before the affective turn took shape as such, reflect (on) the context of the textual turn in which "emotions came to be considered as discursive, dialogical phenomena, structured and influenced by the historical and cultural contingencies of communicational interactions" (p. 9). The three sections examine each of these features respectively: history, culture and society (mainly communicational interactions).
The Oxford Handbook of Affective Computing, 2015
This chapter presents a short history of psychological theory and research on emotion since the beginnings of psychology as an academic discipline in the last third of the 19 th century. Using William James's theory of emotion as the starting point and anchor, the history of research on five main questions of emotion psychology is charted. These concern, respectively: (1) the causal generation of emotions; (2) the effects of emotion on subsequent cognition and behavior; (3) the nature of emotion; (4) the evolutionary and learning origins of the emotion system; and (5) the neural structures and processes involved in emotions. A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMOTION 3 A Short History of Psychological Perspectives on Emotion Psychology as an independent academic discipline emerged during the last third of the 19 th century (see e.g., Leahey, 2003). I have therefore chosen this period as the starting point of the present, short history of psychological perspectives of emotion. However, readers should be aware that academic emotion psychology did not start from scratch. On the contrary, it build on a rich tradition of theorizing about emotions by philosophers, historians, and literary writers that dates back to the Ancient Greeks (see e.g., Strongman, 2003) and has remained influential up to the present (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Nussbaum, 2001). When psychology became an independent discipline, it defined itself initially as the science of consciousness (of conscious mental states; e.g., Brentano, 1873; Wundt, 1896). Given that emotions are salient exemplars of conscious mental states, it is not surprising that the psychologists of consciousness also had a keen interest in the emotions. In fact, most of the basic types of psychological emotion theory discussed today were already present, at least in the outlines, in the psychology of consciousness. During the subsequent, behaviorist phase of psychology (about 1915-1960), and due in large part to its restrictive research doctrines, research on emotions subsided again (see e.g., Arnold, 1960), although behaviorists did make some important contributions to emotion psychology (e.g., research on the classical conditioning of fear; see Gray, 1975; LeDoux, 1998; Watson, 1919). Immediately after the so-called "cognitive revolution" of the early 1960ies, when behaviorism was replaced by cognitivism-a modern version of mentalism guided by the metaphor of information processing in computers-emotion research took up speed again, until in the 1990ies, it became a boom that also began to affect other scientific disciplines. Today, emotion is an important topic in nearly every subfield of psychology, as well as in many other disciplines ranging from biology to neurophysiology to computer science, linguistics and literary studies. Some already see the emergence of a new interdisciplinary research field, analogous to A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMOTION 4 cognitive science: affective science, the interdisciplinary study of emotions and related phenomena (Scherer, 2009). One important reason for the recent surge of interest in emotions has been a reevaluation of the adaptive utility of emotions. Traditionally, emotions have often been regarded as maladaptive (because, it was held, they interfere with rational thinking and decision-making; see e.g., Roberts, 2013). In contrast, during the past twenty or so years, emotions have increasingly come to be seen as overall adaptive (e.g., Feldman-Barrett & Salovey, 2002; Frijda, 1994). Some theorists even regard emotions as indispensable for adaptive behavior (e.g., Damasio, 1994). This changed view of the usefulness of emotions has also been an important motive for launching of the field of affective computing (Picard, 1997). Five Questions of Emotion Psychology The task of emotion psychology can be defined as the reconstruction, or "reverse engineering" of the structure and functioning of the human emotion system, including its relations to other subsystems of the mind (Reisenzein & Horstmann, 2006). The central subtasks of this task are to explain (Q1) how emotions are elicited, or generated; (Q2) what effects (in particular what adaptive, or functional effects) emotions have on subsequent cognitive processes and behavior; and related to both questions, (Q3) what emotions themselves are-how they are to be theoretically defined; what kinds of mental and computational states they are (Reisenzein, 2012). Answering Q1-Q3 amounts to reconstructing the blueprint of the emotion system. However, as already argued by McDougall (1908/1960; see also, Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), to achieve this goal it is helpful and even necessary, to address a further question that is also of independent interest, which concerns the origins of the emotion system; namely (Q4) which parts of the emotion system are inherited and which are acquired through learning. Finally, to help answer questions Q1-A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMOTION 5 Q4, it would be useful to know (Q5) how emotions are biologically realized or implemented, that is, which neural structures and processes underlie them. A generally accepted theory of emotions that gives detailed answers to all these questions, or even just to the central questions Q1-Q3, still does not exist today. Nevertheless, progress has been made. In what follows, I will trace the history of the most important proposed answers to the five main questions of emotion psychology. As the starting point and anchor of my report, I will use a classical theory of emotion, which was proposed by one of the founding fathers of psychology, the psychologist and philosopher William James (1884; 1890; 1894). My reason for choosing James's theory of emotion for structuring this chapter is not that the theory has stood the test of time particularly well (see Reisenzein & Stephan, in press); but that it has been highly influential, is widely known, and is possibly the first emotion theory that tries to give answers-if partly only very sketchy answers-to all of the five main questions of emotion psychology. I will first describe James's answers to these questions and then discuss, in separate sections, what has been learned about them since James's time. James's Theory of Emotion The starting point of James's theory of emotion is the intuition, which I believe readers will confirm, that emotional experiences-experiences of joy, sorrow, anger, fear, pity or joy for another, pride, guilt etc. (see e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988)-have a special phenomenal quality; that is, it "is like" or "feels like" a special way to have them.
Emotions maintain an ambivalent position in the economy of science. In contemporary debates they are variously seen as hardwired biological responses, cultural artifacts, or uneasy mixtures of the two. At the same time, there is a tension between the approaches to emotion developed in modern psychotherapies and in the history of science. While historians see the successful ascription of affective states to individuals and populations as a social and technical achievement, the psychodynamic practitioner treats these enduring associations as pathological accidents that need to be overcome. This short essay uses the career of the Glaswegian public health investigator James L. Halliday to examine how debates over the ontological status of the emotions and their durability allow them to travel between individual identity and political economy, making possible new kinds of psychological intervention.
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT: 52, 2003
Looking inside oneself for the springs of such passion might make a nice case of soul-searching, but is not necessarily the best means for advancing philosophical inquiry. The papers in this volume arise from an international symposium on emotions, and provide material for a continuing dialogue among researchers with different philosophical itineraries. Each essay addresses, in varying detail, the nature of emotions, their rationality, and their relation to value. Chapters I to VIII map the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the intricate relation between consciousness and the body. Chapters IX to XI analyse the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by powerful or persistent emotions. Chapters XII to XIV explore questions of normativity and value in making sense of emotions at a personal, ethical, and political level.
Science & Technology Education Library, 2005
Routledge eBooks, 2008
albeit under different labels such as 'intuitions'. Epistemic activities can be very emotional affairs. Curiosity, doubt, hope and fear trigger everyday cognitive activities as well as academic research, which in turn are sources of surprise, frustration and joy. Less intellectual emotions may also play their part when tireless scrutinizing is driven by jealousy, or when an experiment is too disgusting to occur to any researcher. Nevertheless, emotions did not play a significant role in traditional epistemology and if they were paid any attention at all, they were mainly thought of as impairing cognition. Recently, however, epistemologists and emotion theorists have started to discuss the question of whether the epistemological standing of emotions needs to be reassessed. Are there epistemic functions that can be assigned to emotions? And which
Table of Contents Part I: Introducing the history of emotions 1. Introduction: a guide to sources for the history of emotions Katie Barclay, Sharon Crozier-De Rosa and Peter N. Stearns 2. Theories and methods in the history of emotions Thomas Dodman 3. The practice and ethics of the history of emotions Katie Barclay Part II: Sources for the history of emotions 4. Rituals, relics and religious rhetoric Piroska Nagy, Xavier Biron-Oullet and Anne-Gaëlle Weber 5. Prescriptive literature Peter N. Stearns 6. Medicine, science and psychology Rob Boddice 7. Legal records Alecia Simmonds 8. Institutional records: a comment Catharine Coleborne and Peter N. Stearns 9. Narratives of the self Marcelo J. Borges 10. Emotions in fiction Louise D’Arcens 11. Performing emotions Alan Maddox 12. Visual sources Sarah Hand Meacham 13. The material world Sarah Randles Part III: Emerging themes in the history of emotions 14. Comparative emotions Joseph Ben Prestel 15. Intersectional identities Katie Barclay and Sharon Crozier-De Rosa 16. Emotions of protest Sharon Crozier-De Rosa 17. Technology and feeling Susan J. Matt and Luke Fernandez 18. Emotions and the body Mark Neuendorf 19. Epilogue Peter N. Stearns
Emotion Researcher, 2018
This article briefly appraises the state of the art in the history of emotions, looking to its theoretical and methodological underpinnings and some of the notable scholarship in the contemporary field. The predominant focus, however, lies on the future direction of the history of emotions, based on a convergence of the humanities and neurosciences, and according to important observations about the biocultural status of human beings. While the article stops short of exhorting historians to become competent neuroscientists themselves, it does demand that historians of emotions take note of the implications of social neuroscientific research in particular, with a view to capturing the potential of the emotions to unlock the history of experience, and with a mind to unlocking the political importance of work in this area, namely, the shifting ground of what it means —how it feels— to be human. Este artículo evalúa el estado del arte en la historia de las emociones, considerando tanto sus fundamentos teóricos como metodológicos y algunos de los estudios contemporáneos más notables en este campo. Sin embargo, el enfoque predominante reside en la dirección que tomará la historia de las emociones en el futuro, con base en la convergencia de las humanidades y las neurociencias, y de acuerdo con importantes observaciones acerca del estatus biocultural de los seres humanos. Aunque este artículo no llega a exhortar a los historiadores a convertirse en neurocientíficos competentes, sí exige que los historiadores de la emociones tomen nota de las implicaciones de la investigación neurocientífica social en particular, con miras a captar el potencial de las emociones para decifrar la historia de la experiencia, y con el propósito de entender la importancia política del trabajo en esta área, a saber, el terreno cambiante de lo que significa —de lo que se siente— ser humano.
In 1941 historian Lucien Febvre challenged historians to reflect upon the emotions, stating that no historian concerned with the social life of individuals can any longer disregard their importance . Historians were quick to see, as Joanna Bourke states, that examination of the “transformations undergone by emotions within societies could provide a unique insight into everyday life .” However, the Primary problem facing historians has been how to define emotions to enable a rigorous academic study . If emotions are to have such a thing, then the historian is behoved to seek out and propose suitable methods to achieve such ends. This essay will seek to review the number of different methodological approaches that have been developed to fulfil this requirement and how such work has gleamed new historical insight. First by looking at how it has been suggested we may correctly interpret the cultural meaning of emotion from the past, from our modern vantage point. This in turn requires a review of the debates surrounding how it is proposed historical analysis of emotions be carried out, or if it can at all. Finally, exploring two fundamental methodological concepts central to the history of the emotions, by using as means of analysis the history such methods have produced, the essay will demonstrate how such studies of emotion can contribute to the wider academic practice.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2011